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Abstract
This doctoral thesis presents seven research papers in environmental and resource eco-
nomics. I study how the economic value that society attaches to nature depends on the
distribution of income or the provision of environmental goods, within or across genera-
tions. To this end, three novel environmental economic models are developed on how the
distribution affects aggregated willingness to pay for pure public environmental goods, local
environmental goods or natural capital. The analyses show that for many environmental
goods the economic value is the higher the more equal incomes or environmental good en-
dowment are distributed. For practical applications theory-based adjustment factors are
derived. These allow to estimate societal willingness to pays from secondary data or to con-
duct inequality-adjustments in cost-benefit analysis. In a series of applications  to global
biodiversity conservation, forest protection in Poland or water quality improvement in the
Baltic Sea  inequality adjustments are quantified and empirically tested. Turning to inter-
national environmental agreements, a simulation study shows that uncertainties about the
regional distribution of climate change damages can increase the stability of climate coali-
tions if transfer schemes are implemented. Finally, a case study on the deepening of the
Weser estuary highlights that accounting for environmental costs can substantially change
the results of cost-benefit analyses in transportation infrastructure planning. Overall, this
dissertation shows that the distribution of economic and natural resources within and across
generations substantially affects the economic value that society attaches to nature. I thereby
contribute to the development of economic methods that aim not only at efficiency, but also
at equity and distribution, and thus follow the vision of a sustainable development.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Dissertation bündelt sieben Forschungsarbeiten zur
Ökonomie des Natur- und Umweltschutzes. Dabei untersuche ich, wie der ökonomische Wert,
den die Gesellschaft der Natur beimisst, von der Verteilung des Einkommens oder der Aus-
stattung mit Umweltgütern abhängt. Eine solche integrierte Analyse ist angesichts zweier
großer gesellschaftlicher Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts bedeutsam: dem drama-
tischen, sich beschleunigendem Verlust von natürlichen Ökosystemen und Biodiversität ei-
nerseits, und der seit den 1980er Jahren in vielen Ländern zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen
Ungleichheit andererseits.
Dazu entwerfe ich in meiner Dissertation drei umweltökonomische Modelle zur Frage, wie
die gesellschaftliche Zahlungsbereitschaft für Natur- und Umweltschutzpolitik von der Ver-
teilung des Einkommens oder der Ausstattung mit Umweltgütern, innerhalb oder über Gene-
rationen hinweg, beeinflusst wird. Es zeigt sich, dass für viele Umweltgüter der ökonomische
Wert umso größer ist, je gleichmäßiger das Einkommen oder die Ausstattung mit Umweltgü-
tern zu einem Zeitpunkt verteilt sind. Für reine öffentliche Umweltgüter, wie Existenzwerte
der Artenvielfalt, ist der Grad der Substituierbarkeit durch menschgemachte Güter aus-
chlaggebend für den Effekt der Einkommensungleichheit. Für lokale öffentliche Güter, wie
Stadtparks oder Wälder, hängt der ökonomische Wert zudem von der Verteilung des Zugangs
zum Umweltgut und dessen Korrelation mit der Einkommensverteilung ab. Für Naturkapi-
talbewertung ist darüber hinaus die intergenerationale Verteilung, gegeben die Raten des
Naturverlustes sowie des Einkommenswachstums, entscheidend.
Mit diesen theoretischen Fundierungen entwickelt meine Dissertation modellgestützte
Methoden zur Berücksichtigung von Verteilungsaspekten in ökonomischen Analysen von Po-
litiken und Projekten mit Umweltauswirkungen zur öffentlichen Entscheidungsfindung. Ins-
besondere werden eine Reihe von Korrekturfaktoren hergeleitet, die es erlauben, monetäre
Werte für Veränderungen in der natürlichen Umwelt hinsichtlich einer intra- oder intergene-
rationalen Zielverteilung von Einkommen oder Umweltgütern anzupassen. Diese Korrektur-
faktoren eignen sich etwa zur Anwendung in öffentlichen Kosten-Nutzen Analysen, wie sie
beispielsweise im Verkehrssektor eingesetzt werden, oder sozio-ökonomische Berichtssyste-
men, wie der Umweltökonomischen Gesamtrechnung. Anhand einer Reihe von Fallbeispielen
 zum globalen Biodiversitätsschutz, Walderhaltung in Polen oder einer Wasserqualitäts-
verbesserung in der Ostsee  werden die Ungleichheitskorrekturen praktisch veranschaulicht
und Anpassungsbedarfe beziffert.
Drei empirische Forschungsarbeiten runden die Dissertation ab. Erstens erfordert eine
systematische Inwertsetzung von Leistungen der Natur in öffentlichen Entscheidungen die
Verwendung von Sekundärdaten. Dazu wird in einer länderübergreifenden Studie aller Ost-
seeanrainerstaaten statistisch nachgewiesen, dass eine Berücksichtigung von Unterschieden
in der Einkommensverteilung tatsächlich die Vorhersage gesellschaftlicher Zahlungsbereit-
schaften für Naturschutzpolitik verbessert. Zweitens ist internationale Kooperation für die
Lösung vieler Umweltprobleme notwendig. In einer Simulationsstudie wird gezeigt, dass die
gegenwärtigen Unsicherheiten über die regionale Verteilung von Kosten- und Nutzen des
ii
Klimaschutzes eine Chance für globalen Klimaschutzabkommen bieten können, wenn zwi-
schenstaatliche Ausgleichszahlungen implementiert werden. Drittens stellt sich die Frage,
ob Umweltauswirkungen überhaupt in einer ökonomisch relevanten Größenordnung im Ver-
gleich zu anderen Projektauswirkungen liegen  beispielsweise bei der Prioritätensetzung
in der Bundesverkehrswegeplanung. In einer Studie zur Vertiefung des Weserästuars wird
nachgewiesen, dass bereits die monetäre Berücksichtigung weniger Umweltfolgen zu einer
drastischen Verschlechterung der Profitabilität dieses Verkehrsprojektes führt.
Insgesamt zeigt meine Dissertation, dass die Verteilung von wirtschaftlichen und na-
türlichen Ressourcen innerhalb und zwischen den Generationen den ökonomischen Wert,
den die Gesellschaft der Natur beimisst, wesentlich beeinflusst. Es ist daher wichtig, bei
der Durchführung von ökonomischen Analysen im Kontext des Natur- und Umweltschutzes
Verteilungsaspekte zu berücksichtigen. Diese Dissertation entwickelt mehrere methodische
Vorschläge, wie dies geschehen kann. Damit leistet meine Dissertation auch einen Beitrag
zur Entwicklung volkswirtschaftlicher Methoden, die nicht nur auf Effizienz, sondern auch
auf Gerechtigkeit und Verteilung zielen, und damit dem Leitbild einer nachhaltigen Ent-
wicklung folgen. Ich hoffe, dass meine Dissertation damit etwas zur Findung gerechterer
und effizienterer gesellschaftlicher Entscheidungen in einer Welt beitragen kann, die an ihre
biophysikalischen Grenzen stößt.
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Part I
Introduction
1
1 Nature Conservation and Equity
Environmental degradation is everyone's problem, but it's especially a problem for the poor.
 Joseph E. Stiglitz (2012: 36)
At the beginning of the 21st century, societies face two fundamental challenges, among
others: First, the loss of biodiversity and many ecosystem functions is widespread and
accelerating. Second, the distribution of economic resources within societies is becoming
increasingly unequal. For policy-making aiming at both sustainability and hence distributive
justice, as well as at economic efficiency in attaining this normative goal both challenges are
interlinked. The distribution of both income and environmental goods may affect the value
a society attaches to nature, while nature conservation policies but also political inactivity
generally change the allocation of resources in society. Against this backdrop, my thesis aims
at developing and testing economic methods to understand and account for distributional
aspects in the context of nature conservation.
The mounting evidence that current economic activities are unsustainable has sparked
my personal interest in economics as a field of study a decade ago. My own research efforts,
cumulating in this thesis, are driven by a strong concern that the prevailing high rates of
biodiversity and ecosystem service losses are neither just nor efficient. Thereby, I see my
research guided by the normative vision of sustainability, understood as justice within and
across generations of human beings as well as justice towards nature (Baumgärtner and
Quaas 2010). While the concepts of intra- and intergenerational justice reflect an anthro-
pocentric notion of sustainability, assigning an instrumental value to nature, the normative
goal of justice towards nature encompasses nature conservation for its own sake, acknowl-
edging nature's intrinsic value.1
1The famous and widely accepted definition of sustainable development from the Brundlandt-Report re-
flects an anthropocentric idea of sustainability that focusses on satisfying current and future human needs
and wants: Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987: 41). In the Convention of
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The loss of biodiversity is widespread and at alarmingly high rates. Species extinction and
habitat losses have accelerated over the past four decades, while at the same time pressures
on biodiversity have continued to increase (Butchart et al. 2010). Since the beginning of
the industrial revolution human activity has altered processes in the natural environment so
fundamentally that geologist see a new epoch of earth history, the `Anthropocene' (Crutzen
2002). Human activity has already pushed the planet's biophysical system over several
critical thresholds, most pronounced being the loss of biodiversity measured by the rate
of species extinction (Rockström et al. 2009). As a consequence, many goods and services
humans derive from functioning ecosystems underpinned by biodiversity are in decline (MEA
2005). Since 2017 also public concerns about biodiversity loss gained some momentum in
several European countries (e.g. DIE ZEIT 2017a,b), fuelled by a study on substantially
declining insect abundance in German protected areas (Hallmann et al. 2017).2
Nature's contributions to human well-being are manifold, but not adequately reflected
in market prices. Many benefits people derive from nature  often referred to as ecosystem
services (MEA 2005) or nature's contributions to people (Pascual et al. 2017)  have public
good characteristics. Consequently, market prices fail to appropriately represent the eco-
nomic value of most ecosystem services (OECD 2018), and decentralised market forces tend
to create a world with evermore abundant manufactured goods but a diminishing variety
of natural life. Current regulation, in which the implicit price for many ecosystem services
is often close to zero, does not reflect that over the last decades the world has become a
place where the natural environment is no longer plentiful. As long as nature was relatively
abundant and human activity was relatively low, this might have set desired incentives for
societal development (cf. Daily et al. 2000). However, as nature is becoming relatively
scarce setting price signals that appropriately reflect trade-offs becomes vital. To top it off,
the prices of a cowboy economy" (Boulding 1966: 7) are probably the wrong prices for
the Anthropocene.3 Pricing or valuing nature needs to be done, applied and communicated
Biological Diversity adopted a few years later the states of the world also highlight nature's value indepen-
dent of humans. The very first words of the convention read [c]onscious of the intrinsic value of biological
diversity (UN 1992: 1).
2While public concerns recently got momentum, biodiversity loss gathered public attention before. For
instance, Rachel Carson's (1962) book `Silent Spring' brought concerns about the effect of pesticide use on
the natural environment to the American public and inspired the environmental movements in the 1960s and
1970s.
3In a by now seminal contribution Boulding (1966) argues that there is no longer something like a frontier
of human activity, beyond which an infinite natural environment waits. For centuries natural sources and
sinks were perceived as infinite, and the mode of a cowboy economy", in which throughput of natural
resources meant success, was reasonable. However, as sources and sinks became limited, today's economies
are closed rather than open systems. This requires a fundamental paradigm shift: in such a space ship
economy" stock maintenance rather than throughput maximization becomes crucial.
3
Introduction Nature Conservation and Equity
carefully to avoid `selling out' nature  a danger that comes along with the substitutability of
nature or weak sustainability suggested by monetary values. Despite these caveats, express-
ing nature's benefits in monetary terms can be worthwhile  as one tool among others  to
inform public decision making and policy instrument design about the opportunity costs as-
sociated with environmental consequences, or as the OECD (2018: 37) coins it [u]ncovering
the true value of goods [...] to ensure decisions contribute to improving human well-being is
a defining rational for economics analysis".
There is a range of reasons for nature conservation and people hold diverse values for
nature. These values depend on peoples preferences as well as on cultural and institutional
contexts (e.g. Pascual et al. 2017). Nature may have an intrinsic or universal value indepen-
dent of humans. Human activity towards nature might be valued by whether it is morally
good or bad, for instance by principles of an Kantian ethic, or by judging the process rather
than the outcome of a human-nature interaction. Beyond this, nature also holds instrumen-
tal values for humans. The value nature has as a means to satisfy human ends, by definition
depends on human objectives. Following the utilitarian ethic underlying modern economics,
the economic value of nature is given by its contribution to the objective of maximising
human well-being. Economic valuation thereby maps the consequences of different actions
for human well-being into a comparable unit. This allows to inform policy making that faces
trade-offs between competing uses of scarce resource, such as land or public finance. While
the right level of nature conservation and the choice of policy instruments is ultimately
up to public deliberation and the political process, figures on economic cost and benefits
might inform societal decision making. The research presented in this thesis focusses on
the benefits nature offers to humans, being conscious of non-anthropocentric values, other
ethical approaches and alternative inputs to societal decision making. Put another way, the
presented research is concerned with economic arguments for nature conservation.
Environmental economics developed as an academic field and subdisciplin of public eco-
nomics parallel to the environmental movements in the 1960 and 1970s. Up to now environ-
mental economics has mostly been concerned with the development of policy instruments to
attain efficiency or cost-effectiveness. To this end, environmental valuation aims at measur-
ing the value of environmental goods in units of market-traded consumption goods and thus
money in order to inform optimal decision-making or efficient policy instrument design, of-
ten with the aim of internalising externalities. However, policy makers and the wider public
are frequently more concerned with equity than with efficiency (c.f. Phaneuf and Requate
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2017: 716). I hope the work in this thesis ultimately contributes towards the development
of environmental economic methods that are not only concerned with efficiency, but also
with distributive justice. In this sense, this thesis adds to the emerging field of `sustain-
ability economics' (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010, Drupp 2017), by studying how the inter-
and intragenerational distribution affects the efficient allocation of resources. Beyond this
my thesis adds to various strands of economic research, in particular to environmental and
resource economics, ecological economics and public economics.
Nature degradation and environmental inequalities interplay with economic inequalities.
Over the last four decades, human-made goods and services became increasingly unequally
distributed in most parts of the world. Since 1980, there have been sharp increases in income
inequality in North America, China, India, Russia and to a moderate extend also in Europe
(Alvaredo et al. 2018). Rising economic inequalities in OECD countries (OECD 2016, Stiglitz
et al. 2010), might thereby mark the end of the postwar egalitarian regimes (Piketty 2014).
Nature degradation is deemed to be in particular a problem for the poor (Stiglitz 2013),
but economic inequalities might also be a problem for nature. Inequalities tend to erode
social cohesion and thereby adversely affect the management of public environmental goods
or common pool resources, for instance through deteriorating social capital (cf. Ostrom
2009). Societies that are more equal tend to hold a higher value and demand for nature
conservation (Stiglitz 2013), which might in turn reduce economic inequalities. Moreover,
the goods and services people derive from nature and conversely the effects of environmental
degradation are themselves potentially unevenly distributed and this might correlate with
the distribution of economic resources. For instance, in the U.S. industrial air pollution has
been found to be more unequally distributed than income (Boyce et al. 2016) and frequently
lower income households have a greater exposure to environmental pollution (Ash and Fetter
2004, Heblich et al. 2016). Also within their Strategic Plan for Biodiversity the states of the
world acknowledge the incidence of nature degradation: While the harshest impacts will
fall on the poor, [. . . ] no-one will be immune from the impacts of the loss of biodiversity
(UNEP 2010: 7).
A considerable part of this thesis is devoted to the effect of inequalities when inferring
societal values from individual values. Aggregating individual values to obtain societal val-
ues is an integral part of each environmental valuation exercise. As such environmental
valuation touches upon some of the oldest problems in economics: revealing and aggregat-
ing preferences" (Daily et al. 2000: 396). The presented research studies how inequalities
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affect societal willingness to pay (WTP) within the standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
approach, that is simply summing up all individual WTPs (OECD 2018). In this sense I
study a purely statistical effect of inequalities when aggregating WTPs, without altering
the normative decision of weighting all individuals' WTPs equally. Beyond this `aggregation
effect' of inequality on the societal value of nature there are certainly several other channels
through which inequalities affect societal values of nature, some of which are discussed in
the subsequent Chapter 2.
I believe that studying the nexus of inequality and environmental valuation is a societally
valuable endeavour. Firstly, environmental values are powerful when they inform or even
determine decision-making. In particular, environmental values (i) are applied in social cost-
benefit analysis, for instance in the transportation sector (OECD 2018); (ii) determine the
level of price instruments, for instance water prices under the European Water Framework
Directive (NDS 2013); (iii) are increasingly included when monitoring societal development,
for instance in natural capital accounting (UN et al. 2014); and (iv) can be a bases to estimate
liabilities in judicial decision making, prominent examples being the U.S. lawsuits on the
Exxon Valdez or the BP oil spill (Bishop et al. 2017). In these cases it is relevant for policy
to understand how the monetary figures depend on the prevailing distribution and to enable
the use of inequality-corrected estimates. In words of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission
on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress [w]hat we measure affects
what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted" (Stiglitz et
al. 2010: 7). Secondly, the benefits of biodiversity and their distribution are central for
the public perception and political economy of conservation policies. Public debates are
often dominated by concerns about the cost of specific environmental policies and how they
are distributed across social groups. Therefore, various actors have increasingly stressed
the (economic) benefits of nature conservation, for instance the EU Commission repeatedly
communicated the economic benefits of the Natura 2000 sites (European Commission 2013).
Beyond total numbers, it might be instructive to also understand and communicate how the
non-market benefits of biodiversity conservation are distributed.
This thesis consists of seven independent research papers,4 which are grouped in three
parts. Part I, titled Introduction, is rounded off by Chapter 2, which sets the scene and
sketches out the research program on economic inequality and environmental valuation.
Part II, titled Theory, develops three theoretical approaches on how the economic value
4Except for assigning unique numbers to figures, tables, sections, footnotes and so on, presentations in
the chapters correspond to the original research papers wherever appropriate.
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society attaches to nature is affected by the distribution of income or the provision of envi-
ronmental goods within or across generations. Chapter 3 studies how society's willingness
to pay (WTP) for public environmental goods depends on the intragenerational distribution
of income. Chapter 4 adds the dimension of environmental inequality by studying how the
distribution of environmental amenities with local public good affects societal WTP. Chap-
ter 5 extends these to the intergenerational distribution by studying how income growth
and the rate of environmental degradation affects society's WTP. Part III, titled Applica-
tions, turns to three prominent fields of environmental valuation. Chapter 6 studies whether
accounting for income inequality can improve the transfer of environmental values from a
study context to a policy context. Chapter 7 studies how uncertainty affects the distribution
of benefits and cost of climate change mitigation among world regions within a regionalized
integrated assessment framework. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a case study on how environ-
mental values could be used in environmental cost-benefit analysis to inform infrastructure
planning.
In the following I briefly present each chapter and report its publication status.5
Chapter 2, titled Economic Inequality and the Value of Nature, discusses how
economic inequality affects the value society attaches to nature. We argue that from a
sustainability perspective, economic valuation should not only seek to determine society's
willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental goods to devise an efficient allocation of scarce
resources, but should also account for distributional effects to ensure justice. Yet, we find
that how economic inequality affects the value of non-market environmental goods remains
understudied. Focussing on standard economic valuation approaches and inequality in in-
come this Chapter reviews the sparse existing literature on the nexus of inequality and val-
uation, discusses implications for environmental valuation, management and policy-making
and identifies a number of fruitful areas for future research.
In particular, we can derive some fist conclusions on the benefit incidence of nature
conservation policies. It is well known that the distributional effects of nature conservation
are determined by the income elasticity of WTP (Ebert 2003, Flores and Carson 1997,
Kriström and Riera 1996). The vast majority of existing valuation studies that report income
elasticities of WTP finds that the income elasticity of WTP is below unity. In this case the
non-market benefits of nature conservation are distributed in favour of poor households.
We conclude that encompassing assessments of the distributional effects of environmental
5The summaries of Chapters 2-8 heavily borrow from the chapters and in particular their abstracts.
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policies should consider the distribution of non-market environmental benefits.
Chapter 2 is joined work with Moritz Drupp, Stefan Baumgärtner and Martin Quaas. It
has been published in Ecological Economics (Drupp et al. 2018).
Chapter 3, titled Income Inequality and Willingness to Pay for Environmental
Public Goods, studies how the distribution of income affects the societal value of environ-
mental public goods. To this end the chapter presents a novel model, in which households
have identical preferences over a consumption good and an environmental public good rep-
resented by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function and differ in log-normally
distributed income. One key contribution of this chapter is to relate the effect of income
inequality to the substitutability of environmental goods. Subsequent chapters extent this
model framework for local public goods (Chapter 4), the management of natural capital
(Chapter 5) or test the implications for benefit transfer empirically (Chapter 6).
We show that societal willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental goods decreases (in-
creases) with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods
are substitutes (complements). Moreover, we derive theory-driven adjustment factors for
benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a
policy site. For illustration, we quantify how societal WTP for environmental public goods
depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in Sweden and
the World at large. We find for the case of global biodiversity conservation that income
inequality adjustment increases societal WTP by up to 16 percent depending on society's
preferences for equity.
Chapter 3 is joined work with Stefan Baumgärtner, Moritz Drupp, Jan Munz and Martin
Quaas. It has been published in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
(Baumgärtner et al. 2017a).
Chapter 4, titled Environmental Inequality and Economic Valuation, studies how
the joint distribution of environmental goods and income - and in particular environmental
inequality - affects the valuation of local public goods. As the majority of environmental
goods considered in non-market valuation are unevenly distributed over households, it is
crucial to extend the model developed in Chapter 3 to local public environmental goods.
Therefore, I build on and extend the pure public good model by assuming environmental
goods are provided heterogeneously among members of a society approximated by a log-
normal distribution. This enriches the analysis by the dimension of environmental inequality
and by how this interplays with the distribution of income.
8
Introduction Nature Conservation and Equity
I find that the effect of environmental inequality on societal willingness to pay (WTP)
for environmental local public goods is determined by their substitutability as well as how
their provision is correlated with income. Moreover, I show that sorting of richer house-
holds into places with higher levels of the environmental good increases (decreases) societal
WTP if and only if it is a substitute (complement) to manufactured consumption goods.
I obtain novel closed-form adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences
in the distribution of environmental local public goods. An empirical illustration for forest
preservation in Poland shows that societal WTP is up to 4 percent higher for an equal access
to forest and up to 8 percent higher for an equal distribution of both income and access to
forests.
Chapter 4 is a single-authored paper. It is accepted for presentation at BIOECON 2018.
Chapter 5, titled Inter- and Intragenerational Distribution and the Valuation
of Natural Capital, studies how the intra- and intertemporal distribution of income and
environmental scarcity affect the economic valuation of non-use environmental public goods
derived from natural capital. Therefore, we generalize the static model presented in Chap-
ter 3 to an intertemporal setting. We focus on non-use environmental services, such as the
existence value of biodiversity. We assume income to be log-normally distributed in each
period and a time-constant relative income inequality. To focus the model on valuation, we
consider exogenously given time paths of income and the environmental good, and specif-
ically study their exponential growth and decline. To allow for closed-form solutions, we
make a restrictive assumption on how the elasticity of substitution between the environmen-
tal good and consumption goods relates to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In
this model we study WTP for two different payment types (a single payment in the initial
period or constantly paid fraction of income) and for two different marginal changes to the
provision of the environmental public good (level or growth rate).
We show that societal mean WTP for natural capital decreases (increases) with in-
tragenerational income inequality if environmental goods derived from natural capital and
consumption goods are substitutes (complements). We further find that the intergenera-
tional distribution affects the intertemporal valuation of environmental goods derived from
natural capital. Specifically, societal WTP elicited as a constant payment fraction increases
with income growth for complements or the Cobb-Douglas case. However, it is possible
that WTP declines with income growth in the case of substitutes. Moreover, we show that
societal WTP increases (decreases) with the growth rate of environmental goods if and only
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if environmental goods are a substitute (complement) to manufactured goods. Finally, we
obtain closed-form adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in dy-
namic aspects between study and policy sites, such as income growth, the growth rate of the
environmental goods, and interest rates. We illustrate and quantify the effect sizes of our
results for a global case study on the intertemporal valuation of non-use environmental goods
derived from biodiversity. The application reveals that in particular the substitutability of
environmental goods and the intergenerational distribution substantially affect the societal
value of natural capital.
Chapter 5 is joined work with Moritz Drupp, Stefan Baumgärtner and Martin Quaas.
It was presented and appeared as a conference paper at SURED 2018 and WCERE 2018
(Meya et al. 2018a).
Chapter 6, titled Income Inequality and the International Transfer of Envi-
ronmental Values, studies empirically whether accounting for income inequality can im-
prove one of the most frequently used methods for non-market valuation: benefit transfer.
Specifically, we apply theory-driven, structural transfer factors developed in Chapter 3 to
systematically examine whether adjusting for income inequality affects errors made in the
international transfer of environmental values. Thereby, we draw on a multi-country valu-
ation study on water quality improvement in the Baltic Sea. We find this study to offer a
unique test-bed for our theory-driven approach as the contingent valuation study employed
the same survey instruments across countries with substantial differences in income distri-
butions for a well-defined change in environmental quality that has region-wide public good
characteristics. This multi-country valuation study thereby offers the possibility to compare
hypothetically transferred WTPs with the actual primary valuations.
We find that income inequality adjustment decreases transfer errors by more than 1.5
percentage points on average and that income inequality adjustment becomes particularly
relevant when income is more unequally distributed at the policy relative to the study site.
Even though adjustment for income inequality is of second-order compared to adjusting for
the level of mean income, our study shows that accounting for income inequality can further
improve benefit transfers and that its application is straightforward. We show that this main
finding is robust to considering a number of model variations. Finally, we show that a naive
transfer adjustment for income inequality would increase benefit transfer errors, emphasizing
the importance of employing structural theory-driven factors.
Chapter 6 is joined work with Moritz Drupp and Nick Hanley. It was presented at
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EAERE 2017, BIOECON 2017 and WCERE 2018, and a former version appeared as a Kiel
Economics Working Paper (Meya et al. 2017).
Chapter 7, titledHow Empirical Uncertainties Influence the Stability of Climate
Coalitions, focusses on another key challenge of sustainability: the inherent uncertain
future. We study the effect of parametric uncertainty on the distribution of payoffs within
international climate agreements in the Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA)
using the technique of Monte-Carlo analysis. We extend previous studies to draw a more
comprehensive picture of the effect of uncertainty on coalition stability. Firstly, we improve
the numerical representation by calibrating parametric uncertainty about abatement costs
and climate damages to evidence from meta-studies. A robust comparison of the magnitude
of effects is thereby made possible. Secondly, we consider uncertainty not only about the
level of damages but also regarding the curvature of the damages function, which reflects
their sensitivity to temperature increase.
We find that the stability likelihood of coalitions is mainly driven by uncertainty about
damages through various determinants. Firstly, stability is more affected by uncertainty
about damages compared to uncertain abatement costs, and mostly affected by uncertainty
about the interregional distribution of damages. Secondly, transfers become an important
instrument when there is uncertainty about the distribution of damages. Our scenarios
show that stability is sensitive to uncertainty when no transfers between regions are allowed,
but that the availability of transfers increases the robustness of stability under uncertainty.
Each realization of climate change damages produces distinct winners and losers within
the coalition. With transfers as an additional policy instrument, worse-off regions can be
compensated to remain in the coalition by winners that experience larger gains, i.e. adverse
effects of the realizations of uncertainty are shared within coalitions. Lastly, we present
scenarios in which uncertainty about the curvature of damages has a positive effect on
stability. A higher sensitivity of damages towards a temperature increase tends to increase
stability. Steeper damages resemble a critical threshold, which is known to improve the
incentives to cooperate.
Chapter 7 is joined work with Ulrike Kornek and Kai Lessmann. It has been published in
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (Meya et al. 2018b).
In a subsequent empirical study Klaus Eisenack and I have tested the effectiveness of a sim-
ulation game that conveys several key features of such a regionalized integrated assessment
model to a playable game interface (Meya and Eisenack 2018). Drawing on a sample of two
11
Introduction Nature Conservation and Equity
hundred students we present quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of gaming for com-
municating and teaching international climate politics using the board game KEEP COOL.
In particular, we find that well-designed climate games can facilitate experiential learning on
both difficulties and necessities of international climate cooperation and argue that effective
game design does not require climate-friendly in-game behaviour as a winning condition.
Chapter 8, titled Ecosystem Services in Infrastructure Planning, is arguably the
most applied research paper presented in this thesis. It studies whether considering environ-
mental values in social cost-benefit analysis (CBA) actually matters for the largest field of
applied CBA in Germany: federal transportation infrastructure planning. In OECD coun-
tries most investment in transportation infrastructure are subject to CBA (OECD 2018) and
transportation projects are often associated with large environmental impacts. We conduct a
case study for the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river, in which we recalculate the
project's benefit-cost ratio by integrating the monetary value of changes in different ecosys-
tem services. We find the Weser river to be a particular interesting case for several reasons:
estuaries are characterised by high levels of economic activity and ecosystem functions; the
Lower Weser deepening was the principle case to debate the no-deterioration rule of the Eu-
ropean Water Framework Directive at the European Court of Justice; and the Lower Weser
deepening is assessed to have the highest cost-benefit ratio of water infrastructure projects
within the federal transportation infrastructure plan.
We find that by integrating the values of two major ecosystem service changes, namely,
the loss of `fresh water supply for agricultural production' in the Wesermarsch region and the
loss of `habitat and gene pool protection services' in the bio-diverse river estuary, the benefit-
cost ratio drops sharply (from 26 : 1 to 2 : 1). We conclude that ecosystem service losses can
be economically substantial compared to other non-environmental project outcomes and that
integrating ecosystem services into the infrastructure planning process might substantially
alter outcomes.
Chapter 8 is joined work with Nils Droste. It has been published in the Journal of Envi-
ronmental Planning and Management (Droste and Meya 2017). An earlier German version
of this Chapter served as an expert review in the juridical process on the Lower Weser river
deepening at the Federal Administrative Court. Shortly, after this Chapter was submitted
for publication, the German federal government adopted a new transportation infrastructure
plan  the `Bundesverkehrswegeplan [BVWP] 2030'  that prioritizes infrastructure projects
until 2030. In a subsequent article, Nils Droste, Bernd Klauer and I critically reviewed the
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updated methodological guidelines for CBA and the resulting project prioritization (Meya
et al. 2016). It shows that the BVWP 2030 still insufficiently accounts for environmental
impacts of transport infrastructure projects.6 Reforms to facilitate more complete welfare
assessments could happen along two lines (Meya et al. 2016): (i) a cost-benefit analysis in
which environmental costs are included as fully as possible in monetary terms, or (ii) an up-
grading and systematic inclusion of the environmental and nature conservation assessment,
so that these also affect the project prioritization.
Overall, my thesis concludes that the distribution of economic and natural resources
within and across generations considerably affects the economic value that societies attach
to nature. It is therefore important to consider distributional aspects when carrying out
economic analyses in the context of nature conservation and environmental protection, and
this dissertation develops several methodological proposals on how this can be done. In
this way, my dissertation also contributes to the development of economic methods that
not only aim for efficiency, but also for equity, and are thus in line with the normative
vision of sustainability. I hope that, despite all the pitfalls and risks of assigning monetary
values to nature, emphasising nature's contributions to human well-being can contribute
to finding fairer and more efficient societal choices in a world that is rapidly reaching its
biophysical limits. I would be more than pleased if this dissertation, with the methods and
economic arguments for nature conservation developed here, could ultimately make a small
contribution to protecting the variety of our natural environment.
6Germany's transportation planning therefore fails to implement national commitments under the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (Achi Target 2) according to which [b]y 2020, at the latest, biodiversity
values have been integrated into national [. . . ] planning processes (UNEP 2010: 8).
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2 Economic Inequality and the Value of
Nature
Abstract: Understanding what influences the value of nature is crucial for informing envi-
ronmental policy. From a sustainability perspective, economic valuation should not only seek
to determine a society's willingness to pay for environmental goods to devise an efficient allo-
cation of scarce resources, but should also account for distributional effects to ensure justice.
Yet, how economic inequality affects the value of non-market environmental goods remains
understudied. Combining recently developed theoretical results with empirical evidence, this
Commentary shows that more equal societies have a higher valuation for environmental pub-
lic goods and that non-market benefits of environmental policy accrue over-proportionally
to poorer households. On this ground, we discuss implications for environmental valuation,
management and policy-making and identify a number of fruitful areas for future research.
We conclude that environmental valuation should explicitly account for economic inequality,
and that encompassing assessments of the distributional effects of environmental policies
must consider the distribution of non-market environmental benefits.
Keywords: distribution; environmental goods; income inequality; nature conservation; val-
uation; willingness to pay
Reference: Drupp, M.A., Meya, J.N., Baumgärtner, S. Quaas, M.F. (2018). Economic
inequality and the value of nature, Ecological Economics, 150: 340345.
This is a pre-print of an article published in Ecological Economics. The final authenticated
version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.029.
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2.1 Introduction
Appropriately representing the value of non-market environmental goods or ecosystem ser-
vices in societal decision-making poses a fundamental challenge for ecological and environ-
mental economics.7 Accordingly, approaches to value nature's contributions to people are
diverse and abound (Pascual et al. 2017). Most valuation studies follow the standard eco-
nomic approach of capturing the economic value individuals attach to environmental goods
by eliciting their willingness to pay (WTP) for the provision of environmental goods by use
of stated or revealed preference methods,8 and then summing up individual WTPs over all
members of society.9 As values for environmental goods are increasingly applied to inform
regulatory or judicial decision-making (Atkinson and Mourato 2008; Bateman et al. 2013;
Bishop et al. 2017), the step of aggregating individual values needs more thorough reflection.
Ecological Economics as a school of thought is not only oriented towards economic effi-
ciency but also aims at sustainability and thus distributive justice (Costanza 1989; Baumgärt-
ner and Quaas 2010). Therefore, the nexus of environmental valuation and economic inequal-
ity deserves particular attention. Beyond methodological concerns, it is timely to consider
these two issues intertwined, as on the one hand the loss of environmental goods is widespread
and accelerating (Butchart et al. 2010; Pimm et al. 2014; MEA 2005), and on the other
hand concerns about economic inequalities are becoming more prevalent in science, policy
and society (Stiglitz et al. 2012; Piketty 2014; OECD 2016; IMF 2017). However, with
few notable exceptions, valuation studies largely ignore issues of economic distribution, even
though it is known that the inequality of income or wealth may affect individual and societal
environmental values (Barbier et al. 2009).
To shed light on this important nexus, this Commentary discusses how economic inequal-
ity affects the value society attaches to nature. Given the sparse literature on this issue, we
7For the sake of brevity, we make no distinction between environmental goods and ecosystem services and
only refer to environmental goods. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 focus in particular on the case of environmental
public goods in fixed quantity, i.e. goods whose consumption is non-rival and non-excludable and the amount
of which is exogenous to the valuation. For example, one may think of clean air, biodiversity conservation,
or climate regulation.
8The value of a good is the increase in individual or societal well-being due to an increase in the good's
level or quality. There are different benefit or welfare measures, such as equivalent or compensating surplus
(Freeman 2003). For marginal changes and standard preferences, equivalent and compensating surplus are
identical and equal WTP. Marginal changes imply that we here consider a project that is very small in
relation to the economy; standard preferences are usually self-regarding (DellaVigna 2009) and thus omit,
for example, altruism and relative consumption concerns.
9For any Pareto efficient allocation the amount of a public good is characterized by the Lindahl-Samuelson
condition that the sum of individual WTPs within a society should equal the marginal costs of public good
provision (Samuelson 1954). Equivalently, one could take the mean WTP as found in a representative study,
and multiply it with the number of individuals in a society. We will thus often refer to `mean WTP' when
we speak about the `aggregate WTP'
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focus on standard economic valuation approaches and the case of income inequality, as it is
the most studied measure of economic inequality, and because income is typically elicited in
environmental valuation studies (in contrast to wealth). The literature provides promising
ways to account for economic inequality within standard economic approaches. Indeed, there
is a clear relationship between mean WTP and income inequality: For most empirically rel-
evant cases, a reduction in income inequality increases the value society attaches to public
environmental goods (see Section 2.2). This implies that the incidence of environmental
policies, defined as their distributional consequence across income groups, is such that non-
market environmental benefits accrue over-proportionally to poorer households. We discuss
implications of economic inequality regarding the practice of benefit transfer (Section 2.3.1),
adjustment of WTP for inequality in environmental cost-benefit analysis and its relation
to equity or distributional weights (Section 2.3.2), and the distributional consequences of
environmental policies (Section 2.3.3). Section 2.4 points towards research needs within ap-
proaches to valuing environmental goods. Overall, we conclude that it is neither necessary
nor appropriate to ignore distributional aspects in standard economic valuation approaches.
2.2 How does the distribution of income affect the valuation
of environmental goods?
In a recent contribution, Frank and Schlenker (2016: 652) conjecture that if preservation
values increase with income but at a decreasing rate, as commonly assumed, then a more
equal society will exhibit higher values for conservation. The income distribution might thus
be as important as overall economic growth". Addressing this conjecture, Baumgärtner et
al. (2017a) build on previous work by Ebert (2003), who has been the first to analyze the
incidence of non-market environmental good provision. Specifically, they use a standard
constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function that allows for varying degrees of substi-
tutability or complementarity between an environmental public good and a human-made
consumption good. A constant income elasticity of WTP that is smaller (larger) than one
implies that preservation values increase with income but at a decreasing (increasing) rate.
Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) show that if the constant income elasticity of WTP is below one
 as assumed in the conjecture by Frank and Schlenker (2016)  societies with a more equal
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distribution of income have a higher mean WTP.10 Indeed, empirically the income elasticity
of WTP appears to be below unity in almost all cases (Drupp 2018; Kriström and Riera
1996) and it is usually estimated as a constant, as it is the case for biodiversity conservation
at the global level (Jacobsen and Hanley 2009).
Figure 2.1 illustrates this result. Consider a society of two households with different
incomes: household B has a higher income, YB, than household A with income YA. WTP
increases with income, Y , but at a decreasing rate, such as depicted by the solid black
curve. Thus, the income elasticity of WTP is below unity. Now consider a reduction in
income inequality that leaves society's mean income unchanged (a Pigou-Dalton-transfer):
the income of the relatively richer household B is decreased by the amount ∆Y to Y ′B and
the income of the relatively poorer household A is increased by the same amount ∆Y to
Y ′A but still the richer household B is better off Y
′
B > Y
′
A. An income elasticity of WTP
for environmental public goods below unity implies that, with this change in the income
distribution, the increase of WTPA of the poorer household A is larger than the decrease in
WTPB of the richer household B. Thus, mean WTP in the more equal society, WTP ′, is
higher than in the more unequal society WTP , i.e. ∆WTP = WTP′ −WTP > 0. It also
follows for an income elasticity of WTP equal to unity  and only in this case  that the
distribution of income does not influence mean WTP.
In their theoretical analysis, Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) consider not only two house-
holds, but a whole distribution of incomes within a large society. Specifically, they assume
that income is distributed log-normally within society. They show that while income in-
equality is important, mean WTP for environmental public goods changes more elastically
with mean income than with income inequality except for extreme cases. Hence, the conjec-
ture of Frank and Schlenker (2016) can be qualified as follows: Income elasticities below one
imply that reductions in income inequality increase mean WTP, but changes in mean (that
is per-capita) income have a relatively stronger effect. Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) further
derive correction or transfer factors that allow controlling for the effect of income inequality
on mean WTP for environmental public goods, such as for differences in income inequality
in different societies, or between the current unequal income distribution and normatively
desired ones. We discuss three implications of these findings in the following section.
10Some environmental goods are likely to be complementary to human-made consumption goods. In this
case, the mechanism would go in the opposite direction: redistribution towards a more equal society in
income terms would imply a lower mean WTP for non-market environmental goods.
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Figure 2.1: Income inequality affects mean willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods of two
households. Compared to a more unequal distribution of income (YA, YB), with a mean WTP
(WTP), a more equal distribution of income (Y ′A, Y ′B) increases mean WTP (WTP′) for the same
mean income (∆WTP = WTP′ −WTP > 0), if the constant income elasticity of WTP is below unity.
2.3 Implications
2.3.1 Account for income inequality in value or benefit transfer
As conducting primary environmental valuation studies is time-consuming and costly, the
transfer of environmental values from a study site to a policy site (benefit transfer) has
become one of the most commonly used approaches for obtaining values for environmental
goods (Pearce et al. 2006; Richardson et al. 2015). Strictly speaking, it is only valid to
perform benefit transfer if the study and the policy site are identical in all aspects that
determine mean WTP for the environmental goods. However, in practice, benefit transfer
is applied much more widely. It is therefore crucial to control for differences in important
determinants of WTP in this process, including differences in the distribution of income.
While a number of guidelines, such as in Germany (UBA 2012), the OECD (Pearce et al.
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2006), and the UK (Defra 2007), already suggest how to account for differences in per-
capita income, accounting for income inequality has been neglected so far. Baumgärtner et
al. (2017a) derive closed-form benefit transfer factors to account for income inequality and
show that WTP adjustments can be substantial.11 Meya et al. (2017) empirically investigate
the adjustment for income inequality in benefit transfer for a multi-country valuation study.
They find that adjusting for income inequality indeed increases the accuracy of benefit
transfer considerably. These two studies suggest on theoretical and empirical grounds that
benefit transfer studies should employ a transfer factor for differences in income inequality
above and beyond controlling for differences in per-capita income. Likewise, this adjustment
for differences in income inequality is relevant for scaling up mean WTP values from single
sites or unrepresentative samples, to assess mean WTP for environmental goods of larger
areas and actual society.
2.3.2 Adjust mean WTPs for an undesired degree of income inequality
Sustainability policy has the dual objectives of allocative efficiency and distributive justice
(Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010). While pursuing efficiency may require a monetary valuation
of non-market environmental goods, we have shown in the previous section that economic
distribution influences monetary valuation in turn. Environmental valuation and the distri-
bution of income are thus intertwined and need to be studied simultaneously. For instance,
if the societally desired degree of income inequality is different from the actual distribution,
and if one pursues these dual objectives, one must do two things: First, redistribute income
for distributive justice, and, second, determine the Pareto-efficient amount of a public envi-
ronmental good by adjusting the aggregate WTP that has been empirically estimated based
on the current  unjust  income distribution. For the second task, one can employ the
transfer factors derived for value transfer (see footnote 6) to adjust mean WTP estimates by
using the societally desired level of income inequality instead of the existing one and then use
the inequality-adjusted mean WTP estimates for social cost-benefit-analysis (Baumgärtner
et al. 2017a). Such an adjustment can be substantial: Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) show that
for the case of global mean WTP for biodiversity conservation it might lead to an increase
in mean WTP of up to 16 percent for the extreme case when income inequality is undesired.
11The transfer factor to adjust mean WTPs for differences in income inequality between a policy and a
study site, with WTP
policy
= TCV ×WTPstudy, is TCV(CVpolicyY ,CVstudyY ) =
(
1+CV
policy
Y
2
1+CV
study
Y
2
)η(η−1)/2
, where
CVpolicyY (CV
study
Y ) is the coefficient of variation of income at the policy (study) site, which is computed as
the standard deviation divided by the mean of income, and η is the income elasticity of WTP.
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This aggregate WTP inequality adjustment approach can be seen as an operationaliza-
tion of the more general approach to account for distributional effects by using distributional
or equity weights (Mäler 1974; Adler 2016; Fleurbaey and Abi-Rafeh 2016), which is recom-
mended in the UK Greenbook (HMT 2011) and has been applied in climate change policy
appraisal (e.g. Anthoff et al. 2009). In standard cost-benefit-analysis all benefits and costs
are weighted equally regardless to whom they accrue. In contrast, the distributional weights
approach increases the relative importance of costs and benefits accruing to lower income
households through the introduction of distributional weights. In general, distributional
weights have to be determined for each household by means of maximizing a social welfare
function subject to economic and environmental constraints, which is a very challenging task.
For a decision situation as considered here  when households differ only in their incomes,
incomes are log-normally distributed, and the income elasticity of WTP is constant  the
decision-maker can simply use the aggregate WTP inequality adjustment described above.
The result is the same, provided the welfare-maximizing distribution of incomes is the just
(target) distribution considered here. Both the use of equity weights and the aggregate WTP
inequality adjustment lead to the same condition for the Pareto-efficient amount of the pub-
lic environmental good. For illustration, consider the case of an income elasticity of WTP
smaller than unity, i.e. when poorer households have a disproportionately high individual
WTP. If society's targeted level of income inequality is more equal than it is currently, the
inequality adjustment approach as described above would increase mean WTP. Likewise,
when employing distributional weights, those poorer households with a disproportionately
high individual WTP would receive a higher weight; the effect on aggregate WTP would
be equivalent under the conditions described above. Yet, while the equity weighting litera-
ture assigns higher weights to some of the members of society in the measurement of total
welfare, which may be seen as taking a strong normative stance, the mean WTP inequality
adjustment builds on a descriptive relationship between mean WTP and its determinants.
Furthermore, as it requires less information, the aggregate WTP inequality adjustment ap-
proach may be an easier to implement means of dealing with the problem that distributional
weights seek to address.
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2.3.3 Consider the incidence of non-market benefits from environmental
policies
Public discourse and decision-making is often concerned with the distributional consequences
(incidence) of environmental policies. Most studies focus on the incidence of different in-
struments for pollution control in environmental policy, often showing regressive effects of
price instruments, like fuel and electricity taxes, or regulatory standards (Fullerton and
Muehlegger 2017). This means that these policies put a disproportionate burden on poorer
households (Bento 2013; Fullerton 2011).12 These findings have motivated the design of pol-
icy instruments with neutral or progressive distributional effects, such as through revenue
recycling (Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha 2014; Klenert et al. 2016). However, with few
exceptions (e.g. Ebert 2003; Heal and Kriström 2007; Kriström and Riera 1996), this litera-
ture has so far ignored the distribution of non-market benefits resulting from environmental
policies.
In order to gain an encompassing picture of how the design of environmental policies
affects economic distribution it is important to not just look at the distribution of market
costs of these policies, but to also consider the distribution of their non-market benefits.
Indeed, our discussion on how the distribution of income affects mean WTP for environ-
mental goods can contribute to understanding the distributional effects of environmental
policy and environmental degradation. Thereby, the distributional effects of environmental
policies are determined by the income elasticity of WTP (Ebert 2003; Flores and Carson
1997; Kriström and Riera 1996). If, as in Figure 2.1, societies with a more equal distribution
of income exhibit a higher mean WTP than more unequal societies, the non-market benefits
of environmental policies are distributed regressively, and thus in contrast to most of their
market-based costs, accrue in favor of poorer households. Yet, by the same token, losses of
non-market benefits due to environmental degradation also fall disproportionately on poorer
households. Thus, it is crucial to consider the overall distributional effect of both market
and non-market net benefits. In particular, even if net market benefits occur disproportion-
ately in favor of higher income groups,13 the overall distributional effect may be neutral, or
12There are only few studies that find that environmental policies do not put a disproportionate burden
on poorer households. For example, Bento et al. (2015) find that the benefits of air quality improvements
in the United States from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments accrued disproportionately to lower-income
households.
13For example, because market-based environmental policies, such as fuel taxes, are frequently found to
bring disproportionate costs to poorer households (Frondel et al. 2015), or because the monetary benefits
associated with environmental policies, such as subsidies (renewable energy support, or payment for envi-
ronmental goods), require a house or land ownership and thus disproportionately benefit richer households
(e.g. Haan and Simmler 2018).
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might even favor poorer households, if the pro-poor distribution of non-market net benefits
is substantial enough.
2.4 Perspectives for further research
While our discussion of the sparse existing literature has already highlighted the importance
of considering economic distribution for environmental valuation, further research is needed
to derive more robust conclusions and to broaden the scope of the analysis. In the following,
we briefly sketch a number of pertinent open research areas.
First, more elaborate theories of environmental valuation and economic distribution are
required that capture heterogeneous preferences and environmental goods that are not pure
public goods. For example, different individuals may put different utility weights on envi-
ronmental goods, or may differ in their willingness to substitute environmental goods with
consumption goods. Of particular interest with regard to impure public goods may be the
analysis of a coupled spatial distribution of environmental goods and housing, since hedonic
pricing is a popular valuation method for local public goods. Relatedly, in the sectors of
tourism and agriculture, the provisioning of local public environmental goods largely drives
private market incomes. Thus, the analysis should also depart from the assumption of a
marginal project (see Dietz and Hepburn (2013) for an analysis of non-marginal projects).
Particularly in those cases, valuation of environmental goods and distribution of incomes
should be studied simultaneously. For instance, Heblich et al. (2017) and Lee and Lin
(2017) show that the spatial distribution of environmental amenities shapes the spatial dis-
tribution of income in cities over time, with wealthier households living where environmental
quality is high. Further research is needed to understand how neighborhood-sorting resulting
from the distribution of environmental goods affects the valuations of theses environmental
goods in turn. It may be that accounting for sorting increases the societal value of increasing
environmental local public goods as households with stronger preferences for environmen-
tal goods and/or higher income are likely to locate themselves such as to consume higher
levels of the environmental good. We expect that spatial sorting and its relation to income
inequality depends on whether the environmental good is a substitute or complement to
consumption goods.
Second, there is a need to study different concepts of economic resources that may be
distributed unequally. For example, besides simple annual income, one may consider other
measures of income, such as lifetime income or wealth (Heal and Kriström 2007; Teixidó
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and Verde 2017). Since sustainability concerns not only the distribution of resources within
a generation at a given point in time, but, in particular, also questions of intergenerational
justice, one should study the effect of relevant economic inequalities, such as inequalities
in wealth or income from capital, on environmental values in a dynamic context.14 Such a
dynamic theory of environmental valuation and economic distribution should pay particular
attention to a project's time horizon, as the economic distribution might change in the
meantime (see Section 2.3.2). In such a case, not only the economic distribution at the start
of the project will matter, but also its development over time. How to account for this in
measures of equivalent or compensating variation is an open question.
Third, further research should also depart from the standard assumption of atomistic,
self-regarding economic agents and take into account behavioral effects as pertaining to
inequality and environmental valuation, such as through other-regarding preferences. This
may include, for example, investigating both theoretically and experimentally the roles of
inequality aversion or relative consumption concerns (Broberg 2014; Johansson-Stenman and
Konow 2010; Johannsson-Stenman and Sterner 2015). Previous research has shown that
the incidence and thus the distributional impacts of environmental policies may influence
individual valuation of nature if people have other-regarding preferences (Cai et al. 2010).
Another question for further research is how other-regarding preferences would impact the
income elasticity of WTP. Considering behavioral effects may reinforce the importance of
income inequality for the value a society attaches to environmental goods.
Fourth, since sustainability economics has to deal with multiple market and government
failures, it is not unreasonable to assume that much of environmental policy and actual
environmental valuation are conducted in second-best settings. Thus, due to constraints it
may not be possible to achieve the dual objectives of allocative efficiency and distributive
justice. For example, it could be that there are certain barriers to implementing a desired
degree of income inequality.15 Future research should examine if and how mean WTP should
be adjusted for income inequalities in such circumstances.
Fifth, it is an open question how the distribution of economic resources affects the value
14This relates to the literature on discounting and economic inequality (e.g. Gollier 2015; Emmerling et
al. 2017; Emmerling 2017), as well as on dual discounting and the relative price of environmental goods
(Baumgärtner et al. 2015; Drupp 2018; Drupp and Hänsel 2018; Gollier 2010; Hoel and Sterner 2007; Sterner
and Persson 2008; Traeger 2011; Weikard and Zhu 2005).
15For example, it may be that actual redistribution of income is lower than what society's inequality
aversion would suggest to incentivize richer households to exert more work effort, or that distributional
effects resulting from environmental policies are in practice not offset by changes to the general redistribution
scheme. A number of studies accordingly model distinct social planners for environmental management and
general tax policy (e.g. Barrage 2016).
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of environmental goods as elicited through alternative (that is: non welfare-economic) val-
uation approaches, such as deliberative monetary valuation, democratic valuation or other
participatory valuation methods (e.g. Lienhoop et al. 2015; Schläpfer 2016; Spash 2007).
Sixth, one may consider the effect on the valuation and value of environmental goods of
an unequal distribution in other `resources' than economic ones, such as power and political
influence (Boyce 1994; Boyce et al. 1999). Also, one should investigate how inequality
in power and political influence affects the design of institutions, which can be viewed as
determining the outcome of environmental valuation (Vatn 2009). While economic valuation
may form a starting point for such analyses, such approaches will have to draw on other
research methods as well.
Seventh, while we have mainly discussed the implication of economic distribution on en-
vironmental valuation, a comprehensive reflection on the interplay between the two should
study whether environmental valuation might in turn affect the economic distribution (Cor-
bera 2015; Matulis 2014, 2015).
Finally, there is a need for better data on the relationship between economic distribu-
tion and environmental valuation. In particular, better estimates of income elasticities of
WTP for environmental goods are required to more robustly investigate the finding that the
benefits of environmental goods are distributed in favor of poorer households and qualify
the conditions under which this is indeed the case. For example, it may well be that the
income elasticity of WTP varies across goods. Poorer households may value environmental
goods related to local recreation disproportionately, while richer households may value the
preservation of certain species or cultural ecosystem services disproportionately. This ne-
cessitates more and better data on income elasticities across different goods and services as
well as across countries. Further, it requires systematic studies that assess to what degree
income effects captured in environmental valuation studies are indeed informative of income
elasticities of WTP for environmental goods or relate to confounding factors such as warm
glow and strategic behavior etc. (e.g. List 2017; Schläpfer 2008). Lastly, this calls for more
theoretical and empirical work that allows judging whether income elasticities of WTP for
environmental goods are constant or whether they systematically vary with income.16
16There is some evidence that income elasticities are non-constant (Barbier et al. 2017). This could be
due to a range of factors not captured in standard models, such as subsistence consumption (Baumgärtner
et al. 2017b; Drupp 2018).
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2.5 Conclusions
How to value the non-market benefits of environmental policies is a crucial yet contested
research endeavor. The challenge of sustainability sets further requirements on this endeavor
in demanding that distributional considerations are adequately addressed. We have high-
lighted that the distribution of economic resources within society, notably income inequality,
affects the value society attaches to public environmental goods. We find that it is crucial
to consider distributional impacts not only because this is called for from a sustainabil-
ity economics perspective, but because it carries important implications for environmental
valuation and management already from a standard economics perspective concerned with
allocative efficiency.
We have argued that while a lot more research is needed, some first clear findings emerge
on how the distribution of income affects the societal value of nature. If individual WTP
increases less (more) than proportionally with income, a reduction in income inequality will
lead to an increase (decrease) of the mean and aggregate WTP a society attaches to public
environmental goods. Given this relationship between mean WTP and income inequality,
already standard valuation approaches can and should explicitly account for economic dis-
tribution. In particular, three important implications for environmental valuation, policy
and management emerge: First, as the distribution of income affects mean WTP, studies
that transfer environmental values from some population to another  may it be in inter-
national benefit transfer or for scaling-up environmental values from an unrepresentative
sub-population  should account for how income inequality affects aggregate WTP. Second,
given the dual objective of distributive justice and allocative efficiency in sustainability eco-
nomics, existing aggregate WTP estimates should be adjusted according to the targeted
degree of income inequality when informing regulatory bodies using cost-benefit analysis.
This would likely result in an increase of the estimated benefits society derives from the
public-good type services provided by nature. Third, an encompassing assessment of distri-
butional effects of environmental policies has to account not only for direct monetary cost and
benefits, but also for the distribution of non-market benefits of environmental goods. While
the market-based costs of environmental policies are often deemed to favor higher-income
households, our discussion has shown that non-market benefits might indeed disproportion-
ately favor poorer households. As distributional implications are often used as an argument
against more stringent environmental policies, it is particularly crucial to consider this pro-
poor distribution of non-market benefits, which may provide a further argument for more
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stringent environmental policies.
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3 Income Inequality and Willingness to Pay
for Environmental Public Goods
Abstract: We study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income
inequality in particular, affects social willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public
goods. We find that social WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with in-
come inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes
(complements). We derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in
income distributions between a study site and a policy site. For illustration, we quantify how
social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions
for empirical case studies in Sweden and the World at large. We find that the adjustment
for income inequality can be substantial.
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3.1 Introduction
Estimation of willingness to pay (WTP) for non-market-traded environmental goods has
become a major subfield of environmental economics, with growing importance for environ-
mental management (Bateman et al. 2011, Smith 2000). Lately, this development has been
particularly spurred by the emergence and now wide-spread use of benefit transfer (Kaul et
al. 2013), that is, the transfer of benefit estimates for an environmental good from a study
site to another context where this information is to be used for environmental management
(policy site). Such benefit transfer requires knowledge of how the benefits provided by
environmental goods depend on the context's characteristics, including environmental and
socio-economic variables. With this information one can control for differences in the level
of these variables when doing benefit transfer.
One important determinant of the benefits of environmental goods, as measured by the
WTP for these goods, is the level of income. As individual income determines individual
WTP, mean income in a society determines social WTP, that is, the sum of individual
WTPs. But social WTP is also determined by the (in)equality of the distribution of income
among individual members of society. While there has been substantial research on how
the level of (individual or societal mean) income influences (individual or social) WTP for
environmental goods, the similarly relevant question of how income inequality within society
influences social WTP for environmental goods has hardly been examined.
Here, we study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income
inequality in particular, affects social WTP for environmental public goods. We do this in
some generality based on a theoretical model, exploring how potential effects depend on the
parameters of the income distribution and of individual utility. We also provide an empirical
estimate of the size of these effects.
The question of how WTP for environmental goods depends on income has been studied,
so far, mainly in terms of the income elasticity of WTP. Ebert (2003), following up on pre-
vious work by Aaron and McGuire (1970), Kovenock and Sadka (1981), Kriström and Riera
(1996), Flores and Carson (1997), has scrutinized the incidence of environmental benefits.
Assuming a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function, he has shown that the
income elasticity of WTP for an environmental public good has an inverse relationship to
the elasticity of substitution between a composite consumption good and the environmental
good in question. Hence, the income elasticity of WTP is smaller (greater) than unity if and
only if the environmental good and consumption good are substitutes (complements).
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Empirical evidence, as gathered mainly from contingent valuation studies, suggests that
the income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods is generally below unity  usually
between 0.1 and 0.6.17 It thus follows from Ebert's (2003) result that the environmental
goods assessed in these studies are substitutes to private consumption goods.
In benefit transfer studies, it is current practice to adjust WTP-estimates for differences in
mean income between the study site and the policy site (Ready and Navrud 2006, Czajkowski
and Scasny 2010). But the effects of income inequality are unaccounted for, so far. Indeed,
we are not aware of studies on how the distribution of income among members of society, and
in particular income inequality, affects WTP for environmental goods. Here, we close this
gap. From our theoretical model, we derive adjustment factors to adjust WTP-estimates
for differences not only in mean income but also in income inequality. We also provide an
empirical quantification of the size of these factors, to demonstrate that these adjustments
may be substantial.
For our theoretical analysis of this issue, we employ a specification of the model of Ebert
(2003), where a continuum of individual households have identical self-regarding preferences
over a market-traded private consumption good and a non-market-traded pure public envi-
ronmental good, represented by a CES utility function.18 While the CES utility function is
a particular functional representation of preferences, and thus of limited generality, it is an
appropriate basis for our analysis for the following reasons: (1) Benefit transfer is typically
based on a constant income elasticity of WTP. Our approach of deriving transfer factors
from the CES utility specification yields results that are consistent with this practice. They
are thus directly relevant for environmental management. (2) The CES specification is the
simplest, yet rich-enough functional form that allows studying substitutability. (3) Quali-
tatively, our key result on how income inequality affects the mean WTP for environmental
public goods holds more generally, beyond the CES functional specification. We demonstrate
this in Appendix 3.7.12.
We extend Ebert's (2003) model by assuming that an exogenously given amount of total
income is log-normally distributed over households,19 and consider two alternative measures
17See e.g. Kriström and Riera (1996), Söderqvist and Scharin (2000), Hammitt et al. (2001), Barton (2002),
Ready et al. (2002), Horowitz and McConnell (2003), Hökby and Söderqvist (2003), Liu and Stern (2008),
Scandizzo and Ventura (2008), Jacobsen and Hanley (2009), Khan (2009), Broberg (2010), Pek et al. (2010),
Chiabai et al. (2011), Wang et al. (2013), Lindhjem and Tuan (2012).
18Hence, we focus on statistical effects of income inequality across a population of self-regarding individuals,
and do not study the potential effect of other-regarding individual preferences or behavior.
19Also this particular functional representation of unequal distribution may be generalized to any mean
preserving spread of the income distribution (see Appendix 3.7.12).
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of income inequality: the coefficient of variation and the standard deviation of income. These
correspond to relative and absolute notions of inequality, respectively.20
We find that (i) social WTP for the environmental good increases with mean income;
(ii) social WTP for the environmental good decreases (increases) with income inequality if
and only if the environmental good and the manufactured good are substitutes (comple-
ments); (iii) the effect of income inequality on social WTP is the stronger, the higher the
mean income; (iv) social WTP for the environmental good changes more elastically with
mean household income than with income inequality, except for extreme cases of parameter
values. We also derive transfer factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income
distributions between a study site and a policy site.
To illustrate our theoretical results, and to estimate the potential size of these effects,
we quantify how social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective
income distribution for two empirical case studies: (1) an environmental good of cultural
importance, the existence of large predator species, in Sweden (from Broberg 2010), and (2)
biodiversity conservation at the global scale (from the meta-study of Jacobsen and Hanley
2009).
As for the quantitative size of effects, a benefit transfer for biodiversity conservation
from the global study with high income inequality to the case context of Sweden, a country
known for its low income inequality, would entail a WTP correction for income inequality
of 11 percent. We further find that in a hypothetical world of a completely equal income
distribution WTP for global biodiversity conservation would be 16 percent higher than it
actually is under the current unequal global income distribution.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 3.2, and the results
of the model analysis in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we illustrate these results with empirical
data. In Section 3.5, we discuss our main assumptions. Section 3.6 concludes. All formal
proofs are contained in the Appendix.
20While the coefficient of variation satisfies all standard requirements for inequality measures (weak prin-
ciple of transfers, decomposability, income scale and population size independence), the standard deviation
is an absolute measure and thus increases with the level of income (Cowell 2009: 72). We sketch results
for the Gini coefficient, which is another popular measure of income inequality, only briefly. For, the Gini
coefficient it does not satisfy the criterion of decomposability (cf. Cowell 2009: 64) and, under a log-normal
income distribution, the Gini coefficient is completely determined by the standard deviation of income (cf.
Cowell 2009: 153) and therefore yields fully equivalent results.
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3.2 Model
We employ the model of Ebert (2003) with a specific utility function and a specific dis-
tribution of income. There is a population of households whose well-being is determined
by consumption of two goods  a market-traded private consumption good, X, and a non-
market-traded pure public (i.e. non-rival and non-excludable) environmental good, E. Both
goods may be composites, and their amounts are continuously scalable with X,E ≥ 0.
All households have identical preferences over these two goods, represented by the utility
function
U(X,E) =
(
αX
θ−1
θ + (1− α)E θ−1θ
) θ
θ−1
, (3.1)
where θ with 0 < θ < +∞ is the constant elasticity of substitution between the two goods,
and 0 < α < 1. The utility function (3.1) is strictly quasi-concave, preferences are homoth-
etic, and both the private good and the environmental public good are normal goods. An
individual household's income is exogenously given and denoted by Y . The distribution of
income over households is described by a continuous density function f(Y ) over non-negative
incomes. While the consumption good is traded on a market at given price p > 0, consump-
tion of the environmental good is fixed at an exogenously given level E > 0 which is the same
for all households.21 Each household maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint
and fixed level of the environmental good:22
max
X,E
U(X,E) s.t. pX = Y and E fixed . (3.2)
We follow Aaron and McGuire (1970) and Ebert (2003) in defining the individual income-
equivalent total WTP for the environmental good at level E as the willingness to pay w per
unit (Lindahl price) times the total number E of units:
WTP = wE . (3.3)
The Lindahl price w of the environmental good is implicitly defined as the virtual price
that yields the environmental good level E as the ordinary (unconditional) Marshallian
21Denoting by E both the variable `environmental-good-consumption' and the fixed level at which the
environmental good is actually provided should not cause any confusion, as in our analysis the amount of
the environmental good is never variable but fixed throughout.
22In this `equal-preference'-model, which is standard in public economics (Buchanan 1964), households have
identical preferences and differ only in terms of income, i.e. differences in the evaluation of the environmental
good between rich and poor households are caused by differences in income, not by differences in preferences.
44
Theory Income Inequality and Willingness to Pay
demand in the hypothetical choice problem where the environmental good is considered
a private market good. In this hypothetical choice problem, the environmental good can
be individually chosen and must be paid for at the Lindahl price, and the household has
an income of Y plus the expenditures on E (Neary and Roberts 1980, Hanemann 1991:
Equation 11, Flores and Carson 1997: 289). With utility function (3.1), a household's total
WTP for the environmental good at level E then depends on income Y and the other model
parameters as follows (see Appendix 3.7.1):
WTP(Y ) = κY η with κ =
1− α
α
(pE)
θ−1
θ , η =
1
θ
, (3.4)
where η is the (constant) income elasticity of WTP and κ is a factor that depends on all
parameters of the model and on the quantity of the environmental public good.
One interesting and important implication of the underlying constant-elasticity-of-substi-
tution utility function is that the income elasticity of WTP, η, is simply the inverse of the
elasticity of substitution between the consumption good and the environmental good, θ.
This result, which has already been obtained by Kovenock and Sadka (1981) and Ebert
(2003: 452453), merits some attention. It means that the income elasticity of WTP is
larger than one, η > 1, if and only if the consumption good and the environmental public
good are complements, θ < 1. The income elasticity of WTP is equal to one in the Cobb-
Douglas case, θ = 1; and the income elasticity of WTP is smaller than one, η < 1, if and
only if the private and the public good are substitutes, θ > 1. It follows that WTP for
the environmental good rises progressively (proportionally, regressively) with income if and
only if the consumption good and the environmental good are complements (Cobb-Douglas,
substitutes).23
While all households have identical preferences, represented by utility function (3.1),
income Y is distributed unevenly over households. In particular, we assume that Y is log-
normally distributed with mean µY and standard deviation σY . For instance, the world
income distribution, as well as the income distribution in many countries, can be described
by a log-normal distribution as a good approximation (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009).
The log-normal distribution is handsome for analytical purposes too, as it is completely
determined by its first two statistical moments, µY and σY .24
23WTP for the environmental good is said to rise progressively (proportionally, regressively) with income
Y if and only if d(WTP (Y )/Y )/dY > (=, <) 0.
24Strictly speaking, the first two statistical moments of the log-normal distribution are m and s. These
two biuniquely determine µY and σY (see Equations 3.37 and 3.38 in Appendix 3.7.2).
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In this society, the mean (over households) total WTP for the environmental good at
level E, µWTP, is given by
µWTP(µY , σY ) =
∞∫
0
fln(Y ;µY , σY )WTP(Y ) dY , (3.5)
where fln(Y ;µY , σY ) is the density function of the log-normal distribution of Y with mean
µY and standard deviation σY , and WTP(Y ) is given by Equation (3.4). This yields mean
WTP as a function of mean income and absolute income inequality (see Appendix 3.7.2),
µWTP(µY , σY ) = κµ
1/θ
Y
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
, (3.6)
or, equivalently, mean WTP as a function of mean income and relative income inequality,
µWTP(µY ,CVY ) = κµ
1/θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 , (3.7)
where θ is the constant elasticity of substitution between the environmental public good and
the private consumption good (cf. utility function 3.1), κ > 0 is as defined in Equation (3.4),
and CVY := σY /µY is the coefficient of variation of income.25 While the standard deviation
σY measures the width of the income distribution in monetary units, the coefficient of
variation CVY , i.e. the relative standard deviation of income, measures the width of the
income distribution as a percentage of mean income. Both measures of income inequality
seem plausible. First, one could simply take the standard deviation σY as a measure of
income inequality. This is in line with an idea that absolute income inequality matters, that
is, inequality as a mean absolute deviation (in monetary units) from the mean. Second, one
could take the coefficient of variation CVY as a measure of income inequality. This is in line
with an idea that relative income inequality matters, that is, inequality as measured as a
mean relative deviation (as a percentage) from the mean income.
In our analytical framework, changes in µY and σY (or CVY ) can be interpreted as
outcomes of some stylized, not explicitly modelled policies for the growth and redistribution,
25Denoting both functions, (3.6) and (3.7), by µWTP saves notation but is, strictly speaking, an abuse of
notation, as they depend on different variables. However, this should not cause any confusion, as we will
always specify both arguments of the function. So, the reader will always know whether we speak of mean
WTP as a function of mean income and standard deviation of income, or as a function of mean income and
coefficient of variation of income.
46
Theory Income Inequality and Willingness to Pay
respectively, of income.26
Since the social WTP is the sum of individual WTPs, which is the mean WTP multiplied
by the (constant) number of households, the mean WTP studied here (Equation 3.6 or 3.7)
can be identified with the social WTP.
3.3 Results of model analysis
In this section, we study how the mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP
(Equation 3.6 and 3.7), changes if mean income, µY , and/or income inequality change. We
do this for both relative and absolute measures of income inequality, coefficient of variation
CVY and standard deviation σY , in parallel. For each result, we start with the coefficient of
variation as this yields simpler and more intuitive results.
3.3.1 How does mean WTP for the environmental public good change if
mean income changes?
Proposition 3.1 (relative income inequality)
Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP (Equation 3.7), increases with mean
household income, µY :
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ µY
> 0 . (3.8)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.3.
Proposition 3.2 (absolute income inequality)
1. Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP (Equation 3.6), increases with
mean income, µY , at all levels of mean income if the environmental public good and
the private consumption good are substitutes or weak complements:
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY
> 0 if θ ≥ 1/2 ; (3.9)
2. Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP, decreases (increases) with mean
income if the environmental public good and the private consumption good are strong
26We thereby abstract from restrictions to redistribution schemes that actual policy may face (e.g. Requate
and Lange 2000), as a main application of our results  the theory and practice of benefit transfer  concerns
cross-country comparisons and adjustments.
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complements, θ < 1/2, and mean income µY is smaller (greater) than
√
1/θ−2σY :
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY
Q 0 for µY Q
√
1/θ−2σY if θ < 1/2 . (3.10)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
Proposition 3.1 (for WTP expressed as a function of relative income inequality, Equa-
tion 3.7) states that the influence of mean household income on mean WTP is unambiguous
and straightforward: mean WTP for the environmental public good increases with mean
income. This reflects the fact that both the private consumption good and the environmen-
tal public good are normal goods for all households in the population, and that, therefore,
individual WTP for the environmental public good increases with individual income. Our
proposition transfers this well known result about individual WTP to the context of a soci-
ety with unequally distributed income, where it becomes a statement about mean variable
values.
Proposition 3.2 (for WTP expressed as a function of absolute income inequality, Equa-
tion 3.6) states that, unless the environmental public good and consumption good are strong
complements, the influence of mean household income on mean WTP is unambiguous and
straightforward: mean WTP for the environmental public good increases with mean income.
A difference to the corresponding Proposition 3.1 for relative income inequality is that, keep-
ing absolute income inequality fixed, mean WTP may decrease as mean income increases
 namely if the two goods are strong complements, θ < 1/2, and mean income is smaller
than the threshold value of
√
1/θ − 2σY . This threshold value increases with the degree of
complementarity (it goes to +∞ for θ → 0) and with absolute income inequality, σY .
3.3.2 How does income inequality affect mean WTP for the environmen-
tal public good?
We now come to our key result on how income inequality affects mean WTP for the envi-
ronmental public good.
Proposition 3.3 (relative income inequality)
1. Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP (Equation 3.7), decreases (in-
creases) with relative income inequality, CVY , if and only if the environmental public
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good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1 . (3.11)
2. ∂µWTP/∂CVY decreases (increases) with mean income, if and only if the environmental
public good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂2 µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ µY ∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1 . (3.12)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.5.
Proposition 3.4 (absolute income inequality)
1. Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP (Equation 3.6), decreases (in-
creases) with absolute income inequality, σY , if and only if the environmental public
good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ σY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1 . (3.13)
2. (a) ∂µWTP/∂σY does not change with mean income, µY , at all if and only if θ = 1/2
or θ = 1:
∂ µ2WTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY ∂ σY
= 0 for all µY > 0 if and only if θ = 1/2 or θ = 1 . (3.14)
(b) ∂µWTP/∂σY decreases with mean income, µY , for µY < σY
√
1/θ and increases
with mean income, µY , for µY > σY
√
1/θ, if and only if the environmental public
good and the private consumption good are substitutes or strong complements:
∂ µ2WTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY ∂ σY
Q 0 for µY Q
√
1/θ σY if and only if θ < 1/2 or θ > 1 .
(3.15)
(c) ∂µWTP/∂σY increases with mean income, µY , for µY < σY
√
1/θ and decreases
with mean income, µY , for µY > σY
√
1/θ, if and only if the environmental public
good and the private consumption good are weak complements:
∂ µ2WTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY ∂ σY
R 0 for µY Q
√
1/θ σY if and only if 1/2 < θ < 1 . (3.16)
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Proof. See Appendix 3.7.6.
Statement 1 of Proposition 3.3 (for WTP expressed as a function of relative income
inequality, Equation 3.7) shows that the influence of relative income inequality on meanWTP
crucially depends on whether the environmental public good and the private consumption
good are substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes, a more equal distribution of
income increases mean WTP. If they are complements, in contrast, a more equal distribution
of income decreases mean WTP.
The rationale behind this result is as follows. The two goods being substitutes is equiva-
lent to an income elasticity of WTP below unity (cf. Equation 3.4). Then, households with
lower incomes are willing to pay relatively more of their income for the environmental public
good than are households with higher income. This means that if a household experiences an
increase (decrease) in income, their WTP increases (decreases) only by less than his income.
In addition, a more equal income distribution means that some high-income households have
a lower income, while some low-income household have a correspondingly higher income, and
mean income remains unchanged. Taking these two effects together explains the result, as
shifting income from relatively high income levels to relatively lower levels reduces the WTP
of the higher income levels, and it also increases the WTP of lower incomes, and the sum
of WTP increases at low-income households is larger than the sum of WTP reductions at
high-income households.
The size of this effect depends on the level of mean income in the society (Statement 2
of the proposition). In particular, in the case of substitutes the negative effect of relative
income inequality on mean WTP is aggravated by the mean income level: its negative effect
is increased in absolute magnitude if mean income is higher.
Statement 1 of Proposition 3.4 (for WTP expressed as a function of absolute income in-
equality, Equation 3.6) is exactly as in the case of relative income inequality (Proposition 3.3,
Statement 1). In contrast, Statement 2 now contains an additional qualification: the effect
of income inequality on social WTP not only depends on the degree of substitutability but
also on the level of mean income.
Our key result on how income inequality affects mean WTP is more general than stated
in Proposition 3.3 and 3.4. We assumed a particular functional specification of the util-
ity function (CES-function with substitution parameter θ, Equation 3.1) and of the income
distribution (log-normal distribution with mean µY and standard deviation σY ), for ease
of exposition and direct applicability in empirical cases (Section 3.4). Yet, a similar result
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can be casted in more general terms for any concave utility function and any regular dis-
tribution function as long as the WTP function is globally concave or globally convex (see
Appendix 3.7.12 for details).
3.3.3 What has a larger influence on mean WTP for the environmental
public good  mean income or income inequality?
Since both mean income and relative income inequality influence mean WTP for the envi-
ronmental public good, we ask: which one of the two influences is relatively larger?
Proposition 3.5 (relative income inequality)
Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP (Equation 3.7), changes more elasti-
cally with mean household income, µY , than with relative income inequality, CVY , except
for the extreme case where the environmental public good and the private consumption good
are strong complements, θ < 1/2, and relative income inequality is larger than
√
θ/(1− 2θ).
In this case, mean WTP for the environmental public good changes less elastically with
mean household income than with relative income inequality:
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| :=
∣∣∣∣∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )∂ µY µYµWTP(µY ,CVY )
∣∣∣∣ (3.17)
>
=
<

∣∣∣∣∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )∂ CVY CVYµWTP(µY ,CVY )
∣∣∣∣ =: |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )|
if and only if

θ ≥ 12 , or θ < 12 and CVY <
√
θ
1−2θ
θ < 12 and CVY =
√
θ
1−2θ
θ < 12 and CVY >
√
θ
1−2θ
. (3.18)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.7.
Proposition 3.6 (absolute income inequality)
Mean WTP for the environmental public good, µWTP (Equation 3.6), changes more elasti-
cally with mean household income, µY , than with absolute income inequality, σY , except for
the extreme case where the environmental public good and the private consumption good are
strong complements, θ < 2/3, and mean income is smaller than
√
2/θ − 3σY . In this case,
mean WTP for the environmental public good changes less elastically with mean household
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income than with relative income inequality:
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| :=
∣∣∣∣∂ µWTP(µY , σY )∂ µY µYµWTP(µY , σY )
∣∣∣∣ (3.19)
>
=
<

∣∣∣∣∂ µWTP(µY , σY )∂ σY σYµWTP(µY , σY )
∣∣∣∣ =: |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )|
if and only if

θ ≥ 23 , or θ < 23 and µY >
√
2/θ−3σY
θ < 23 and µY =
√
2/θ−3σY
θ < 23 and µY <
√
2/θ−3σY
. (3.20)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.8.
Proposition 3.5 (for WTP expressed as a function of relative income inequality, Equa-
tion 3.7) means, that  except for the extreme case where the environmental public good
and the private consumption good are strong complements and relative income inequality is
large  mean WTP for the environmental public good reacts more elastically to the mean
income level than to income inequality. That is, a one-percent increase in society's mean
income level will increase society's mean WTP relatively more, i.e. by more percent, than
a one-percent reduction in the coefficient of variation of income. In the extreme case, the
relative effect size will be the other way round, though. For the delineation of this extreme
case, what is a large income inequality, CVY , depends on the elasticity of substitution,√
θ/(1− 2θ). The stronger complementary the two goods are, i.e. the smaller θ, the smaller
is this expression,27 and the smaller the large income inequality that defines this case.
3.3.4 How to adjust the WTP for the environmental public good for
changes in the income distribution?
Finally, we derive adjustment factors for the effects of the income distribution on mean
WTP. These will be useful for different applications, such as benefit transfer or sustainability
policy. Here, we present these adjustment factors in the context of benefit transfer, while
we illustrate the role of these adjustment factors for sustainability policy in Section 3.4.
The increasing demand for the valuation of environmental public goods on the one hand
and the resource-intensity of primary valuation studies on the other hand have caused a
27
√
θ/(1− 2θ) monotonically increases with θ, from 0 (for θ → 0) to +∞ (for θ → 1/2).
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frequent application of benefit transfers, that is, the transfer of benefit measures from one
site to another (Kaul et al. 2013). While benefit transfers have many limitations, they
are, due to budget constrains, often the only option to account for monetary values of
environmental public goods in the planning or policy process.
In the practice of benefit transfer, WTP-estimates are transferred from a study site, where
a primary valuation study has been undertaken and which is characterized  in terms of our
model  by site-specific variables (Estudy, pstudy, µstudyY ,CV
study
Y ), to a policy site, where
benefit measures are needed and which is characterized by site-specific variables (Epolicy,
ppolicy, µpolicyY ,CV
policy
Y ). It is widely acknowledged that a valid benefit transfer needs to
correct for the difference in the amount of environmental public good available at both sites
and the difference in the mean income level (e.g. Richardson et al. 2015, Ready and Navrud
2006). But so far, adjusting for the difference in income inequality has been neglected.
Substantiating the concept of a benefit transfer function (e.g. Loomis 1992, Rosenberger
and Loomis 2003), our model implies that the mean WTP at the policy site, µpolicyWTP , can be
simply obtained through multiplying the mean WTP at the study site, µstudyWTP, by a transfer
factor T .
Proposition 3.7 (relative income inequality)
Assume that people's preferences (θ, α) are identical in the study and the policy sites. If
mean WTP for the environmental public good (Equation 3.7) is given by µstudyWTP at a study
site where the quantity of the environmental public good is Estudy, the private-good market
price level is pstudy, mean income is µstudyY and relative income inequality is CV
study
Y , then
mean WTP for the environmental public good in a policy site with (Epolicy, ppolicy, µpolicyY ,
CVpolicyY ) is given by
µpolicyWTP = T (Epolicy, ppolicy, µpolicyY ,CVpolicyY ; Estudy, pstudy, µstudyY ,CVstudyY ) · µstudyWTP (3.21)
with the following disentangled transfer factor:
T (. . .) = TE(Epolicy, Estudy) · Tp(ppolicy, pstudy) · Tµ(µpolicyY , µstudyY ) · TCV(CVpolicyY ,CVstudyY )
(3.22)
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with
TE(Epolicy, Estudy) =
(
Epolicy
Estudy
) θ−1
θ
, (3.23)
Tp(ppolicy, pstudy) =
(
ppolicy
pstudy
) θ−1
θ
, (3.24)
Tµ(µpolicyY , µstudyY ) =
(
µpolicyY
µstudyY
) 1
θ
, (3.25)
TCV(CVpolicyY ,CVstudyY ) =
(
1 + CVpolicy 2Y
1 + CVstudy 2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
. (3.26)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.9.
Proposition 3.8 (absolute income inequality)
Assume that people's preferences (θ, α) are identical in the study and the policy sites. If
mean WTP for the environmental public good (Equation 3.6) is given by µstudyWTP at a study
site where the quantity of the environmental public good is Estudy, the private-good market
price level is pstudy, mean income is µstudyY and absolute income inequality is σ
study
Y , then
mean WTP for the environmental public good in a policy site with (Epolicy, ppolicy, µpolicyY ,
σpolicyY ) is given by
µpolicyWTP = T (Epolicy, ppolicy, µpolicyY , σpolicyY ; Estudy, pstudy, µstudyY , σstudyY ) · µstudyWTP (3.27)
with the transfer factor:
T (. . .) = TE(Epolicy, Estudy) · Tp(ppolicy, pstudy) · Tµ,σ(µpolicyY , σpolicyY , µstudyY , σstudyY ) (3.28)
with
Tµ,σ(µpolicyY , σpolicyY , µstudyY , σstudyY ) =
(
µpolicyY
µstudyY
)1/θ
·
(
1 + (σpolicyY /µ
policy
Y )
2
1 + (σstudyY /µ
study
Y )
2
) 1−θ
2θ2
(3.29)
and TE(Epolicy, Estudy), Tp(ppolicy, pstudy) as in Equations (3.23) and (3.24).
Proof. In analogy to the proof of Proposition 3.7, see Appendix 3.7.9.
Proposition 3.7 (for WTP expressed as a function of relative income inequality, Equa-
tion 3.7) shows that adjusting WTP-estimates for differences in income inequality is easy, as
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the transfer factor fully factorizes into a product of variable-specific factors. So, each of the
site-specific variables can be controlled for separately. As expected after Proposition 3.3, the
income-inequality specific transfer factor TCV may be greater or small than one, depending
on whether the environmental public good and the private consumption good are substitutes
or complements, θ > 1 or θ < 1, and whether income inequality is greater or smaller in the
policy site than in the study site, CVpolicyY > CV
study
Y or CV
policy
Y < CV
study
Y .
If the two goods have an elasticity of substitution of one, as for Cobb-Douglas-preferences,
one has TCV = 1 so that there does not need to be any adjustment for income inequality. In
this case, there is also no need to correct for differences in market prices for private goods or
the endowment with the environmental public good. Yet, in the empirically more relevant
case θ > 1, all these correction factors will in general differ from one.
As a by-product, Proposition 3.7 also states how to control for the difference in market
price level, p, that is, the purchasing power of income, between the study site and the policy
site.
In Proposition 3.8 (for WTP expressed as a function of relative income inequality, Equa-
tion 3.7), the transfer factors for the level of the environmental public good, E, and for the
private-good market price level, p, are the same as for the case of relative income inequality
(cf. Proposition 3.7). The transfers factors for the two moments of the income distribution,
µY and σY , are not algebraically decomposable and, therefore, appear as a joint factor,
Tµ,σ(µpolicyY , σpolicyY , µstudyY , σstudyY ).28
3.4 Empirical analysis
In this Section, we provide two empirical case studies to illustrate the theoretical results
from Section 3.3, and to estimate the order of magnitude of the comparative static effects.
We have chosen these cases to represent different environmental public goods and different
socio-economic contexts, to demonstrate a range of potential effects. We have based selection
28As the Gini coefficient is also often used as an inequality measure, we report here the corresponding
transfer function: For the case of log-nomally distributed income the Gini coefficient (G) depends only on
σY and can be represented as G(σy) = 2F (σy/
√
2) − 1 (Cowell 2009: 153), where F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). Hence, the transfer factor Tµ,σ(...) can be
expressed in terms of the Gini coefficient as follows:
Tµ,G(µpolicyY , GpolicyY , µstudyY , GstudyY ) =
(
µpolicyY
µstudyY
)1/θ
·
 1 + ((√2F−1(GpolicyY +12 ))/µpolicyY )2
(1 + ((
√
2F−1(
G
study
Y
+1
2
)))/µstudyY )
2

1−θ
2θ2
.
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on the crucial criterion of availability of recent data on the income elasticity of WTP for the
environmental public goods.
The first case concerns an environmental public good of high cultural importance in a
developed country: the existence of large predator species in Sweden (Section 3.4.1, based
on the study described in Broberg and Brännlund 2008, and in Broberg 2010). The second
case examines a global environmental public good  the existence of biodiversity worldwide
(Section 3.4.1, based on the meta-study of Jacobsen and Hanley 2009).
We first describe each of the case studies separately and review how the respective data
have been gathered and processed (Section 3.4.1). We subsequently present the results of
our empirical analysis in an overview of both cases (Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Data description and processing
Existence of large predator species in Sweden
The existence of large predator species provides a range of culturally important services
to humans, including direct use and option values for hunters or wildlife tourists and in
particular bequest and existence values for the broader population. In Sweden, four large
predator species were threatened with extinction at the time of the study: the wolf and the
wolverine are `critically endangerd' and `endangered', respectively, while the populations of
bear and lynx are `vulnarable' (Broberg and Brännlund 2008: 1066).
Broberg (2010) studied the income effects on WTP for the 2009 Swedish Predator Policy,
which aims at securing the survival of these predator species. His analysis builds on survey
data from 872 Swedish individuals from May 2004.29 Respondents had filled out a multiple
bounded payment card matrix which was based on a polychotomous-choice question that
elicited WTP according to different levels of an annual tax to be paid in the next five
years with nine amounts ranging from 10 Swedish krona (SEK)30 to 5,000 SEK and five
uncertainty levels, from definitely yes" to definitely no" (Broberg 2010: 7). Mean WTP of
Swedish survey respondents was found to be µSWEWTP=449.67 SEK (Broberg and Brännlund
2008: 564).31
29The survey was sent by mail to 4,050 randomly selected Swedish individuals, who were chosen on the
basis of a stratification process to ensure the selection of individuals living far from, close to and within
wildlife areas. Of the 2,455 respondents, those 872 were selected to estimate the WTP function who stated a
positive WTP, had non-zero income, and consistently filled out the multiple bounded payment card matrix.
30One Swedish krona (SEK) was worth 0.15 US Dollars in 2004.
31Broberg and Brännlund (2008: 564) employed different estimation techniques for the WTP function,
including an expansion approach where data are recoded such that definitely yes" and probably yes"
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For each survey respondent, Broberg (2010) took household income data from the income
register of Statistics Sweden, which have a very high degree of accuracy. Among other in-
come variables, he reports annual disposable household income (net income including capital
income and social benefits) in 2003. Mean annual disposable household income of all 872
survey respondents is µSWEY =304,422 SEK, with a standard deviation of σ
SWE
Y =174,879 SEK
and a corresponding coefficient of variation of CVSWEY =0.57. The constant income elasticity
of WTP for the Swedish Predator Policy using annual disposable household income was
estimated to be ηSWE=0.37, with a standard error of ∆ηSWE=0.1 (cf. model Mod.3HN of
Broberg 2010).32
Figure 3.1: Histogram of the distribution of disposable annual household income in Sweden [in 1,000 SEK], as
used by Broberg (2010), and best-fitting log-normal distribution.
Having described the case study, we now turn to how we have processed this data. In
order to quantify the effects of the income distribution on mean WTP for the Swedish
Predator Policy, we need to specify the inputs to Equation (3.7). As far as possible, we rely
on data and estimation results provided in the original study of Broberg (2010), yielding
inputs for µSWEY , σ
SWE
Y , CV
SWE
Y as well as θ
SWE = 1/ηSWE.
means yes", and the other answers mean no". This approach was used by Broberg (2010) in his subsequent
analysis of the income effects.
32To model the relationship between WTP and income, Broberg (2010) employed a range of functional
forms (linear, quadratic, linear in logarithms), different income variables and other determining factors. He
found that income has a significantly positive effect on WTP, with income elasticities of WTP ranging from
0.14 to 0.4, depending on the functional form. The specification yielding a constant income elasticity of
WTP do[es] not have significantly worse overall fit than other specifications (Broberg 2010: 15).
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For µSWEY , σ
SWE
Y and CV
SWE
Y we use the data of disposable household income from
Broberg (2010), which is depicted in Figure 3.1. We assume that the best fitting log-normal
distribution is the true income distribution. Furthermore, we take the constant income
elasticity of WTP estimated in Broberg (2010) and compute as its inverse the elasticity of
substitution between consumption goods and the cultural environmental good, θSWE. This
yields an elasticity of substitution of θSWE = 1/ηSWE=1/0.37=2.63 (Equation 3.4). From the
standard error in the measurement of the income elasticity, estimated by Broberg (2010) to
be ∆ηSWE=0.1, we obtain corresponding errors in θSWE that  through the inverse relation-
ship  directly translate into the following upper and lower bound estimates: θSWEη=0.47=2.12,
θSWEη=0.27=3.66.
We compute the missing residual κSWE indirectly through Equation (3.7). Rearranging
Equation (3.7) for κ as κ calib.= µWTP
[
µ
1/θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
]−1
and using all parameters in
that equation from Broberg (2010) yields a residual, calibrated factor of κSWE = 4.24. As
κ =
1− α
α
(pE)
θ−1
θ depends on θ = 1/η (Equation 3.4), we use a standard method for error
propagation to determine the error in κ stemming from the error of the income elasticity of
WTP, η, (see Appendix 3.7.10):
κη±∆η = exp
([
1∓ ∆η
1− η
]
· lnκη
)
. (3.30)
This procedure yields κSWEη=0.47=3.38 and κ
SWE
η=0.27=5.33 as upper and lower bounds, respec-
tively, for κ.
Global biodiversity conservation
For our analysis of how mean WTP for an environmental good depends on the distribution
of income on a global scale, we draw on the meta-study by Jacobsen and Hanley (2009), who
gathered 145 WTP-estimates from 46 contingent valuation studies across six continents.
These contingent valuation studies assessed WTP for different kinds of ecosystem service
preservation projects, with a focus on existence values. Most studies included in the dataset
are located in developed countries and have been conducted between 1979 and 2005. Jacob-
sen and Hanley (2009) estimated an income elasticity of WTP for global biodiversity conser-
vation of ηGLO=0.38, with a standard error of ∆ηGLO=0.14, through a double-log estimation
with `WTP per year' [in units of 2006-purchasing-power-converted-USD, 2006-PPP-USD]
as the dependent variable and 'annual household income' [in units of 2006-PPP-USD] as
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Figure 3.2: Best-fitting log-normal distribution of annual household income worldwide [in units of 1,000
2006-PPP-USD], based on Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009).
the explanatory variable (Table 3 in Jacobsen and Hanley 2009: 145) from 127 data pairs
with household income. Their estimated mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation is
µGLOY =89.51 2006-PPP-USD.
As there is  to our knowledge  no better estimate for an income elasticity of global
WTP for environmental goods, we treat it as a proxy for the global picture. The income data
in the sample of Jacobsen and Hanley (2009) consist of the mean income values of the single
studies. Thus, these income data are not representative of the world distribution of household
income, but reflect the arbitrary study selection, with an over-proportionate representation
of studies from developed countries. We therefore generated an approximation of the world
household income distribution that more closely resembles the actual distribution.
We specify the inputs to Equation (3.7) as follows. First, for the moments of the world
distribution of household income, we draw on the study by Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin
(2009), who estimate log-normal income distributions for 191 countries as well as for the
world, suggesting a global mean income per capita in 2006 of 9,550 USD and a standard
deviation of 15,400 USD (Pinkovskiy, personal communication). To derive the world dis-
tribution of household income, we combine their per-capita income data with estimates on
average national household size, which originate from the year 2002 (Dorling et al. 2010).
Simple multiplication produces the moments of the global distribution of household income.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the two case studies.
Existence of large predator species
(Sweden)
Existence of biodiversity
(Global)
N 872 127 (for WTP data)
WTP
mean WTP (µWTP) 449.67 [annual SEK for five years] 89.51 [annual 2006-PPP-USD]
income elasticity of WTP (η) 0.37+0.10−0.10 0.38
+0.14
−0.14
elasticity of substitution (θ) 2.69+0.97−0.57 2.63
+1.54
−0.71
constant (κ) 4.24+1.09−0.86 1.90
+0.30
−0.26
Income
annual mean (µY ) 304,422 [SEK] 37,522 [2006-PPP-USD]
standard deviation (σY ) 174,879 [SEK] 60,555 [2006-PPP-USD]
coefficient of variation (CVY ) 0.57 1.61
We find that global mean household income is µGLOY =37,552 2006-PPP-USD, with a stan-
dard deviation of σGLOY =60,555 2006-PPP-USD corresponding to a coefficient of variation
of CVGLOY =1.61. The curve of the log-normal distribution with this mean and standard
distribution is depicted in Figure 3.2. Second, θGLO is given through 1/ηGLO=1/0.38=2.63.
Taking into account the standard error in ηGLO of ∆ηGLO=0.14, we obtain correspond-
ing errors in θGLO = 1/ηGLO: θGLOη=0.52=1.92, θ
GLO
η=0.24=4.17. Third, as above, we calculate
κGLO indirectly as 1.90. Taking into account the standard error in η impacting κ, through
a standard error propagation estimation (Appendix 3.7.10), we obtain: κGLOη=0.52=1.64 and
κGLOη=0.24=2.20.
3.4.2 Results of empirical analysis
We now quantify and illustrate how mean WTP for environmental public goods depends on
the distribution of income in a society (Propositions 3.1 through 3.8) using the case studies
described above. We do this in parallel for both measures of relative and absolute income
inequality, the coefficient of variation and standard deviation of income, respectively. Due
to the symmetry of the analysis, we only discuss in detail the results of the case study
concerning the global picture (Section 3.4.1), and report the corresponding results of the
other case study in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The quantitative inputs from the two case studies to
the empirical analysis are summarized in Table 3.1.
First, we examine how mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation changes with
adjustments in mean world household income. Figure 3.3 illustrates this relationship for the
income elasticity of WTP of ηGLO=0.38 (θGLO=2.63), from Jacobsen and Hanley (2009),
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Table 3.2: Elasticities of mean WTP with respect to mean income as well as relative and absolute income
inequality for the model with relative income inequality (Equations 3.58, 3.59) and the model with absolute income
inequality (Equations 3.74, 3.78), with i=SWE,GLO.
Existence of large predator species
(Sweden)
Existence of biodiversity (Global)
Elasticities of mean WTP for the model with relative income inequality (Proposition 3)
ηiµWTP,µY (µ
i
Y ,CV
i
Y ) 0.37
+0.10
−0.10 0.38
+0.14
−0.14
ηiµWTP,CVY (µ
i
Y ,CV
i
Y ) 0.06
+0.00
−0.01 0.17
+0.01
−0.04
Elasticities of mean WTP for the model with absolute income inequality (Proposition 3.6)
ηiµWTP,µY (µ
i
Y , σ
i
Y ) 0.43
+0.10
−0.11 0.55
+0.15
−0.18
ηiµWTP,σY (µ
i
Y , σ
i
Y ) 0.06
+0.00
−0.01 0.17
+0.01
−0.04
depicted as the solid black curve, with a shaded error range of one standard error in the
income elasticity of WTP, while holding the coefficient of variation of income constant at
the given level of CVGLOY =1.61 (Proposition 3.1).
Figure 3.3: Relationship between mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation, µGLOWTP, and mean world
household income, µGLOY , with an error margin of one standard error of the income elasticity of WTP
(shaded in grey), for a given coefficient of variation of income of CVGLOY =1.61. The adjustment factor
Tµ(2µGLOY , µGLOY ) for a (hypothetical) doubling of mean income corresponds to an increase in mean
WTP, ∆µGLOWTP, of 30.13%.
Mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation is an increasing, concave function of
mean world household income. If mean world household income increased by 1%, and
global relative income inequality stayed constant, mean WTP would rise by approximately
ηGLOµWTP,µY = 0.38%
+0.14
−0.14 (Proposition 3, Equation 3.58, see Table 3.2). The reported range
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corresponds to one standard error in the income elasticity of WTP.33 A hypothetical dou-
bling of mean world household income for a constant coefficient of variation of income,
corresponding to an adjustment factor Tµ(2µGLOY , µGLOY ), would lead to an increase in mean
WTP for environmental goods, ∆µGLOWTP, of 30.13%
+13.26
−12.03 (Propositions 3.7 and 3.8, see Ta-
ble 3.3).34 For the case of a constant absolute income inequality, mean WTP would rise by
ηGLOµWTP,µY (µY , σY ) = 0.55%
+0.15
−0.18 if mean household income increased by 1% (Proposition 3.6,
Equation 3.74, see Table 3.2), and by 42.66%+15.40−15.85 in case of a hypothetical doubling of mean
income, corresponding to the adjustment factor Tµ,σ(2µGLOY , σGLOY , µGLOY , σGLOY ) (Proposi-
tion 3.8, see Table 3.3).
Second, we look at how mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation changes with
income inequality, as measured by either the coefficient of variation or the standard deviation
of income, for a given level of mean world household income µGLOY =37,552 2006-PPP-USD.
Figure 3.4 illustrates this relationship for the coefficient of variation as a measure of relative
income inequality.35 Mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation decreases with income
inequality. Increasing either relative or absolute income inequality by 1% would decrease
mean WTP by 0.17+0.01−0.04% (Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, see Table 3.2).
As a hypothetical scenario, reducing relative or absolute income inequality to zero and
obtaining an equal income distribution, would yield an adjustment factor of TCV(0,CVGLOY )
or Tµ,σ(µGLOY , 0, µGLOY , σGLOY ) that corresponds to an increase of mean WTP for global bio-
diversity conservation, ∆µGLOWTP, by 16.29%
+1.05
−3.90. As a more realistic scenario, we consider a
benefit transfer from the global study to an application in Sweden, which is a country known
for its relatively low income inequality. In this case, a transfer of a WTP-estimate from a
global study context with an income inequality of CVGLOY =1.61 to a policy context in Swe-
den with an income inequality of CVSWEY =0.57, would lead to an increase in mean WTP by
∆µGLOWTP of 11.11
+0.62
−2.40%. This corresponds to an adjustment factor of TCV(CVSWEY ,CVGLOY ).
Third, we study whether the negative effect of income inequality on mean WTP for
environmental public goods depends on the level of mean income. As shown in Propo-
sition 3.7, the adjustment factor TCV that concerns the relationship between mean WTP
for environmental public goods and relative income inequality is independent of the level
33This is the only source of error we report, as the quality of the data does not permit us to provide reliable
standard errors for the estimation of the moments of the distribution of income.
34At historical or forecasted world long-term growth rates of between 1.6% and 2% (Drupp et al. 2015),
such a doubling would occur within 35 to 44 years, that is, within the lifetime of one generation.
35The respective figure for the standard deviation as a measure of absolute income inequality shows exactly
the same curve and error margin.
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation, µGLOWTP, and the coefficient of
variation of world household income, CVGLOY , for a given level of mean world household income
µGLOY =37,552 in 2006-PPP-USD, with an error margin of one standard error (shaded in grey). The
adjustment factors TCV(0,CVGLOY ) and TCV(CVSWEY ,CVGLOY ) correspond to an (hypothetical)
increase in mean WTP, ∆µGLOWTP, of 16.29% and 11.11%, respectively. While the former is the
WTP-adjustment for the extreme case of complete income equality, the latter is the WTP-adjustment
for income inequality between the global situation to the setting in Sweden.
of mean income. This means, reducing relative income inequality to zero from its origi-
nal value CVGLOY raises mean WTP by ∆µ
GLO
WTP = 16.29% irrespective of the initial level
of mean income. This finding does not hold for the relationship between mean WTP for
environmental public goods and absolute income inequality as measured by the standard
deviation, σY (cf. Proposition 3.8). We find that for the world mean household income level
of µGLOY , reducing absolute income inequality to zero, corresponding to an adjustment factor
Tµ,σ(µGLOY , 0, µGLOY , σGLOY ), leads to an increase of mean WTP for global biodiversity con-
servation by ∆µGLOWTP = 16.29
+1.05
−3.90%. In comparison, for a 30% lower world mean household
income level, the same reduction of absolute income inequality, corresponding to an adjust-
ment factor Tµ,σ(0.7µGLOY , 0, 0.7µGLOY , σGLOY ), leads to an increase of mean WTP for global
biodiversity conservation by ∆µGLOWTP = 24.23
+1.61
−5.94%; and for a 30% higher world household
income level, corresponding to an adjustment factor Tµ,σ(1.3µGLOY , 0, 1.3µGLOY , σGLOY ), the
increase is ∆µGLOWTP = 11.60
+0.73
−2.73% (Table 3.3). So, the negative effect of income inequality
on mean WTP is more than twice as strong, in percent, when the income level doubles.
Fourth, since both mean income and income inequality influence global mean WTP for
biodiversity conservation, we study which one of the two influences is relatively stronger
(Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, see Table 3.2). WTP with respect to mean income for CVY as the
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Table 3.3: Changes in mean WTP for environmental public goods ∆µiWTP in percent corresponding to the
adjustment factors T , with ∆µiWTP = T − 1, and i=SWE,GLO.
Adjustment factor Existence of large predator species
(Sweden)
Existence of biodiversity (Global)
Changes in mean WTP for the model with relative income inequality (Proposition 3.7)
Tµ(2µiY , µiY ) 29.41+9.20−8.58 30.13+13.26−12.03
TCV(0,CViY ) 3.39+0.23−0.52 16.29+1.05−3.90
TCV(CVSWEY ,CViY ) 0 11.11+0.62−2.40
Changes in mean WTP for the model with absolute income inequality (Proposition 3.8)
Tµ,σ(2µiY , σiY , µiY , σiY ) 32.56+9.65−9.23 42.66+15.40−15.85
Tµ,σ(µiY , 0, µiY , σiY ) 3.39+0.23−0.52 16.29+1.05−3.90
Tµ,σ(0.7µiY , 0, 0.7µiY , σiY ) 6.20+0.42−0.96 24.23+1.61−5.94
Tµ,σ(1.3µiY , 0, 1.3µiY , σiY ) 2.11+0.14−0.32 11.60+0.73−2.73
measure of relative income inequality is simply the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between the composite environmental good and consumption good: ηGLOµWTP,µY = 0.38
+0.14
−0.14%
(Equation 3.58). The elasticity of mean WTP with respect to mean income for σY as
the measure of absolute income inequality is ηGLOµWTP,µY (µY , σY ) = 0.55
+0.15
−0.18%. (cf. Equa-
tion 3.74). The elasticity of mean WTP with respect to both absolute and relative income
inequality is ηGLOµWTP,CVY (CVY ) = η
GLO
µWTP,σY
(µY , σY ) = 0.17
+0.01
−0.04% (Equations 3.59 and 3.78).
It thus follows that the influence of a change in mean income on mean WTP is relatively
stronger than a change in either relative or absolute income inequality, while this relative
effect is greater for the case of absolute income inequality.
3.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss to what extent assumptions made in this analysis limit the gener-
ality of our results. First, our model applies to pure public environmental goods only. The
meta-study of Jacobsen and Hanley (2009), employed in our empirical illustration, draws on
contingent valuation studies that elicit WTP for biodiversity conservation with a particular
focus on existence values. Although these habitat and species preservation projects will
not benefit all households equally on a global scale, existence values may be regarded as a
prime example of pure-public-good-type benefits. However, there are many environmental
goods with only a limited spatial range of benefits, or with at least some degree of rivalry in
consumption. Our analysis does not cover cases of such impure public environmental goods.
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Second, while most empirical evidence, as gathered mainly from contingent valuation
studies, suggests that the income elasticity is smaller than unity, this has been challenged by
Schläpfer (2006, 2008). He argues that the incidences of income elasticities of WTP smaller
than unity may be an artifact of the design of contingent valuation studies resulting among
others from anchoring effects or strategic answers. If the income elasticity of WTP were
indeed greater than unity, the direction of some of our empirical results would be exactly
opposite to what we have described in Section 3.4 (in line with the case distinctions for θ in
the propositions in Section 3.3).
Third, the CES-utility specification implies that both the private consumption good and
the environmental public good are normal goods, and not Giffen or luxury goods. It further
implies that the income elasticity of WTP is constant, an assumption that is supported
by some empirical evidence (e.g. Jacobsen and Hanley 2009, Broberg 2010) and adopted
in most benefit-transfer applications. There is, however, also empirical evidence that the
income elasticity of WTP may vary with mean income (Barbier et al. 2016, Ready et al.
2002).36 Again, our model does not capture this effect. An extension of our analysis that
could capture a non-constant income elasticity is to assume non-homothetic preferences, for
example by taking into account a minimum (subsistence) consumption level (Baumgärtner
et al. 2017b, Drupp 2016).
Fourth, we assume that households have identical preferences and differ only with re-
spect to income. Our results continue to hold, however, if households have different utility
functions, as long as for each household the elasticity of substitution between environmental
goods and market consumption goods is constant, and these elasticities as well as the other
utility parameters (e.g. the relative weight of market consumption goods to environmental
goods in utility) and utility-determining variables (e.g. education, social norms and rela-
tions) are not systematically correlated with the distribution of income. In particular, it is
easy to show that the basic structure of the model is unaltered if the income elasticity of
WTP is normally distributed over households, which is a common assumption in empirical
studies (see Appendix 3.7.11). Thus, our results generalize to a setting where preferences of
all households are described by a constant elasticity of substitution between the private and
environmental goods, but this elasticity may be different across households.
36In an attempt to check whether the income elasticity of WTP is constant or changes with income in
the global case study, we have classified the data into three income groups (low, middle, high) and have
estimated the income elasticities of WTP separately for each group. We obtained inconclusive results, as
there are only few observations in the lower income groups and the estimate for the large high-income group
was not significant.
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Fifth, our analysis rests on the assumption that income is log-normally distributed among
members of society. While there is sound evidence that this is the case at the global level
and in many countries, there are also suggestions (e.g. by Bandourian et al. 2003, Giesen et
al. 2010) that actual income distributions may have a `fatter tail' than the log-normal distri-
bution. As our calculation of mean WTP rests on the assumption of log-normal distribution
of income, these results would quantitatively, but not qualitatively, change if one assumed a
different kind of distribution (see last point of discussion).
Sixth, we have only examined the statistical effect of how the income distribution, and
income inequality in particular, affects mean WTP for environmental public goods. A further
channel of influence may be through behavioral responses to income inequality affecting mean
WTP due to social preferences. The experimental findings provide hitherto inconclusive
and contradictory results: while some studies find that heterogeneously endowed players
in public good games contribute the same percentage of their income (e.g. Hofmeyr et al.
2007, Rapoport and Suleiman 1993), others find that players contribute the same absolute
amount, meaning that low-income players contribute a higher relative share of their income
(e.g. Buckley and Croson 2006). Furthermore, a recent study by Broberg (2014) suggests
that relative income effects may play a role in determining WTP for environmental public
goods. Yet, we are not aware of any study that relates (income inequality dependent)
contributions to a public good to the substitutability between private consumption goods
and public goods. We therefore cannot conclude whether taking into account behavioral
reactions would amplify or dampen our results, which crucially depend on the elasticity of
substitution. Scrutinizing the interaction of social preferences and the income inequality
effects described in this paper represents a fruitful area for further research.
Finally, we have derived all our results from a particular functional specification of the
model to allow for an empirical quantification. One can qualitatively derive our main result
more generally, using more general concepts of utility, substitutability, and income inequality.
We show this in Appendix 3.7.12.
3.6 Conclusion
We have studied how the distribution of income among members of society, in particular
income inequality, affects the social willingness to pay for environmental public goods. We
found that if income is unevenly distributed among otherwise identical households (i) so-
cial WTP for environmental public goods increases with mean income; (ii) social WTP for
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environmental public goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if en-
vironmental public goods and private consumption goods are substitutes (complements);
(iii) the effect of income inequality on social WTP is the stronger, the higher the mean
income; and (iv) social WTP for environmental public goods changes more elastically with
mean household income than with income inequality, except for extreme cases of parameter
values.
Our results are relevant in several respects. First, for benefit transfer, one should correct
WTP-estimates for differences in both mean income and income inequality. We provide
ready-to-use adjustment factors for this purpose. With data from empirical case studies
we have demonstrated that the size of this adjustment may be considerable: for example,
a WTP-transfer for biodiversity conservation from a global case study with high income
inequality to a society with relatively low income inequality, such as Sweden, would entail a
WTP correction for income inequality of more than ten percent.
Second, as the income-inequality effect on social WTP is the stronger, the higher the level
of mean income, it is more important to take it into account in studies and applications in
rich countries than in poor countries. In light of this theoretical finding and the fact that our
global case study over-represents studies from developed countries due to data availability,
the substantial size of the global WTP-adjustment for income inequality seems more relevant
for rich countries and should only be considered with caution for poorer countries.
Third, when giving policy recommendations aimed at both allocative efficiency and dis-
tributive justice (sustainability policy, Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010), the effect of the
income distribution on WTP has to be known. Assessment of allocative efficiency may re-
quire monetary valuation of non-market goods, while the distribution of income influences
this monetary valuation in turn. The two aspects are thus mutually interlinked and need
to be studied and addressed simultaneously. For instance, one may correct WTP-estimates
for unjust income inequality, and use inequality-corrected WTP-estimates for efficiency (e.g.
cost-benefit)-analysis. In the case of global WTP for biodiversity conservation this adjust-
ment might lead to an increase in WTP of up to 16 percent, depending on the (in-)equality
preferences of society.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates the importance of taking into account economic in-
equality and equity considerations when doing benefit transfer and economic policy in gen-
eral.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Derivation of WTP(Y ) (Equation 3.4)
Total WTP for the environmental public good at level E is given as the marginal WTP w
times the number of units of E:
WTP = wE . (3.31)
The marginal WTP w can be derived from the agent's indirect utility function V (p,E, Y )
by an extension of Roy's identity (Ebert 2003: 440).
w =
∂V (p,E, Y )/∂E
∂V (p,E, Y )/∂Y
. (3.32)
With the CES-utility function (Equation 3.1) the indirect utility function is
V (p,E, Y ) =
(
α
(
Y
p
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− α)E θ−1θ
) θ
θ−1
(3.33)
and, employing (3.32), the marginal WTP is then
w = p
1− α
α
(
Y
pE
) 1
θ
. (3.34)
Plugging this into Equation (3.31) yields
WTP(Y ) =
1− α
α
(pE)
θ−1
θ Y 1/θ . (3.35)
3.7.2 Derivation of µWTP (Equation 3.6)
The density function of the log-normal distribution of income Y with mean µY and standard
deviation σY is given by
fln(Y ;µY , σY ) =
1
Y
√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY −m)
2
2s2
)
(3.36)
with m = lnµy − 1
2
ln
(
1 + σ2Y /µ
2
Y
)
, (3.37)
s2 = ln
(
1 + σ2Y /µ
2
Y
)
. (3.38)
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Equation (3.5) then becomes
µWTP =
∞∫
0
fln(Y ;µY , σY )WTP(Y ) dY
(3.36), (3.4)
=
∞∫
0
κY η−1√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY −m)
2
2s2
)
dY
lnY=:Z
=
κ√
2pis2
∞∫
−∞
exp(ηZ) exp
(
−(Z −m)
2
2s2
)
dZ
= κ exp
[
(η)
(
m+
η
2
s2
)]
(3.37), (3.38)
= κµηY
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) η(η−1)
2
η=1/θ
= κµ
1/θ
Y
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
. (3.39)
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Taking the derivative of µWTP (Equation 3.7) with respect to µY yields
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ µY
= κ
1
θ
µ
1
θ
−1
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 , (3.40)
which is strictly greater than zero because κ, θ, µY ,CVY > 0.
3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Taking the derivative of µWTP (Equation 3.6) with respect to µY yields
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY
= κ
1
θ
µ
1
θ
−1
Y
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
1− (1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 . (3.41)
Because κ, θ, µY , σY > 0,
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY
R 0 for
1− (1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 R 0 (3.42)
⇔ µ
2
Y
σ2Y
R 1
θ
− 2 . (3.43)
For θ ≥ 1/2, the RHS is non-positive while the LHS is strictly positive, so that the inequality
holds with >. Thus, ∂µWTP/∂µY is strictly positive for all levels of mean income µY .
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In contrast, for strong complementarity, θ < 1/2, ∂µWTP/∂µY (Equation 3.41) can have
either sign. µWTP attains a unique minimum at the mean income level µminY =
√
1/θ − 2σY ,
where ∂µWTP/∂µY (Equation 3.41) equals zero: µWTP falls with mean income for mean
income levels below µminY and increases with mean income above µ
min
Y .
3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Ad 1. Taking the derivative of µWTP (Equation 3.7) with respect to CVY yields
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ CVY
= κ
1− θ
θ2
µ
1
θ
Y CVY
(
1 + CVY 2
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (3.44)
Because θ, κ, µY ,CVY > 0, the sign of ∂µWTP/∂CVY is determined by the sign of 1− θ:
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1 . (3.45)
Ad 2. The cross derivative of mean WTP (Equation 3.7) is obtained by taking the derivative
of (3.44) with respect to µY :
∂2 µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ µY ∂ CVY
= κ
1− θ
θ3
µ
1
θ
−1
Y CVY
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (3.46)
Again, because θ, κ, µY ,CVY > 0, the sign of ∂2µWTP/∂µY ∂CVY is determined by the sign
of 1− θ:
∂2 µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ µY ∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1 . (3.47)
3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Taking the derivative of µWTP (Equation 3.6) with respect to σY yields
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ σY
= κ
1
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
)
µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 σY
µ2Y
. (3.48)
Because κ, θ, µY , σY > 0 it follows directly that
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ σY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1 . (3.49)
This establishes the first part of Proposition 3.4. To prove the second part of the proposition,
we take the cross derivative of µWTP (Equation 3.6) as the derivative of (3.48) with respect
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to µY and find:
∂2 µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY ∂ σY
= F1× F2× F3 with (3.50)
F1 := κ
1
θ
µ
1
θ
−3
Y σY
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2
, (3.51)
F2 :=
1
θ
− 1 , (3.52)
F3 :=
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
(
1
θ
− 2
) (
µ2Y
σ2Y
− 1
θ
)
. (3.53)
As F1 > 0 for all parameter values, the sign of (3.50) depends on the signs of the factors
F2 and F3. As for F2 (Equation 3.52), we have
F2 R 0 if and only if θ Q 1 . (3.54)
As for F3 (Equation 3.53), we have
F3 = 0 if and only if θ =
1
2
or µY =
√
1/θ σY . (3.55)
As µY > 0 and σY > 0, we also have that for θ < 1/2:
F3 R 0 ⇔ µ
2
Y
σ2Y
− 1
θ
R 0 ⇔ µY R
√
1/θ σY , (3.56)
and for θ > 1/2:
F3 R 0 ⇔ µ
2
Y
σ2Y
− 1
θ
Q 0 ⇔ µY Q
√
1/θ σY . (3.57)
Hence, the signs of F1, F2 and F3 and, consequently, the sign of d2µWTP/dµY dσY (Equa-
tion 3.50) are as follows:
F1 F2 F3 d2µWTP/dµY dσY (µY , σY )
θ < 1/2 > 0 > 0 R 0 for µY R
√
1/θσY Q 0 for µY Q
√
1/θσY
θ = 1/2 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0
1/2 < θ < 1 > 0 > 0 R 0 for µY Q
√
1/θσY R 0 for µY Q
√
1/θσY
θ = 1 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
θ > 1 > 0 < 0 R 0 for µY Q
√
1/θσY Q 0 for µY Q
√
1/θσY
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This establishes the second part of Proposition 3.4.
3.7.7 Proof of Proposition 3.5
The elasticity of mean WTP with respect to mean income can be calculated from Equa-
tions (3.7) and (3.40) as
ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY ) :=
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ µY
µY
µWTP(µY ,CVY )
=
1
θ
> 0 . (3.58)
Hence, |ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| = ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY ).
The elasticity of mean WTP with respect to relative income inequality can be calculated
from Equations (3.7) and (3.44) as
ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY ) :=
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY )
∂ CVY
CVY
µWTP(µY ,CVY )
=
1− θ
θ2
1
1 + 1/CV2Y
Q 0 for θ R 1 . (3.59)
Hence
|ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )| =

ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )
0
−ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )
 for θ

<
=
>
 1 . (3.60)
To determine which of the two elasticities is greater in absolute terms, we have to dis-
tinguish three cases.
Case 1: θ > 1
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| < ? > −ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY ) = |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )|(3.61)
1
θ
< ? >
θ − 1
θ2
1
1 + 1/CV2Y
(3.62)
⇔ 1/CV2Y < ? > −1/θ . (3.63)
As CVY > 0 and θ > 0, the LHS (which is positive) is always greater than the RHS (which
is negative). Hence, we have
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| >
∣∣ηµWTP(µY ,CVY ),CVY ∣∣ for θ > 1 . (3.64)
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Case 2: θ = 1
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| = 1 > 0 = |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )| for θ = 1 . (3.65)
Case 3: θ < 1
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| < ? > ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY ) = |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )| (3.66)
1
θ
< ? >
1− θ
θ2
1
1 + 1/CV2Y
(3.67)
⇔ 1/CV2Y < ? >
1
θ
− 2 . (3.68)
As CVY > 0, if θ ≥ 1/2 the LHS (which is positive) is always greater than the RHS (which
is non-positive), and we have
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| > |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )| for 1/2 ≤ θ < 1 . (3.69)
If θ < 1/2, the RHS is positive and
1/CV2Y < ? >
1
θ
− 2 (3.70)
⇔
√
θ
1− 2θ < ? > CVY . (3.71)
Hence, we have
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )| > |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )| for θ < 1/2 and CVY >
√
θ
1− 2θ .
(3.72)
Considering all three cases together, we thus have
|ηµWTP,µY (µY ,CVY )|
 <>
 |ηµWTP,CVY (µY ,CVY )|
if and only if

θ < 12 and CVY >
√
θ
1−2θ
else
. (3.73)
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3.7.8 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The elasticity of mean WTP with respect to mean income can be calculated from Equa-
tions (3.6) and (3.41) as
ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY ) :=
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ µY
µY
µWTP(µY , σY )
=
1
θ
1− (1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 .
(3.74)
This is strictly positive for all levels of mean income µY for an elasticity of substitution
θ ≥ 1/2. In contrast, for θ < 1/2, it can have either sign:
1
θ
1− (1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 R 0 for µY R √1/θ − 2σY . (3.75)
Hence,
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| =

ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )
0
−ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )
 (3.76)
for

θ ≥ 1/2, or θ < 1/2 and µY >
√
1/θ − 2σY
θ < 1/2 and µY =
√
1/θ − 2σY
θ < 1/2 and µY <
√
1/θ − 2σY
. (3.77)
The elasticity of mean WTP with respect to absolute income inequality can be calculated
from Equations (3.6) and (3.48) as
ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY ) :=
∂ µWTP(µY , σY )
∂ σY
σY
µWTP(µY , σY )
=
1
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
R 0 for θ Q 1 . (3.78)
Hence,
|ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| =

ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )
0
−ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )
 for θ

<
=
>
 1 . (3.79)
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To determine which of the two elasticities is greater in absolute terms, we have to distinguish
the following cases:
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| = |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| =
1 θ > 1 ηµWTP,µY −ηµWTP,σY
2 θ = 1 ηµWTP,µY 0
3 1/2 ≤ θ < 1 ηµWTP,µY ηµWTP,σY
4 θ < 1/2 and µY >
√
1/θ − 2σY ηµWTP,µY ηµWTP,σY
5 θ < 1/2 and µY =
√
1/θ − 2σY 0 ηµWTP,σY
6 θ < 1/2 and µY <
√
1/θ − 2σY −ηµWTP,µY ηµWTP,σY
Case 1: θ > 1
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )|−|ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| = ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )+ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY ) =
1
θ
> 0 .
(3.80)
Hence
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| > |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| . (3.81)
Case 2: θ = 1
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| − |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| = ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )− 0 = 1 > 0 . (3.82)
Hence
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| > |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| . (3.83)
Case 3: 1/2 ≤ θ < 1
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| − |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| = ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )− ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )
=
1
θ
1− 2(1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 (3.84)
81
Theory Income Inequality and Willingness to Pay
Hence
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| R |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| ⇔
1− 2(1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 R 0(3.85)
⇔ µ
2
Y
σ2Y
R 2
θ
− 3 (3.86)
For θ ≥ 2/3 the RHS is non-positive. As µY , σY > 0, the LHS is strictly positive. It follows
that |ηµWTP,µY | > |ηµWTP,σY | for θ ≥ 2/3. For θ < 2/3, the RHS is strictly positive and we
have
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| R |ηµWTP,µσ(µY , σY )| ⇔
µ2Y
σ2Y
R 2
θ
− 3 ⇔ µY R
√
2
θ
− 3σY .
(3.87)
Case 4: θ < 1/2 and µY >
√
1/θ − 2σY
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| = ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY ) R ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY ) = |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )|
⇔ 1
θ
1− (1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 R 1
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
(3.88)
⇔ 1
θ
1− 2(1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
 R 0 (3.89)
⇔ µ
2
Y
σ2Y
R 2
θ
− 3 (3.90)
⇔ µY R
√
2
θ
− 3σY . (3.91)
As
√
2/θ − 3 > √1/θ − 2 for θ < 1/2, all three potential relations between the LHS and
the RHS are feasible.
Case 5: θ < 1/2 and µY =
√
1/θ − 2σY
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| R |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| ⇔ 0 R
1
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
. (3.92)
As the RHS is strictly positive for all µY , σY and θ < 1/2, we have that
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| < |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| . (3.93)
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Case 6: θ < 1/2 and µY <
√
1/θ − 2σY
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| = −ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY ) R ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY ) = |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )|
⇔ −1
θ
+
1
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
R 1
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
)
1
µ2Y
σ2Y
+ 1
(3.94)
⇔ −1
θ
R 0 . (3.95)
As the LHS is strictly negative for all θ < 1/2, we have that
|ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| < |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| . (3.96)
Putting the different cases and sub-cases together we have the following results.
 |ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| > |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| in the following cases:
 θ > 1
 θ = 1
 2/3 ≤ θ < 1
 1/2 ≤ θ < 2/3 and µY >
√
2/θ − 3σY
 θ < 1/2 and µY >
√
2/θ − 3σY (which implies µY >
√
1/θ − 2σY )
 |ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| = |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| in the following cases:
 1/2 ≤ θ < 2/3 and µY =
√
2/θ − 3σY
 θ < 1/2 and µY =
√
2/θ − 3σY (which implies µY >
√
1/θ − 2σY )
 |ηµWTP,µY (µY , σY )| < |ηµWTP,σY (µY , σY )| in the following cases:
 1/2 ≤ θ < 2/3 and µY <
√
2/θ − 3σY
 θ < 1/2 and
√
1/θ − 2σY < µY <
√
2/θ − 3σY
 θ < 1/2 and µY =
√
1/θ − 2σY
 θ < 1/2 and µY <
√
1/θ − 2σY
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3.7.9 Proof of Proposition 3.7
The transfer function is defined as the quotient of the mean WTPs at the policy and the
study sites, and is given as:
T (Epolicy, ppolicy, µpolicyY ,CVpolicyY ; Estudy, pstudy, µstudyY ,CVstudyY )
:=
µpolicyWTP (µY ,CVY )
µstudyWTP(µY ,CVY )
(Equ. 3.5)
=
1− α
α
(pEpolicy)
θ−1
θ (µpolicyY )
1
θ (1 + CVpolicy 2Y )
1−θ
2θ2
1− α
α
(pEstudy)
θ−1
θ (µstudyY )
1
θ (1 + CVstudy 2Y )
1−θ
2θ2
=
(
Epolicy
Estudy
) θ−1
θ
·
(
ppolicy
pstudy
) θ−1
θ
·
(
µpolicyY
µstudyY
) 1
θ
·
(
1 + CVpolicy 2Y
1 + CVstudy 2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
3.7.10 Error propagation
Equation (3.4) shows how κ depends on η = 1/θ:
κ =
1− α
α
(pE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:C
θ−1
θ
= C1−η . (3.97)
Taking the natural logarithm, we obtain
lnκ︸︷︷︸
=:y
= (1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:x
· lnC . (3.98)
Taking C as exactly measured, and denoting by ∆z the absolute standard error of some
variable z, standard error propagation from x to y yields (Bronstein and Semendjajew 1987:
99100)
∆y
y
=
∆x
x
⇔ ∆lnκ
lnκ
=
−∆η
1− η ⇔ ∆lnκ =
−∆η
1− η · lnκ . (3.99)
As κ ≡ exp (lnκ), the standard error in η gives rise to an interval around κη  the value of
κ obtained from η according to Equation (3.97)  the boundaries of which are given by the
following values:
κη±∆η = exp (lnκη ±∆lnκ) = exp
([
1∓ ∆η
1− η
]
· lnκη
)
. (3.100)
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3.7.11 Heterogenous preferences
Assuming that each household has a different elasticity of substitution, θ, between the en-
vironmental public good and the private consumption good, and that η = 1/θ is normally
distributed with mean µη and standard deviation ση, and uncorrelated with income, the
mean WTP is
µWTP(µY , σY ) =
∞∫
0
fln(Y ;µY , σY )
 ∞∫
−∞
fnorm(η;µη, ση)κY
η dη
 dY
=
∞∫
0
fln(Y ;µY , σY )κY
µη+
σ2η
2 dY
= κµ
µη+
σ2η
2
Y
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1
2
(
µη+
σ2η
2
)(
1−µη−σ
2
η
2
)
. (3.101)
This expression has the same structural form as Equation (3.6), except that η = 1/θ is
replaced by µη + σ2η/2.
Similarly, if κ differs across households and follows some statistical distribution, for
example because the parameter α of the utility function (3.1) has different values for different
households, one has to replace κ in Equation (3.6) by its mean value µκ.
3.7.12 Generalization of main result
Our main result  that the mean willingness to pay for the environmental public good de-
creases (increases) with the inequality of the income distribution, for constant mean income,
if and only if the environmental public good and the private consumption good are substi-
tutes (complements) (Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4, Statement 1)  can be shown to
hold more generally, that is, beyond the particular functional specifications of the utility
function (CES) and the income distribution (log-normal) used there. We sketch the line of
argument of such a more general proof in the following.
Consider the following setting. There are m private consumption goods Xj that are
market-traded at prices pj (j = 1, ...,m) and a non-market-traded environmental public
good E. There are n individuals with identical preferences over the j + 1 goods that are
represented by a utility function U(X1, ...Xm, E) that is strictly increasing in all arguments
and strictly quasi-concave. Income Y is distributed over individuals according to some
regular distribution over non-negative incomes.
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In order to classify the environmental public good as a substitute or a complement for
the private consumption goods we build on the partial elasticities of substitution introduced
by Allen and Uzawa: the partial elasticity of substitution θAU (Xˆj , Eˆ) between the environ-
mental public good and the private consumption good j is defined as the percentage change
of the ratio of the quantity E to Xj arising from a percentage change in the price ratio
pj/w keeping utility U unchanged (cf. Uzawa 1962), where w is the Lindahl price (virtual
price), i.e. the willingness-to-pay per unit, for the environmental public good and Xˆ and
Eˆ denote the ordinary (unconditional) Marshallian demand in a hypothetical setting where
the environmental public good was market-traded at price w and income was adjusted to
Yˆ = Y + wEˆ, so that the consumer would choose (X,E).
For the following, consider the following aggregate Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution
between the environmental public good and the private consumption goods,
θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ) :=
m∑
j=1
pjXj
Y
θAU (Xˆj , Eˆ) , (3.102)
which is a weighted sum of the partial elasticities of substitution where the weights are the
budget shares of market-traded consumption good Xj with respect to original income Y .
This definition of the aggregate elasticity of substitution allows us, for any utility function
U(X,E) and depending on the consumption levels X = (X1, ..., Xm) and E, a classifica-
tion of the environmental public good as being a substitute (θAUaggr > 1) or a complement
(0 ≤ θAUaggr < 1) for the private consumption consumption goods, in an aggregate man-
ner. If θAU (Xˆj , Eˆ) = θ for all j = 1, ...,m, as it is the case for the CES-utility function,
θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ) = θ.
Ebert (2003: Result 9) has shown that
ηWTP,Y =
ηEˆ,Yˆ
θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ)
. (3.103)
That is, in a hypothetical setting where the environmental public good was market-traded
at the price w, the income elasticity of WTP depends positively on the income elasticity
of demand for the environmental public good, and inversely on the aggregate Allen-Uzawa
elasticity of substitution between the environmental public good and the private consumption
goods. All three quantities in Equation (3.103) depend on the level of income Y , so that
this equation generally holds for any level of income Y . Result (3.103) is a generalization
of η = 1/θ (Equation 3.4) for any utility function, and for a CES-utility function reduces to
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the latter, as ηEˆ,Yˆ ≡ 1 and θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ) ≡ θ for CES-utility functions.
Result (3.103) implies that the income elasticity of WTP, ηWTP,Y , increases with the
income elasticity of demand for the environmental public good, ηEˆ,Yˆ , and decreases with the
aggregate Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution, θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ). It thus depends on both,
the value of ηEˆ,Yˆ and the value of θ
AUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ), whether ηWTP,Y is smaller or larger than
one, that is, whether WTP increases with income in a progressive or regressive way. Ebert
(2003: Section 4.3) illustrates this result with a number of examples of different kinds of
utility functions.
Define
θ˜ := ηEˆ,Yˆ , (3.104)
such that for all θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ) > (<) θ˜ one has ηWTP,Y < (>) 1 and WTP increases with
income in a regressive (progressive) way. In other words, WTP increases with income in a
regressive (progressive) way if and only if the aggregate Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution
is larger (smaller) than some threshold value θ˜ which is given by the income elasticity of
demand for the environmental public good, ηEˆ,Yˆ (Definition 3.104). WTP is then a concave
(convex) function of income Y over that range(s) of income for which θAUaggr(Xˆ, Eˆ) > (<) θ˜
holds. In general, WTP(Y ) may not be a globally37 concave (convex) function of income Y .
To define what it means to say that an income distribution is more (un)equal than
another one we employ a fundamental axiom of inequality measurement: an income distri-
bution that emerges from another one through a Pigou-Dalton-transfer38 is more equal
than the original one. In a more general sense, an income distribution that emerges from
another one through a sequence of Pigou-Dalton-transfers is more equal than the original
one.
For a globally concave (convex) WTP(Y )-function a more equal distribution of income Y
implies a higher (lower) mean value of WTP, µWTP . This can be seen as follows. Consider
a society of n individuals with income distribution Y = (Y1, ..., Yn), i.e. Yi ≥ 0 is the income
of individual i with i = 1, ..., n. Consider in particular two individuals j and k with j, k ∈
{1, ..., n}, j 6= k and Yj < Yk and an income transfer δ > 0 from individual k to individual j
with Yj+δ ≤ Yk−δ which leaves the incomes of all other members of society unaltered. This
37Globally here means that the WTP(Y )-function is concave (convex) over the entire support of the
income distribution.
38Consider a society of n individuals with income distribution Y = (Y1, ..., Yn), i.e. Yi ≥ 0 is the income of
individual i with i = 1, ..., n. Now take two individuals j and k with j, k ∈ {1, ..., n}, j 6= k and Yj < Yk. An
income transfer δ > 0 from individual k to individual j with Yj + δ ≤ Yk − δ which leaves the incomes of all
other members of society unaltered is called a Pigou-Dalton-transfer (Dalton 1920, following Pigou 1912).
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Pigou-Dalton transfer generates an income distribution Y ′ = (Y1, ..., Yj+δ, ...., Yk−δ, ...., Yn)
which is, by definition, more equal than the distribution Y . Also, the following inequality
holds:
Yj < Yj + δ ≤ Yk − δ < Yk . (3.105)
Define
λ := 1− δ
Yk − Yj . (3.106)
This can be rearranged into δ = (1− λ)(Yk − Yj), so that
Yj + δ = λYj + (1− λ)Yk , (3.107)
Yk − δ = (1− λ)Yj + λYk . (3.108)
As λ ∈ [0, 1], this shows that for all possible Pigou-Dalton-transfers δ, the after-transfer
incomes of individuals j and k can be expressed as convex combinations of their before-
transfer incomes.
Under the original income distribution Y , mean income and mean WTP for the environ-
mental good are
µY = (Y1 + ...+ Yj + ....+ Yk + ....+ Yn)/n , (3.109)
µWTP = [WTP (Y1) + ...+WTP (Yj) + ....+WTP (Yk) + ....+WTP (Yn)] /n . (3.110)
Under the more equal income distribution Y ′, mean income and mean WTP for the envi-
ronmental good are
µY ′ = (Y1 + ...+ Yj + δ + ....+ Yk − δ + ....+ Yn)/n (3.111)
µ′WTP = [WTP (Y1) + ...+WTP (Yj + δ) + ....+WTP (Yk − δ) + ....+WTP (Yn)] /n .
(3.112)
Obviously, µY ′ = µY , that is, the Pigou-Dalton-transfer income leaves mean income unal-
tered, and
µ′WTP −µWTP = {WTP (Yj + δ) +WTP (Yk − δ)− [WTP (Yj) +WTP (Yk)]} /n . (3.113)
Suppose the WTP (Y )-function is globally concave (convex). Then, as there exists a
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that Yj + δ = λYj + (1−λ)Yk (Equation 3.107) and Yk− δ = (1−λ)Yj +λ′Yk
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(Equation 3.108), one has  by definition of concavity (convexity)39  that
WTP (Yj + δ) = WTP (λYj + (1− λ)Yk) ≥ (≤)λWTP (Yj) + (1− λ)WTP (Yk) and
(3.115)
WTP (Yk − δ) = WTP ((1− λ)Yj + λ)Yk) ≥ (≤)(1− λ)WTP (Yj) + λWTP (Yk) . (3.116)
This implies that
WTP (Yj + δ) +WTP (Yk − δ)
≥ (≤) λWTP (Yj) + (1− λ)WTP (Yk) + (1− λ)WTP (Yj) + λWTP (Yk)
= WTP (Yj) +WTP (Yk) . (3.117)
With this and Equation (3.113), it becomes obvious that
µ′WTP ≥ (≤) µWTP . (3.118)
That is, for a globally concave (convex) WTP(Y )-function a more equal distribution of
income Y implies a higher (lower) mean value of WTP, µWTP
Putting the pieces together, we can make the following general proposition. Assume that
the utility function U(X1, ...Xm, E) is such that the associated WTP(Y ) function is globally
concave (globally convex). Then, there exists a threshold value of the aggregate Allen-Uzawa
elasticity of substitution between the environmental public good and the private consumption
goods, θ˜, such that the following holds: the mean willingness to pay for the environmental
public good, µWTP , decreases (increases) with the inequality of the income distribution 
for given mean income  if and only if the aggregate Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution
is larger (smaller) than θ˜.
39A real function φ(x) is called convex if for all x1, x2 from its domain and all λ ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
φ (λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ λφ(x1) + (1− λ)φ(x2) . (3.114)
If the inequality is reversed, i.e. it holds with ≥, the function is called concave.
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4 Environmental Inequality and Economic
Valuation
Abstract: This paper studies how the distribution of environmental goods and income
affect the economic valuation of local public goods. I show that environmental inequality
affects societal willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental local public goods and that this
is determined by their substitutability as well as by how their provision is correlated with
income. Specifically, I find that in cases where environmental inequality is weakly greater
than income inequality or the correlation between income and environmental good endow-
ment is negative, environmental inequality decreases (increases) societal WTP if and only
if the environmental good is a substitute to (complement for) manufactured consumption
goods. Moreover, I show that sorting of richer households into places with higher levels of
a given environmental good increases (decreases) societal WTP if and only if it is a sub-
stitute for (complement to) manufactured consumption goods. I obtain novel closed-form
adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in the (spatial) distribution
of environmental local public goods. Using forest preservation in Poland as an empirical
example, I find that societal WTP is up to 4 percent higher for equal access to forests and
up to 8 percent higher for an equal distribution of both income and access to forests.
Keywords: Inequality, environmental valuation, WTP, local public good, spatial distribu-
tion, scope effect, benefit transfer, forest ecosystem services
Reference: Meya, J.N. (2018). Environmental inequality and economic valuation. Olden-
burg Discussion Papers in Economics, V 416-18.
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4.1 Introduction
Environmental policy making is increasingly informed by economic values assigned to non-
market environmental goods, which are often distributed highly unequal among households.
For instance, Boyce et al. (2016) recently found that exposure to industrial air pollution in the
United States is even more unequally distributed than income. In many cases environmental
inequalities reinforce prevailing economic inequalities. For centuries, wealthy citizens have
tended to live in areas where environmental quality is high, while pollution has been burdened
disproportionately on poor citizens.40 It is timely to study the interplay of environmental
inequalities and economic inequalities, as economic inequalities are on the rise in most parts
of the world (Alvaredo et al. 2017), while the loss of biodiversity and many ecosystem services
is accelerating (Baumgärtner et al. 2015, Butchart et al. 2010, MEA 2005).
The monetary valuation of non-market goods has become a central challenge for envi-
ronmental economics. So far, however, valuation studies have paid little attention to the
implications of (spatially) coupled environmental and income inequalities (Drupp 2018).
Recently, Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) presented a model of how the distribution of income
affects the societal value of pure public goods at the stage of aggregating individual values.
For an equal preference model set-up in which all households are endowed with the same
level of an environmental good but differ in exogenously given income, they find that aggre-
gate willingness to pay (WTP) decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if the
environmental good is a substitute for (complement to) manufactured consumption goods.
As the majority of environmental goods considered in non-market valuation are unevenly
distributed across households, it is crucial to extend this model framework to local public
environmental goods and to analyze how environmental inequalities affects aggregate WTP
(cf. Drupp 2018).
In this paper, I study how the joint distribution of environmental goods and income
 and in particular, environmental and income inequality  affect the valuation of local
public goods. I present a model of society's aggregate willingness to pay (WTP) for an
environmental local public good where households differ in both the environmental good
and income. Building on the model developed by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) for pure
public goods, I assume (a) households to have identical preferences regarding a manufactured
40For instance, Lee and Lin (2018) show that in the period from 1880 to 2010, U.S. metropolitan neigh-
borhoods that are close to environmental amenities increase in income over time, and that cities with a
pronounced heterogeneous distribution of natural amenities are also characterized by a persistent heteroge-
neous spatial distribution of income. Heblich et al. (2017) show that in 90 English cities, air pollution around
1880 explains a large share of both the historical and current spatial income distribution.
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private consumption good and an environmental good represented by a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) utility function, and (b) log-normally distributed household income.
I extend their model to the case of environmental local public goods by assuming (c) that
households are heterogeneous in their endowment with environmental goods, represented
by a log-normal distribution. While this is certainly an approximation, the assumption of
log-normality reflects that the distribution of many environmental goods across households
in a society is strongly right-skewed and positive. Assumptions (b) and (c) make it possible
to employ a bi-variate log-normal distribution to study different correlations between the
environmental good endowment and income.
I find that the distribution of the environmental good  and how this is correlated with
income  affects society's aggregate WTP. In particular, I show that (i) societal WTP for
the environmental local public good increases (decreases) with the level of the environmental
good ('scope') if and only if the environmental good and the private consumption good are
substitutes (complements); (ii) the effect of environmental and income inequality on mean
WTP is determined by whether the environmental good is a substitute for or a complement to
manufactured consumption goods and by how environmental good endowment is correlated
with income; (iii) sorting of richer households such that they are endowed with higher levels of
the environmental good increases (decreases) societal WTP if and only if the environmental
good is a substitute for (complement to) manufactured consumption goods. Based on these
theoretical insights, I derive theory-based adjustment factors for benefit transfer to account
for differences in the distribution of environmental local public goods and income. Finally,
an application to forest preservation in Poland illustrates considerable economic effect sizes
of the proposed adjustments.
My research adds to several strands of literature: First, I contribute to the development
of theory-based (`structural') methods for spatial benefit transfer. Practical policy analysis
usually draws on monetary values from past studies to inform policy making in a different
context (OECD 2018), which is commonly referred to as `benefit' or `value transfer'. As the
associated errors are often large, several scholars have argued that benefit transfers should
be based more firmly in micro-economic theory (Bateman et al. 2011, Smith et al. 2002).
Recently, there has been a growing interest in spatially explicit approaches to benefit transfer
(e.g. Kuminoff 2018, Turner 2017, Perino et al. 2014, Brander et al. 2012). In the present
paper, I qualify the conditions under which the transfer factors proposed by Baumgärtner
et al. (2017a) and empirically tested by Meya et al. (2017) and also hold for environmental
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local public goods.
Second, I contribute to the theoretical underpinnings of primary valuation of non-market
environmental goods. The sensitivity of mean WTP to the amount of the valued environ-
mental good (`scope effect') is a common validity test for stated preference studies (e.g.
Arrow et al. 1993). However, the absence of positive scope effects in several valuation stud-
ies has spurred a heated debate on the underlying reasons, leading some scholars to discard
the practice of contingent valuation as a whole.41 Here, I link the existence of a positive sen-
sitivity to scope to the substitutability of the valued environmental good by manufactured
consumption goods.
Third, I contribute to the literature on spatial inequality and neighborhood sorting. My
analysis is thus related to Brueckner et al. (1999), Lee and Lin (2018), Heblich et al. (2017),
who show that environmental amenities induce neighborhood sorting, with higher-income
households sorting into neighborhoods where environmental quality is high. The correlation
between environmental quality and socio-demographic variables such as income has been
scrutinized under the headline of `environmental justice' for decades (e.g. Ash and Fetter
2004). Here, I link the effect of sorting to the societal valuation of environmental amenities
by analyzing changes in the correlation between environmental goods and income.
The remainder is structured as follows. I present the model in Section 4.2, and the results
from the model analysis in Section 4.3. An empirical application for a forest protection policy
in Poland is presented in Section 4.4. I discuss major limitations of my analysis in Section 4.5
and conclude in Section 4.6. The Appendix contains all formal proofs.
4.2 Model
I build on and extend the pure public good model developed in Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) to
make it applicable to local public goods. Consider a society that consists of a population of
n households, denoted i = 1, ..., n. This might be a city, region, or country. There is a single
environmental amenity, E, that households enjoy at different levels, Ei. Several households
might be endowed with the same level of the environmental good, which is locally public.42
41A review of the extensive discussion on the scope effect is beyond the scope of this introduction. Early
contributions include the study by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and the critical response of Smith (1992).
A recent overview on the debate can be found in Whitehead (2016).
42By `environmental good' I refer to all types of goods and services people receive from nature. In the
following, I study environmental goods that are locally public, i.e. they are non-excludable and non-rival
but only available within a limited geographic area so that the exposure varies across households within a
society. My analysis therefore applies mainly to use values as opposed to non-use values, which generally do
not depend on exposure to the environmental good. For example, one may think of regulatory ecosystem
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A household i derives utility by consuming two goods: a private, manufactured consumption
good, Xi > 0, traded on a market at price P > 0, and the non-market-traded environmental
local public good, Ei > 0. The household cannot choose the level of the environmental good,
which is rationed at quantity Ei. Household i's endowment with the environmental good,
Ei, might be measured in physical units, for example `parts per million', `park area density'
or `distance to the nearest environmental amenity' such as an urban park or forest.
Households have equal preferences regarding these two goods, represented by a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function
U(Xi, Ei) =
(
αX
θ−1
θ
i + (1− α)Ei
θ−1
θ
) θ
θ−1
, (4.1)
where θ ∈ (0,+∞) is the constant elasticity of substitution between the market-traded
consumption good and the non-market-traded environmental local public good. The other
preference parameter α ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of the consumption good relative to the envi-
ronmental good in the household's overall utility. The CES utility function is the simplest
preference representation that is still rich enough to study different degrees of substitutabil-
ity in the consumption of the environmental good and manufactured goods. It contains the
cases where both are substitutes (θ > 1), Cobb-Douglas (θ = 1) and complements (θ < 1).
Household i's decision problem is then to maximize utility from the consumption good,
Xi, and the environmental good, Ei, subject to a budget constraint given by their income,
Yi > 0, and the exogenously fixed level Ei:43
max
Xi,Ei
U(Xi, Ei) s.t. P Xi = Yi, Ei fixed. (4.2)
I follow Aaron and McGuire (1970), Ebert (2003) and Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) by defining
household i's income-equivalent total WTP for the local public environmental good at level
Ei as the marginal willingness to pay, ω, per unit of the environmental good at level Ei
times the enjoyed quantity of Ei: WTP (Yi, Ei) = ω(Yi, Ei)Ei. The marginal WTP (so
called `Lindahl price'), ω, is obtained as the price the household would have been willing
to pay if the level of the environmental good that household enjoys, Ei, had been freely
services such as clean air and cultural ecosystem services such as recreation opportunities provided by urban
green spaces or forests. For the sake of brevity, I only refer to E as environmental good in the following.
Nevertheless, the analysis equally holds for a reduction in environmental bads, such as local air pollution or
environmental disamenities such as hazardous waste sites or highways.
43To save on notation, I use Ei to denote both the variable `household i's endowment with the local public
environmental good' and the actual consumed quantity, as the consumed quantity Ei is fixed throughout
the main analysis (see Appendix 4.7.9 for how this assumption might be relaxed).
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chosen on a hypothetical market. As such, marginal WTP can be derived from household
i's indirect utility function at the currently enjoyed level of the environmental good, Ei, the
market prices of consumption goods, P , and income, Yi (see Appendix 4.7.1).
For the CES utility function, household i's total WTP for the environmental good at level
Ei can be expressed as a function of income, Yi, price level, P , and preference parameters,
α and η or θ, as follows (Appendix 4.7.1):
WTP(Yi, Ei) =
1− α
α
P 1−η Ei1−η Yiη, η =
1
θ
, (4.3)
where η denotes the income elasticity of WTP. Except for the household index i on the
environmental good, Eq. (4.3) is identical to household's WTP for pure public goods derived
by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a). The CES utility function implies that the elasticity of
substitution, θ, between the manufactured consumption good, Xi, and the environmental
good, Ei, is the inverse of the income elasticity of WTP, η, (Baumgärtner et al. 2017a, Ebert
2003, Kovenock and Sadka 1981), which consequently is also constant.44 As most approaches
to benefit transfer are based on a constant income elasticity of WTP, this property makes
the CES utility framework the preferred functional form to deduct benefit transfer factors
in the following.
Recall that there is a single environmental local public good E, which households enjoy
at different exogenously fixed levels Ei. In order to model the local public good charac-
ter, I assume that the environmental good is unevenly and continuously distributed over
households, represented by a log-normal distribution,
Ei ∝ LN(µE ;σ2E), (4.4)
where µE > 0 is the mean level of the environmental good and σE is the spread of envi-
ronmental good endowment across households. The frequency of households endowed with
a certain level of the environmental good is given by the corresponding density function.
Assuming a log-normal distribution reflects that the endowment with environmental goods
is positive and that some households in society enjoy a higher level of the environmental
good than the majority of households  for instance, households living very close to environ-
mental amenities. The assumption of log-normality is in line with empirical evidence that
the endowment with environmental goods is strongly right-skewed (see Section 4.5).
44 The income elasticity of WTP, η, has been elicited in a number of stated preference studies and mostly
found to be below unity (Drupp 2018, Kriström and Riera 1996).
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Households are also heterogeneous in income, represented by a log-normal distribution
Yi ∝ LN(µY ;σ2Y ), (4.5)
where µY > 0 is the level of mean income and σY is the spread of the income distribution in
the society. Empirical evidence supports this assumption of log-normality as a fairly good
approximation for many national income distributions as well as the global distribution of
income (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009).
In this setting, society's mean WTP, µWTP, for the environmental local public good is
given as
µWTP (µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ) =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
fln(Y,E;µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ)WTP (Y,E) dY dE, (4.6)
where fln(Y,E;µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ) is the density function of the bivariate log-normal distri-
bution for income, Y - with mean µY and standard deviation σY  and the environmental
good, E  with mean µE and standard deviation σE  and their correlation, ρ.
The density function of the bivariate log-normal distribution is given by (e.g. Yue 2000)
fln(Y,E;µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ)
=
exp
[
− 1
2(1−ρ2)
(
(ln(Y )−mY )2
s2Y
− 2ρ ln(Y )−mYsY
ln(E)−mE
sE
+ (ln(E)−mE)
2
s2E
)]
2pi Y E
√
s2Y s
2
E(1− ρ2)
, (4.7)
with mj = ln(µj)− 1
2
ln
(
1 +
σ2j
µ2j
)
, s2j = ln
(
1 +
σ2j
µ2j
)
, j ∈ {Y,E} , (4.8)
where ρ ∈ (−1, 1) is the product-moment correlation coefficient of Y and E.45 The bivariate
log-normal distribution contains the cases where income and endowment with the environ-
mental good are positively correlated (ρ > 0), negatively correlated (ρ < 0), or distributed
independently (ρ = 0). While all three cases seem plausible, several empirical studies report
a positive correlation between income and the endowment with environmental goods such
as urban green spaces (Jensen et al. 2016, Tan and Samsudin 2017) or air quality (Ash and
45The product-moment correlation coefficient (often also referred to as Pearson correlation coefficient), ρ, is
defined as ρ(Y,E) = E[(Y−µY )(E−µE)]
σY σE
, where E[·] is the expected value. Applied to a sample with {Y1, ..., YN}
and {E1, ..., EN}, the sample Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is r =
∑N
1 (Yi − µY )(Ei − µE)√∑N
1 (Yi − µY )2
√∑N
1 (Ei − µE)2
,
where µY and µE are the sample means.
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Fetter 2004, Hsiang et al. 2017).
Mean WTP can then be expressed as a function of the moments  µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ  of
the distribution of income and environmental good endowment (see Appendix 4.7.2):
µWTP (µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ) =
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2 Ψ
with Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) := exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)]
, (4.9)
where the coefficients of variation CVY := σYµY and CVE :=
σE
µE
describe the spread of the dis-
tribution of income and the environmental good relative to their mean level. In the following
I employ CVY and CVE as measures for relative income inequality and relative environmen-
tal inequality, respectively.46 When all households are exposed to the same amount of the
environmental good, i.e. σE = 0 or equivalently CVE = 0, mean WTP for the environmen-
tal good in Eq. (4.9), reduces to the case of a pure public good, ∀i : Ei = E, studied by
Baumgärtner et al. (2017a).
When income and the environmental local public good are distributed independently,
ρ = 0, then the last term in Eq. (4.9) becomes one, Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) = 1, and the expression
for mean WTP reduces to
µindWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE) =
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2 , (4.10)
which is an import special case as the terms for income inequality and environmental in-
equality factorize. It follows directly that the key result of Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) on
how income inequality affects mean WTP for pure public goods can be generalized to local
public goods that are distributed independently of income.
In the following, I study the effects of marginal changes in income inequality, CVY , and in
the distribution of an environmental local public good (µE , CVE , ρ). Marginal changes in the
distribution of the environmental good can be understood as various stylized, not explicitly
modelled environmental policies: Increases in µE can be interpreted as environmental policies
that increase the quality or quantity of environmental goods, whereby decreases in µE can be
interpreted as environmental degradation. Increases (decreases) in CVE can be interpreted as
environmental policies that decrease (increase) equity in the endowment with environmental
goods. Increases (decreases) in ρ can be interpreted as environmental policies that increase
46In the remainder I focus on the coefficient of variation as measure of spread to facilitate comparisons
between environmental and income inequality. Thus, I conduct a variable transformation where σj is replaced
by a function CVj(σj) which scales σj by µj with j ∈ Y,E.
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(decrease) the endowment of richer households with environmental goods relative to poorer
households or as the effect of some exogenous, not-modelled neighborhood sorting.
4.3 Results of model analysis
4.3.1 Societal WTP for environmental local public goods
I am now prepared to study how mean WTP for the environmental local public good, µWTP
(Eq. (4.9)), changes with a marginal change in (i) the mean level of the environmental good,
µE , (ii) income inequality, CVY , (iii) environmental inequality, CVE , or (iv) the correlation
between income and endowment with the environmental good, ρ.
Question 1: How does the mean environmental good level affect society's mean WTP for
a marginal increase in the environmental local public good?
Proposition 4.1
Mean WTP for the environmental local public good, µWTP (Eq. (4.9)), increases (decreases)
with the mean level of the environmental local public good, µE , if and only if the environ-
mental local public good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ µE
R 0 if and only if θ R 1. (4.11)
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.3.
Proposition 4.1 implies that there is only a positive scope effect, defined as an increase in
mean WTP for an increase in the level of the environmental good, when the environmental
good and the consumption good are substitutes (θ > 1), or analogously, when the income
elasticity of WTP for the environmental good is below unity (η < 1). However, for comple-
ments (θ < 1), or analogously, an income elasticity of WTP above unity (η > 1), there is
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not a positive scope effect but a negative one. Note that Proposition 4.1 also holds for the
special case of pure public goods, i.e. where ∀i : Ei = E, which is equivalent to CVE = 0.47
The negative sensitivity to scope for complements can be explained as follows: Recall
that a household's WTP is given as the product of marginal WTP for the environmental
good at level Ei times the quantity of the environmental good, Ei. Marginal WTP is positive
and decreasing in Ei (see Eq. 4.30). The more difficult it is to replace environmental goods
by manufactured goods in a household's utility, the more convex household's marginal WTP
becomes in Ei. An increase in Ei now has two effects on a household's total WTP: a
`(Lindahl) price effect' due to the decrease in marginal WTP and a `quantity effect' due
to an increase in the Ei quantity of environmental good consumed. For complements, the
negative effect of a decrease in marginal WTP on total WTP outweighs the positive effect
of an increase in quantity Ei on total WTP.
Question 2: How does income inequality affect society's mean WTP for a marginal in-
crease in the environmental local public good?
Next, I am interested in how the mean WTP for the local environmental public good
changes with a marginal change in income inequality or environmental inequality. I assume
that there is some inequality in income and the environmental good has some local pub-
lic good characteristics, CVY ,CVE > 0. These assumptions are necessary to differentiate
mean WTP given in Eq. (4.9) with respect to income inequality, CVY , and environmental
inequality, CVE . Note that I assume the correlation between income and the exposure to
the environmental good to remain unchanged, while evaluating the sign of the mean WTP
function for a marginal change in income inequality or environmental inequality. I conduct
this stepwise for the case that the distribution of the environmental good is correlated with
income (ρ 6= 0) and for the important special case that the environmental good and income
are distributed independently (ρ = 0), which generates simpler results.
47The same holds true at the household level: It is apparent from Eq. (4.3) that a household i's WTP
increases (decreases) with the amount of the environmental good, ∂WTP(Yi,Ei)
∂Ei
R 0, if and only if the income
elasticity of WTP is below (above) unity, η Q 1, or equivalently, if the environmental good is a substitute
for (complement to) manufactured consumption goods, θ R 1. Thus, if a household's endowment with the
environmental good is inversely related to the household's distance to the environmental good  think, for
instance, of Ei as household i's proximity to urban green space  WTP decreases with distance (`distance
decay') if and only if the income elasticity of WTP is below unity. As η is usually found to be well below
unity, my model supports the distance decay of WTP found for many environmental local public goods
(Bateman et al. 2006).
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Proposition 4.2
Mean WTP for the environmental local public good, µWTP, decreases (increases) with rela-
tive income inequality, CVY , if and only if the environmental good and the private consump-
tion good are substitutes (complements) and their point correlation is lower than a weighted
ratio of income inequality and environmental inequality, or the environmental good and
the private consumption good are complements (substitutes) and their point correlation is
higher than a weighted ratio of income inequality and environmental inequality.
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if

θ > 1, ρ < a or θ < 1, ρ > a
θ = 1 or ρ = a
θ < 1, ρ < a or θ > 1, ρ > a
,
(4.12)
where a :=
√
ln(1+CVY
2)
ln(1+CVE
2)
and ρ 6= 0.
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.4.
Proposition 4.2 states that the effect of income inequality on mean WTP for the en-
vironmental local public good is determined both by whether the environmental good is a
substitute for or a complement to the manufactured consumption good and by the correla-
tion of environmental good endowment and income in the society. Compared to the case of
pure public goods, which is a special case in my analysis, the latter is an additional determi-
nant for local public goods. It shows that the key result of Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) that
mean WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only
if the environmental good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements)
applies only to local public goods when the correlation with income is lower than a weighted
ratio of income inequality and environmental inequality, ρ < a. For cases where the correla-
tion between income and the environmental local public good is strongly positive, ρ > a, the
reverse might be true: mean WTP increases (decreases) with income inequality if and only
if the environmental good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements).
The threshold a thereby captures how unequal a society's income distribution is relative
to the provision of environmental goods. The parameter a is above unity when income
inequality is relatively larger, CVY > CVE , but below unity when environmental inequality
is relatively larger, CVY < CVE . I will now briefly discuss both cases in turn.
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First, if income inequality is weakly greater than environmental inequality, CVY ≥ CVE ,
it follows directly that ρ < 1 ≤ a as ρ ∈ (−1, 1). Thus it becomes evident that for income
inequality being weakly greater than environmental inequality, CVY ≥ CVE , mean WTP for
the local environmental good always decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only
if the environmental good is a substitute for (complement to) manufactured consumption
goods.
Second, for the case of income inequality being lower than environmental inequality,
CVY < CVE , the effect of income inequality depends on the correlation, ρ. When poorer
households are endowed with a comparably high level of the environmental good ρ < 0, then
it generally holds that ρ < 0 < a as a > 0. Thus, we can directly conclude that if income
and environmental good provision are negatively correlated, ρ < 0, mean WTP for the local
environmental good decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if environmental
goods are substitutes (complements) to manufactured consumption goods. Only for the case
of the environmental good being distributed more unequally than income CVY < CVE and
richer households enjoying comparably high levels of the environmental good ρ > 0 can the
effect of income inequality become the reverse. Note that the more unequal the provision
of environmental goods relative to the distribution of income, the lower a becomes and the
less strongly positive the correlation, ρ, needs to be to end up in the case where societal
WTP for environmental goods increases (decreases) with income inequality if and only if the
environmental good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements).
The rationale behind the reverse effect of income inequality on mean WTP in the case
of a strongly positive correlation and relatively high environmental inequality is as follows:
A decrease in income inequality means that at least one of the poorer households is better
off, while at least one of the richer households is worse off and mean income in the society
remains unchanged. This has two opposing effects. First, the environmental good being
a substitute for consumption goods is equivalent to an income elasticity of WTP being
below unity, i.e. richer households are willing to pay a smaller share of their income than
poorer households for the environmental local public good. A reduction of income inequality
therefore increases mean WTP, as the gains in WTP of the poorer household overcompensate
for the losses in WTP of the richer household. Second, a positive correlation between income
and the environmental local public good means that households with higher incomes enjoy
more of the environmental good than households with lower incomes. For substitutes, a
higher endowment with the environmental good contributes to a higher WTP, and thus
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for a positive correlation, to a higher WTP of richer households relative to their income.
Through this second channel of the 'environmental-endowment-income-correlation' effect,
reducing income inequality decreases mean WTP. Hence, in cases where the environmental
good provision is more unequal than the distribution of income, the second effect might
outweigh the first if the correlation between income and environmental good provision is
sufficiently strong.
Corollary 4.1 (E and Y distributed independently)
For the case of the environmental good and income being distributed independently (ρ =
0), it holds that mean WTP for the environmental local public good, µindWTP (Eq. (4.10)),
decreases (increases) with relative income inequality, CVY , if and only if the environmental
local public good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂ µindWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE)
∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1. (4.13)
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.5.
Question 3: How does environmental inequality affect society's mean WTP for a marginal
increase in the environmental local public good?
Proposition 4.3
Mean WTP for the environmental local public good, µWTP, decreases (increases) with rel-
ative environmental inequality, CVE , if and only if the environmental good and the private
consumption good are substitutes (complements) and their point correlation is lower than
a weighted ratio of environmental and income inequality, or the environmental good and
the private consumption good are complements (substitutes) and their point correlation is
larger than a negative weighted ratio of environmental and income inequality.
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ CVE
Q 0 if and only if

θ > 1, ρ < b or θ < 1, ρ > b
θ = 1 or ρ = b
θ < 1, ρ < b or θ > 1, ρ > b
,
(4.14)
where b :=
√
ln(1+CVE
2)
ln(1+CVY
2)
= a−1 and ρ 6= 0.
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Proof. See Appendix 4.7.6.
Proposition (4.3) depicts that for environmental local public goods, environmental in-
equality has a similar effect on mean WTP as income inequality. The effect of environmental
inequality on the mean WTP for environmental local public goods is determined both by
whether the environmental good is a substitute for or complement to manufactured con-
sumption goods and by how the correlation between environmental goods and income in the
population of households, ρ, is related to the extent of environmental inequality relative to
income inequality, b.
The logic behind the effect of environmental inequality on mean WTP for local public
goods is as follows. For the case of substitutes, θ ∈ (1,∞), which is for CES preferences
analogous to an income elasticity of WTP below unity, η ∈ (0, 1), individual WTP for the
local public good increases with environmental good endowment Ei, but at a decreasing
rate (see Eq. (4.3)). Thus, households that enjoy less of the environmental good ('envi-
ronmentally poor' households) have a relatively higher WTP for the environmental local
public good than households that enjoy more of the environmental good ('environmentally
rich' households). A more equitable environmental good provision implies that at least
one environmentally poor household faces an increase in environmental good endowment,
while at least one environmentally rich household faces a decrease. As a result, the gains in
WTP of environmentally poor households exceed the losses in WTP of environmentally rich
households so that society's mean WTP for the environmental local public good increases.
When the provision of environmental goods in society is not independent of income, the
effect of environmental inequality also depends on their correlation, ρ, relative to a weighted
ratio of environmental inequality and income inequality, b. For environmental inequality
weakly greater than income inequality, CVE ≥ CVY , the condition ρ < b is generally ful-
filled as b > 1 > ρ. It also follows directly for a negative correlation, ρ < 0, that ρ < 0 < b
as b > 0. Thus, Proposition (4.3) states that in societies where environmental inequality is
higher than income inequality or where the correlation between income and environmental
good provision is negative, mean WTP decreases (increases) with environmental inequality
if and only if the environmental local public good is a substitute for (complement to) man-
ufactured consumption goods. The effect of environmental inequality is reverse for cases of
environmental inequality lower than income inequality and a positive correlation of income
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and environmental good provision, if only if the correlation is stronger than a weighted ratio
of environmental and income inequality.
Corollary 4.2 (E and Y distributed independently)
For the case of the environmental good and income distributed independently (ρ = 0), it
holds that mean WTP for the environmental local public good, µindWTP (Eq. (4.10)), decreases
(increases) with relative environmental inequality, CVE , if and only if the environmental local
public good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂ µindWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE)
∂ CVY
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1. (4.15)
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.7.
Corollary 4.2 shows that for the case of environmental goods uncorrelated with income,
the effect of environmental inequality on mean WTP, µindWTP, is the same as of income in-
equality. This is of course due to the identical structure of the problem.
Question 4: How does the correlation between income and environmental good endowment
affects society's mean WTP for a marginal increase in the environmental local public good?
Next, I study how a change in the correlation between environmental good endowment
and income, ρ, affects the societal valuation of the environmental local public good, µWTP.
A change in ρ might result from an environmental policy altering the spatial distribution of
environmental amenities or of households adapting their location to the spatial distribution
of environmental goods (`sorting').
Household sorting will generally change how income and endowment with the environ-
mental local public good is correlated within society. Richer (poorer) households moving
to places where environmental quality is high will increase (decrease) the correlation, ρ, be-
tween income and environmental good endowment. The effect of sorting on societal WTP
can thus indirectly be studied via its effect on ρ.
Recall that to focus my model on valuation, I treat the level of the environmental good
enjoyed as exogenous from the viewpoint of the household, and therefore do not study sorting
explicitly. I nevertheless sketch in Appendix 4.7.8 for a simple case of two income groups and
CES preferences that in a situation where neighborhood sorting arises only from differences
in the endowment with the environmental good, households with higher incomes will sort into
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places with higher environmental quality. In such a situation, sorting increases the correlation
between income and endowment with the environmental local public good, ρ. This finding is
in line with other theoretical models on how households adapt their place of residence to the
spatial distribution of environmental goods. In a seminal paper, Brueckner et al. (1999) show
that if households have CES preferences over a consumption good, a housing good, and an
amenity, and if these goods are substitutes, then the marginal valuation of amenities increases
faster than housing consumption with income, resulting in richer households living where the
amenity value is high (abstracting from commuting cost). Heblich et al. (2017) and Lee and
Lin (2018) study models with two neighborhoods, two income groups, and Cobb-Douglas
preferences regarding environmental amenities and consumption goods, and find that richer
households sort into neighborhoods where the endowment with the environmental amenity
is high.
Proposition 4.4
Mean WTP for the local environmental public good, µWTP , increases (decreases) with the
correlation between income and environmental good endowment in society, ρ, if and only
if the local environmental public good and the private consumption good are substitutes
(complements).
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ ρ
R 0 if and only if θ R 1. (4.16)
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.9.
Proposition 4.4 shows that the way an increase in the correlation between income and
endowment with the environmental local public good, ρ, affects societal WTP, µWTP, is de-
termined by the substitutability between private consumption goods and the environmental
good, θ. An increase in ρ reinforces societal WTP for the environmental good for the case
of substitutes, but decreases societal WTP in the case of complements. For instances where
household sorting increases the correlation of environmental good endowment and income,
ρ, it will thus indirectly increase (decrease) societal WTP for the local environmental public
good if this is a substitute for (complement to) manufactured consumption goods.
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4.3.2 Benefit transfer and environmental local public goods
Next, I derive structural transfer factors to account for differences in the distribution of
the environmental local public good and income. These transfer factors can be used to
adjust WTP estimates from primary valuation studies to inform environmental policy and
management in other contexts, as well as to adjust for the socially desired distribution. In
benefit transfer, WTP estimates from a valuation study conducted in one context s  the
`study' site  inform policy making in other context p  the `policy' site. Based on the model
set-up presented above, I specify the benefit transfer function approach (e.g. Loomis 1992)
for environmental local public goods.
Proposition 4.5
Assume households' preferences (θ, α) are identical at study site s and policy site p. If at
the study site mean WTP for the environmental local public good is µsWTP (Eq. 4.9), the
market price level for consumption goods is P s, mean income is µsY , relative income inequal-
ity is CVsY , the mean quantity of the environmental local public good is µ
s
E , the relative
environmental inequality is CVsE and the correlation between income and the environmental
local public good is ρs, then at the policy site with (P p, µpY , CV
p
Y , µ
p
E , CV
p
E , ρ
p) the mean
WTP for the environmental local public good is given as
µpWTP = T (P p, µpY ,CVpY , µpE ,CVpE , ρp;P s, µsY ,CVsY , µsE ,CVsE , ρs) · µsWTP, (4.17)
where the transfer function T () factorizes into the following transfer factors
T (P p, µpY ,CVpY , µpE ,CVpE , ρp;P s, µsY ,CVsY , µsE ,CVsE , ρs)
= TP (P p, P s) · TµY (µpY , µsY ) · TµE (µpE , µsE) · TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVpY ,CVpE , ρp,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs),
(4.18)
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with
TP (P p, P s) =
(
P p
P s
) θ−1
θ
, (4.19)
TµY (µpY , µsY ) =
(
µpY
µsY
) 1
θ
, (4.20)
TµE (µpE , µsE) =
(
µpE
µsE
) θ−1
θ
, (4.21)
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVpY ,CVpE , ρp,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) =
(
1 + CVp 2Y
1 + CVs 2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
·
(
1 + CVp 2E
1 + CVs 2E
) 1−θ
2θ2
· exp
[
θ − 1
θ2
(
ρp
√
ln (1 + CVpY
2
) ln (1 + CVpE
2
)− ρs
√
ln (1 + CVsY
2) ln (1 + CVsE
2)
)]
.
(4.22)
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.10.
Proposition 4.5 shows how to control for differences in income inequality, environmental
inequality and the correlation of income and endowment with the environmental good by
using a closed-form transfer factor TCVY ,CVE ,ρ. The transfer factor TCVY ,CVE ,ρ captures the
dynamics studied in Proposition 4.2 - 4.4. It is thus not surprising that TCVY ,CVE ,ρ can be
greater or smaller than unity  implying a downward or upward adjustment of societal WTP
 depending on whether income and the environmental good are distributed more equally
at the study site or at the policy site, whether the income and the environmental good are
more strongly correlated at the policy or at the study site, and whether the environmental
good is a substitute for or complement to manufactured consumption goods. Note that for
θ = 1, no adjustment is necessary, TCVY ,CVE ,ρ = 1.
This transfer factor might also be applied to account for sorting effects. Governmental
project appraisal on the efficient allocation of environmental local public goods are usually
done ex-ante, i.e. before project implementation, and therefore capture households' current
WTP. If the project is actually implemented, the distribution of environmental goods will
change and thereby induce sorting effects, changing the correlation between income and
endowment with the environmental local public good, ρ, which in turn changes societal WTP.
Welfare analyses will aim at measuring WTP both ex-ante and ex-post in order to assess
welfare gains and identify who might (potentially) need to compensate whom. Thus, welfare
analysis generally requires information on household WTP after project implementation and
107
Theory Environmental Inequality and Economic Valuation
sorting has taken place. The transfer factor TCVY ,CVE ,ρ shows how to correct WTPs elicited
ex-ante to be used for ex-post welfare analysis by specifying ρs and ρp .
Moreover, the transfer factor might be applied in the context of sustainability policy that
aims at the two normative goals of allocative efficiency and distributional justice (Baumgärt-
ner and Quaas 2010). To attain the normative goal of distributional justice, resources have
to be redistributed within society, and to ensure allocative efficiency, mean WTPs have to
be adjusted when conducting efficiency analysis in accordance with the target distribution
(Drupp et al. 2018).48 When efficiency is assessed by the means of environmental cost-benefit
analysis the proposed transfer factor might be employed to directly adjust mean WTP for
the desired distribution.
For E and Y being distributed independently (ρ = 0) at both sites, the transfer factor for
inequalities T indCVY ,CVE ,ρ, Eq. (4.22), simplifies to two disentangled transfer factors for income
inequality and environmental inequality (Appendix 4.7.10):
T indCVY ,CVE (CVpY ,CVpE ,CVsY ,CVsE) =
(
1 + CVp 2Y
1 + CVs 2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
·
(
1 + CVp 2E
1 + CVs 2E
) 1−θ
2θ2
(4.23)
=: TCVY (CVpY ,CVsY ) · TCVE (CVpE ,CVsE). (4.24)
Note that as T indCVY ,CVE factorizes into two variable-specific factors, one can correct for differ-
ences in CVY or CVE separately and without paying attention to the other type of inequality.
In this case the transfer factors for environmental inequality is absolute analogue to the one
for income inequality.
4.4 Empirical application
Next I illustrate empirical magnitudes for a case study on forest preservation in Poland.
This application serves the purpose of assessing whether the argument developed above is
associated with considerable economic effect sizes that warrant the actual use of the novel
benefit transfer factor, TCVY ,CVE ,ρ, in public policy making. I draw on a valuation study
offering a unique case for illustration, as WTP was elicited for a single national environmental
good (`Polish ecologically-valuable forest'), the access to which differs in society ('proximity
to the next forest') and substantially affects households' WTPs.
48According to Lindahl-Samuelson, a necessary condition for a Pareto-efficient allocation is that the sum
of household WTPs  or the product of mean WTP and the number of households  equals the marginal
costs of providing the environmental local public good (Samuelson 1954).
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Forests are subject to high rates of degradation and deforestation globally. Until the late
nineteenth century, deforestation was most pronounced in the temperate climate zone, where
recent decades have seen net gains in forest area (FAO 2016). Forests serve crucial ecological
functions such as carbon sequestration, water purification, and soil conservation, and offer
habitats for a variety of wildlife (FAO 2016). They contribute substantially to human well-
being (SCBD 2001), with forest ecosystem services encompassing a range of use values, such
as timber supply and opportunities for recreation, as well as non-use values, such as the
existence values of various rare flora and fauna. A forest's actual array of ecosystem services
depends on the management regime and varies from heavily economically used forests, which
are associated with high timber production but little biodiversity and recreational value, to
pristine forests, which are associated with very little timber production but high biodiversity
and recreational value (SCBD 2001). People live in different proximities to forests, which is
likely to result in an unequal distribution of forest ecosystem services, such as recreational
values. Thus, forests are likely to exhibit local public good characteristics.
Polish forests are among the largest and most valuable forests in Europe. 29.3% of
Poland's land area is covered by forest, including the Bialawiza forest, which is commonly
referred to as the last lowland forest in temperate Europe with primeval fragments (CBD
Fifth National Report of Poland 2014). Overall, 65% of Poland's biodiversity resources and
50% of Poland's Natura 2000 sites are situated in forests (Czajkowski et al. 2009, CBD Fifth
National Report of Poland 2014). Approximately 3% of Poland's 90, 000 km2 total forest
area is considered to be highly ecologically valuable, as it is still in almost pristine condition.
Only half of this forest area is under effective nature protection (Czajkowski et al. 2017).
The remaining half is under pressure from human use and exploited as regular economically
used forests (Czajkowski et al. 2014a).
To investigate the relationship between the distribution of forest ecosystem services and
income and the societal WTP for forest protection, I draw on survey and forest data studied
in depth by Budzi«ski et al. (2018) and Czajkowski et al. (2014a,b, 2017). Respondents
were asked for their willingness to pay for an increase in national income taxes for different
national forest management options, including protecting all of Poland's most ecologically
valuable forests (3% of the Polish forest area).49 The survey was carried out on a representa-
tive sample of 1001 Polish adults in January 2010 employing face-to-face computer-assisted
49Respondents were informed that forest protection would mean prohibiting any human interference except
recreational use.
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interviews. To ensure representativeness, a multi-stage sampling strategy was applied, ran-
domly selecting first communities and then adult household members. Survey data included
respondents' household income and ZIP codes. Additionally data on forest characteristics at
a high spatial resolution were obtained from the European Environmental Agency's CORINE
Land Cover dataset and the Polish Information System of State Forests and aggregated on
10× 10km2 grid squares.50
A subset of N = 714 respondents also provided information on their monthly net house-
hold income [in 2011-PLN], defining the sample used in the following. Income, Yi, is dis-
tributed with a mean of µsY = 2758 and a standard deviation of σ
s
Y = 1857, corresponding
to a relative income inequality of CVsY = 0.66. With this, the sample's relative income
inequality is slightly below the national average according to official statistics.51
I use a household's forest proximity as a proxy for the endowment with forest ecosystem
services, Ei. Forest proximity is measured as the inverse of the average Euclidean distance
from any point in a respondent's 10 × 10km2 grid square to the nearest forest (Czajkowski
et al. 2017). Proximity is chosen as a proxy for the endowment with forest ecosystem ser-
vices as it has the strongest effect on WTP for forest protection among different forest
characteristics  such as area of coniferous forest, deciduous forest, mixed forest, old or
particularly biodiverse forest  with larger distances substantially reducing WTP for forest
protection (Czajkowski et al. 2017). The coefficient of variation of households' forest prox-
imity is CVsE = 0.57. Thus, forest proximity is more equally distributed than income in
Poland. The correlation between respondents' forest proximity, Ei, and household income,
Yi, is ρs = −0.1.52 Thus, richer households tend to live further away from forests in Poland.
The average distance to the nearest forest, the location of respondents, and their household
income is depicted in Figure 4.1. Histograms on the distribution of Yi and Ei are depicted
in Appendix 4.7.11.
I complement these data from Czajkowski et al. (2017) with a parameter range for the
elasticities of substitution, θ, found in two global meta-studies.53 Thereby I infer θ indirectly
from the income elasticities of WTP, η, as elicited in recent valuation studies. As a best guess
50For further details on the survey design, see Czajkowski et al. (2014a), and on forest data, see Czajkowski
et al. (2017).
51The World Bank estimates a coefficient of variation of disposable household income for Poland of
CV POLY = 0.69 (Zaidi 2009), based on data from the 2006 European Union Survey of Income and Liv-
ing Conditions. In a contingent valuation study on water quality improvement in the Baltic Sea conducted
in 2011, a representative sample of Polish respondents exhibited exactly the same coefficient of variation of
their monthly disposable income (Meya et al. 2017).
52The correlation coefficient ρ is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
53The use of an elasticity of substitution from meta-studies is in line with the model assumption that people
have identical preferences. While I only aim at illustrating ranges, I admit that these general measures for
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Figure 4.1: Spatial distribution of distance to forests in Poland and respondents' income. Circle sizes represent
mean household income stated by respondents in the 10× 10 km2 grid square of their residency. The
average Euclidean distance from each point in a 10× 10 km2 grid square to the nearest forest is shown
in green.
estimate, I take the income elasticity of WTP for forest ecosystem services from Chiabai et
al. (2011), who provide a global meta-study on forest ecosystem services encompassing 86
WTP estimates from 27 valuation studies. They estimate an income elasticity of WTP for
forest recreation of η = 0.63 and for non-use forest ecosystem services of η = 0.75. As the
forest preservation under question would allow for recreational use, I take the arithmetic
mean of both elasticities and derive as its inverse the elasticity of substitution between
non-consumptive forest ecosystem services and manufactured consumption goods, θforest =
(0.63+0.752 )
−1
= 1.46.54 Additionally I take a range of elasticities of substitution from Drupp
(2018), who reviews existing empirical estimates for the income elasticity of WTP from
contingent valuation studies since 2000 for different ecosystems and services to indirectly
the elasticity of substitution will most likely not be a precise estimate for the population and ecosystem
service under consideration, but might arguably be more accurate for a policy site.
54Remarkably, this is close to an income elasticity elicited for another type of environmental local public
good in the same region. Czajkowski and Scasny (2010) find an income elasticity of WTP of η = 0.64,
corresponding to an elasticity of substitution of θ = 1.56, for lake water quality improvements in Poland and
the Czech Republic.
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Table 4.1: Parameter values used in empirical application.
Variable Value Source
elasticity of substitution
(θforest[θmin; θmax])
1.46 [0.86; 7.14] Chiabai et al. (2011), Drupp
(2018)
coefficient of variation of forest
proximity (CVsE)
0.57 Own calculation based on
Czajkowski et al. (2017)
coefficient of variation of disposable
household income (CVsY )
0.66 Czajkowski et al. (2014a)
correlation of income and forest
proximity (ρs)
−0.10 Own calculation based on
Czajkowski et al. (2017)
Table 4.2: Resulting transfer factors to correct WTP for differences in the distribution environmental local public
good and income.
Transfer factor θforest = 1.46 θmin = 0.86 θmax = 7.14
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY , 0, 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 1.04 0.97 1.04
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(0,CVsE , 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 1.05 0.96 1.05
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(0, 0, 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 1.08 0.94 1.07
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY , 2CVsE , ρs,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 0.94 1.06 0.95
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(2CVsY ,CVsE , ρs,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 0.93 1.07 0.94
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY ,CVsE , 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 1.01 0.99 1.03
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY ,CVsE ,−0.5,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 0.96 1.02 0.90
TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY ,CVsE , 0.5,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) 1.06 0.97 1.18
asses θ, finding a range from θmin = 0.86 to θmax = 7.14.55 I use these three estimates to
explore the effect of different degrees of substitutability between forest ecosystem services
and manufactured consumption goods. All parameter inputs are summarized in Table 4.1.
I now study how my model predicts societal WTP for forest protection to change if
households were more (un)equal in their proximity to forests, if household income were
distributed more (un)equally, or if forest proximity were more strongly negatively (positively)
correlated with income. To this end, I specify the transfer factor TCVY ,CVE ,ρ (Eq. (4.22))
with the parameters in Table 4.1 for different hypothetical choices of CVpY , CV
p
E and ρ
p.56
The resulting WTP adjustments are considerable (Table 4.2). Hypothetically reduc-
ing environmental inequality to zero, TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY , 0, 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs), would increase
mean WTP by 4 %. As income inequality is larger in the status quo, reducing it to zero,
55Drupp (2018) finds a mean of θES = 2.31 across all kinds of ecosystem services, which implies a slightly
larger degree of substitutability than I assume here for forest ecosystem services based on Chiabai et al.
(2011).
56For CVpY or CV
p
E equal to zero, i.e. when the standard deviation of Y or E is zero, the correlation
coefficient ρ does not exist. I therefore assume independently distributed endowments with the environmental
good and income, ρ = 0, to evaluate these extreme scenarios.
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TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(0,CVsE , 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs), would imply a slightly higher upward adjustment of
WTP by 5 %. Adjusting for the even more extreme situation with an equal distribution
of forest proximity and income, TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(0, 0, 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs), societal WTP for forest
protection would be 8% higher. If forest ecosystem services were complements, θmin, the
effect would be reversed, and a complete egalitarian distribution would imply a downward
adjustment of societal WTP by 6%.
It is also apparent from comparing TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(0, 0, 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) for θforest and θmax
that the required WTP adjustment does not strictly increase or decrease with the degree of
substitutability, θ. Figure 4.2 depicts TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(0, 0, 0,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) as a function of θ,
which has its maximum value close to the mean elasticity of substitution reviewed by Drupp
(2018) for global ecosystem services, θES, and decreases sharply with stronger complementar-
ity, θ → 0, where predicted adjustments become enormous. Moreover, I find that for a dou-
bling of current environmental inequality or income inequality  implying adjustment factors
of TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY , 2CVsE , ρs,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) or TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(2CVsY ,CVsE , ρs,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs)
 WTP would decrease by 6% or 7%, respectively. Again, the larger effect of income in-
equality thereby reflects that income is more unequally distributed in Poland than forest
proximity.
Finally, I find that differences in the correlation between environmental good endowment
and income require remarkable WTP adjustment. All else equal, in a situation where forest
proximity and income were positively correlated with a Pearson correlation coefficient of
ρp = 0.5 societal WTP would be 6% higher than elicited in the present study, corresponding
to a transfer factor of TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY ,CVsE , 0.5,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) . For a high degree of sub-
stitutability, this would imply a WTP adjustment of 18%. For complements, θmin, the case
would be the opposite: societal WTP would be lowered by 3%. Figure 4.5 (Appendix 4.7.11)
illustrates TCVY ,CVE ,ρ(CVsY ,CVsE , ρp,CVsY ,CVsE , ρs) as a function of ρp for different degrees
of substitutability.
These estimates illustrate the importance of considering the distribution of environmental
goods and income when aggregating WTP for environmental local public goods and in
particular when using these aggregate WTPs in benefit transfer or environmental cost-benefit
analysis.57
57As expected, differences in the mean forest proximity and mean income require comparably larger adjust-
ments. For instance, doubling mean forest proximity, TµE (2µsE , µsE), would imply an upward adjustment of
mean WTP by 24.37%, and doubling mean income, TµY (2µsY , µsY ), would even imply an upward adjustment
of mean WTP by 60.81%.
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between the transfer factor to adjust societal WTP for differences in the distribution of
the environmental local public good and income, TCVY ,CVE ,ρ, and different degrees of substitutability.
In the hypothetical transfer depicted, the societal WTP for forest protection in Poland is adjusted to
a situation where proximity to forests and income is distributed equally over the population.
4.5 Discussion
Here I discuss several assumptions made in the analysis and the extent to which these might
limit the generality of my results. These assumptions are (i) the absence of household
mobility, (ii) the purely bio-physical heterogeneity in environmental good endowment, (iii)
the log-normal distribution of the environmental local public good, and (iv) the coefficient
of variation as a measure of environmental inequality.58
First, there is no household mobility and in particular no sorting with respect to en-
vironmental quality in the main model. The model framework studied here allows me to
evaluate an exogenous change in the correlation between environmental good endowment
and income (in Appendix (4.7.8), I sketch how sorting will increase this correlation under
certain conditions), but does not anticipate sorting effects induced by a change in the distri-
bution of an environmental local public good. Hence, the proposed benefit transfer factors
do not account for sorting effects, and are thus valid in the short run (before sorting takes
58For a discussion of the CES utility function employed, the equal-preference framework, as well as the
log-normal distribution of income, the reader is referred to Baumgärtner et al. (2017a).
114
Theory Environmental Inequality and Economic Valuation
place), or valid for the evaluation of environmental policies and projects that are `small' in
the sense that the resulting change in the distribution of the environmental good is not large
enough to motivate households to move. Turner (2017) makes a first conceptual attempt
to account in benefit transfer for the possibility that people and firms change locations in
response to a `large' environmental regulation. Future research could attempt to extend my
model to endogenous sorting. Since valuation studies indicate that the income elasticity
of WTP is below unity, my model nevertheless suggests that sorting is likely to increase
the societal value of environmental local public goods by changing the correlation between
environmental goods and income in society. Whether changes in the specific environmental
goods studied in the valuation literature are below or above a level that induces households
to move is ultimately an empirical question that remains to be answered in future research.
Second, I studied a heterogeneous distribution of environmental benefits over households
in a society arising only from an uneven distribution of biophysical quantities,59 but there
are other sources of heterogeneity in environmental benefits. In particular, an uneven distri-
bution of benefits might result from heterogeneous preferences regarding the environmental
good or because vulnerability  for example, measured as `dose-response functions'  dif-
fers across groups within a society (Hsiang et al. 2017). Moreover, it seems plausible that
both preferences regarding the environment and dose-response functions differ across income
groups. However, there is little empirical research to date on these sources of heterogeneity
and how they are linked to income. Furthermore, empirical measurement of biophysical
environmental good endowment is already challenging (Hsiang et al. 2017). For simplicity
and applicability, I therefore stick to the simplest case of heterogeneity in the physical en-
dowment with environmental goods and leave other sources of heterogeneity as an issue for
future research.
Third, I approximated the distribution of the environmental good by a log-normal distri-
bution. It is necessary to assume a specific distributional form in order to derive closed-form
solutions and to develop parameterized adjustment factors for benefit transfer. Employing a
continuous representation extends upon the previous dichotomous representations in stylized
two-region models in the sorting literature. The assumption of log-normality is certainly only
59Measuring exposure to environmental goods and the corresponding environmental inequality is often
challenging. While the unit of observation for measuring economic inequality is usually the individual or
household, the exposure to environmental goods and `bads' is usually not known on the level of the individual
or household. In order to avoid errors in interfering individual exposure from aggregate data, one should aim
at using small-scale data (Boyce et al. 2016). However, in primary valuation studies, it is often straightforward
to collect data on the endowment with environmental goods from respondents, for instance, the distance to
environmental amenities or the frequency of visits.
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a first approximation, and its empirical fit has to be tested in further applications. Never-
theless, the assumption of log-normal distribution is generally in line with empirical evidence
that the distribution of environmental goods and `bads' is non-negative and right-skewed,
which makes it a preferred choice over symmetric distributions like a normal distribution. It
has been shown, for instance, in the case of Singapore, that access to urban green spaces in
cities is strongly right-skewed (Tan and Samsudin 2017), which also holds true for exposure
to industrial air pollution in the U.S. (Boyce et al. 2016). Moreover, airborne particulate
matter in London seems to follow a log-normal distribution (MacKerron and Morato 2009),
as does historic air pollution in English cities (Heblich et al. 2017, Fig A7ab).
Finally, I employed the coefficient of variation, CVE , as a measure of environmental
inequality, but there are several other measures that one could apply. Using the CVE is in
line with the idea of relative inequality, which feature prominently in scientific and public
debates on distributive justice. For instance, Chancel and Piketty (2015) find that relative
inequality in individual CO2-eq emissions increased over the period from 1998 to 2013 and
interfere from this design options for an equitable financing of global climate adaptation.
However, one might argue that when considering the endowment with environmental goods
and exposure to environmental pollution, such as air pollution, water pollution or noise, it is
the absolute level and hence the absolute inequality that matters for health and general well-
being. However, employing a relative and thereby unit-less measure was advantageous for
the purpose of this study, as it allows a direct comparison between environmental and income
inequality (see Propositions 4.2 and 4.3). Again, I leave an extension to other measures of
environmental inequality for future work.
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4.6 Conclusion
I have studied how environmental and income inequality affect the valuation of environmental
local public goods. To this end, I analyzed a model in which households have identical
preferences characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function and are
heterogeneous in both their endowment with a local public good and their income.
My main results are: (i) there is a positive (negative) scope effect, if and only if the
environmental good and consumption goods are substitutes (complements); (ii) the effect of
environmental and income inequality on mean WTP for the environmental local public good
is determined by whether the environmental good is a substitute for or a complement to
manufactured consumption goods and by how environmental good endowment is correlated
with income; (iii) an increase in the correlation between environmental good endowment
and income  for example, due to richer households sorting into places where environmental
quality is high  increases (decreases) mean WTP if and only if the environmental good and
consumption goods are substitutes (complements). Moreover, I derived closed-form transfer
factors for application in benefit transfer and environmental cost-benefit analysis that ac-
count for differences in the distribution of the environmental good and income and which
are particularly simple if both are distributed independently. Using a forest preservation
in Poland as an example, I illustrated that this theory-based adjustment is associated with
considerable effect sizes  increasing societal WTP by up to 8% for an equal distribution of
the environmental good and income compared to the status quo. Note that these results
also hold for the valuation of non-environmental local public goods, such as transportation
infrastructure or historical amenities that are exogenously given.
These findings extend the recent literature on how income inequality affects mean WTP
for pure public goods. In particular, I showed that the key result of Baumgärtner et al.
(2017a) according to which mean WTP decreases (increases) with relative income inequality
if and only if the environmental good and the consumption good are substitutes (comple-
ments) also holds for local public goods in cases where (i) they are distributed independently
of income, (ii) their endowment is negatively correlated with income, or (iii) relative income
inequality is larger than relative environmental inequality. Moreover, the transfer factor
for income inequality proposed by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) and empirically validated by
Meya et al. (2017) for a multi-country valuation study, also holds for environmental local
public goods uncorrelated with income.
My results are relevant in several respects: First, when applying benefit transfer to value
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local pubic goods one should correct for differences in environmental good provision and its
correlation with income. Public policy making frequently uses secondary data in cost-benefit
analysis, as primary valuation studies are time intensive and costly. Therefore, `value' or
`benefit transfer' has become a dominant method of environmental valuation (Pearce et al.
2006, Richardson et al. 2015) and is by now far more pervasive to policy analysis than many
perhaps [..] realize (OECD 2018, p.160). The development of benefit transfer methods in
the context of environmental local public goods is of major importance for environmental
policy and management, as most environmental goods are distributed unevenly. Government
agencies are required to conduct environmental valuation and cost-benefit analysis on local
public goods under several regulatory acts, such as the EU Water Framework Directive, the
European Marine Strategy Framework Directive, and U.S. regulations like the Clean Air
Act. However, even though a grounding of benefit transfers in economic theory is generally
held to ensure quality (Smith et al. 2002), the practical application of such structural benefit
transfers remains very limited in the domains of policy making and management, probably
due to the advanced micro-economic skills required (Phaneuf and Requate 2017: 685). Here,
I contribute to the development of structural benefit transfer by clarifying the conditions un-
der which existing transfer factors may be used to value local public goods and by presenting
novel transfer factors to control for differences in their distribution. I thus hope to serve the
high policy demand to improve benefit transfer methods for natural capital accounting (UN
et al. 2014), in particular regarding the scaling-up of site-specific WTP estimates to larger
areas.60
Second, when conducting validity tests of environmental valuation studies on should also
consider the substitutability of the valued environmental good. The existence of a positive
scope effect is a key criterion for assessing the construct validity of stated preference studies.
Against the backdrop of the controversies on contingent valuation following the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, the NOAA panel suggested to cast doubt on the reliability of contingent valuation
studies if the elicited WTPs show [i]nadequate responsiveness to the scope" (Arrow et al.
1993, p.37) of the environmental good, as [u]sually, though not always, it is reasonable to
suppose that more of something regarded as good is better so long as an individual is not
satiated" (Arrow et al. 1993, p.11). Many studies on scope sensitivity take the statement that
economic theory predicts an increase in WTP for an increase in the environmental good as
60Another extension that it necessary to make the structural benefit transfer approach of Baumgärtner et
al. (2017a) suitable for natural capital accounting is to generalize the model framework from a static to a
dynamic setting, as done in Meya et al. (2018).
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their point of departure (e.g. Borzykowski et al. 2018, Whitehead 2016).61 However, several
valuation studies do not find a sensitivity to scope or even find a negative scope effect,62
which has spurred a heated debate on the reliability of the contingent valuation method
as a whole. This paper adds another explanation from economic theory to the debate on
scope effects:63 The existence of a negative scope effect might result from the environmental
good under examination being a complement to manufactured consumption goods, and the
absence of a scope effect might result from Cobb-Douglas preferences over the environmental
good under examination and consumption goods.
Third, my study highlighted the importance of accounting for the spatial distribution of
environmental goods and income when aggregating WTP for local public goods in environ-
mental valuation. It is well known that the aggregation process of individual WTPs itself
can substantially shape the resulting societal values (Bateman et al. 2006, Loomis 2000,
Smith 1993). Primary valuation studies should report distributional parameters on the val-
ued environment good and income to facilitate more sophisticated environmental cost-benefit
analysis and estimate income elasticities of WTP, η, to cross-validate the existence of a scope
effect. In particular, primary valuation studies eliciting WTP for local public goods should
report how the valued environmental good is distributed, µE and σE or CVE , and correlated
with income, ρ. Moreover, this analysis once more emphasizes that the income elasticity
of WTP, η, which, for CES preferences, is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and environmental goods, is crucial to determine how the distribution
of both the environmental good endowment and income affects societal WTP for environ-
mental local public goods. This points to a need for more robust empirical estimates on
η.
Fourth, my findings are relevant for environmental policy makers who are concerned with
both equity and allocative efficiency. When deciding where to create new environmental
amenities, place new sources of pollution, or reduce existing ones, and when employing
environmental cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to ensure efficiency, policy makers should use
inequality-adjusted WTPs in CBA. Under certain conditions, the developed transfer factors
are a specification of distributional weights (Drupp et al. 2018). They are probably easier to
61Sensitivity to scope is commonly tested by comparing mean WTP values from split samples in which
WTP is elicited for different qualities or quantities of the environmental good.
62For instance, Ojea and Loureiro (2011) provide an overview of meta-studies that test the effect of the
quantity of the environmental good on mean WTP. Of the 14 meta-studies reported, six find no or a negative
scope effect.
63Banerjee and Murphy (2005) already show that regular preferences in general do not necessarily imply
the existence of a scope effect.
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use, however, as policy analysts only need approximating CVY , CVE and ρ and their target
levels rather than specifying weights and assessing the distribution of environmental benefits
across income groups. In the context of gentrification, for instance, policy makers might have
a preference regarding the correlation of environmental goods with income, ρ, and aim at
counteracting the distributional effects of decentralized market forces by introducing explicit
measures like social housing or spatially sensitive development of urban green spaces.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Derivation of household's total WTP, WTP(Yi, Ei) (Eq. (4.3))
In the following I derive the household's total WTP for the environmental local public good.
In doing so, I build on Ebert (2003) and Baumärtner et al. (2017, Appendix A.1), who have
already obtained the household's WTP for a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
function for environmental pure public goods.
From the perspective of the household, the quantity of the environmental good is fixed.
Household i faces the following constrained maximization problem (Ebert 2003: 439)
max
Xi,Ei
U(Xi, Ei) (4.25)
s.t. P Xi = Yi, Ei fixed. (4.26)
For the CES utility function given in Eq (6.1) and using Xi =
Yi
P
the corresponding
indirect utility function reads
V (P, Yi, Ei) =
[
α
(
Yi
P
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
i
] θ
θ−1
. (4.27)
The marginal WTP for environmental local public good Ei can then be derived by
an extension of Roy's identity from the household's indirect utility function, V (P, Yi, Ei)
(Eq. (4.27)), (Ebert 2003: 440):
w(Yi, Ei) :=
∂V (P, Yi, Ei)
∂Ei
∂V (P, Yi, Ei)
∂Yi
(4.28)
(4.27)
=
[
α
(
Yi
P
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
i
] θ
θ−1
(1− α)E−1/θi[
α
(
Yi
P
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
i
] θ
θ−1
αP
1−θ
θ Y
−1/θ
i
(4.29)
=
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ Y
1/θ
i E
−1/θ
i . (4.30)
The marginal WTP, ω, can be interpreted as the virtual price the household is willing to pay
in a hypothetical choice problem where the household would have voluntarily chosen quantity
Ei, given income Yi and consumption good prices P . One can directly observe that marginal
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WTP, ω, increases with income, but decreases with the quantity of the environmental good,
as P,Ei, Yi > 0, α ∈ (0, 1).
Total WTP, WTP(Yi, Ei), for the environmental local public good is then given as
marginal WTP, ω, at levels Ei and Yi times the level of the environmental good Ei (Ebert
2003: 442)
WTP(Yi, Ei) = w(Yi, Ei)Ei (4.31)
(4.30)
=
1− α
α
(P Ei)
θ−1
θ Y
1/θ
i , (4.32)
where the income elasticity of WTP, η, is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, η = 1θ .
Hence, the WTP function can also be written directly for the income elasticity of WTP as
WTP(Yi, Ei) =
1− α
α
(P Ei)
1−ηY ηi . (4.33)
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4.7.2 Derivation of mean WTP, µWTP, (Eq. (4.9))
Mean WTP, µWTP (Eq. (4.6)), can be reformulated with respect to the moments of the
bivariate log-normal distribution - µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ - as follows
µWTP (µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ) =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
fln(Y,E;µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ)WTP (Y,E) dY dE
(4.3)
=
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
fln(Y,E;µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ)
1− α
α
P 1−η E1−η Y η dY dE
=
1− α
α
P 1−η
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
fln(Y,E;µY , σY , µE , σE , ρ)E
1−η Y η dY dE
(4.7)
=
1− α
α
P 1−η
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
exp
[
− 12(1−ρ2)
(
(ln(Y )−mY )2
s2Y
− 2ρ ln(Y )−mYsY
ln(E)−mE
sE
+ (ln(E)−mE)
2
s2E
)]
2pi Y E
√
s2Y s
2
E(1− ρ2)
E1−η Y η dY dE
=
1− α
α
P 1−η
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
exp
[
− 12(1−ρ2)
(
(ln(Y )−mY )2
s2Y
− 2ρ ln(Y )−mYsY
ln(E)−mE
sE
+ (ln(E)−mE)
2
s2E
)]
2pi
√
s2Y s
2
E(1− ρ2)
E−η Y η−1 dY dE
=
1− α
α
P 1−η
∞∫
0
1√
2pis2Y
exp
[
−mE + η
2(ρ2 − 1)s2Es2Y + 2 η sE(−sEmY + ρmE sY ) + ln(E)2
2sE
]
E
mE+ηsE(−sE+ρsY )
s2
E dE
=
1− α
α
P 1−η exp
[
1
2
(η − 1)2 s2E + η(mY −mE) +mE − ρ(η − 1) η sE sY +
1
2
η2 s2Y
]
(4.8)
=
1− α
α
P 1−η exp
[
1
2
(η − 1)2 ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)
+ η
(
ln(µY )− 1
2
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)
− ln(µE) + 1
2
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
))
+ ln(µE)− 1
2
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)
− ρ(η − 1) η
√
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)√
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)
+
1
2
η2 ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)]
=
1− α
α
P 1−η exp
[
η2 − η
2
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)
+
η2 − η
2
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)
+ (1− η) ln(µE) + η ln(µY )
− ρ(η − 1) η
√
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)√
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)]
=
1− α
α
P 1−η exp
ln
(1 + σ2E
µ2E
) η2−η
2
 exp
ln
(1 + σ2Y
µ2Y
) η2−η
2
 exp [ln(µ1−ηE )] exp [ln(µηY )]
exp
[
−ρ(η − 1) η
√
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)√
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)]
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=
1− α
α
P 1−η µηY
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) η2−η
2
µ1−ηE
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
) η2−η
2
exp
[
ρ (−η2 + η)
√
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)]
η=1/θ
=
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
µ
θ−1
θ
E
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
) 1−θ
2θ2
exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 +
σ2E
µ2E
)
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y
µ2Y
)]
.
(4.34)
Equivalently mean WTP can be expressed for relative income inequality, CVY := σYµY ,
and relative environmental inequality, CVE := σEµE . Eq. (4.34) then becomes:
µWTP (µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ) =
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2 Ψ,
with Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) := exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)]
. (4.35)
4.7.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Differentiating µWTP (Eq. (4.9)) with respect to µE yields
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ µE
=
θ − 1
θ
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
−1/θ
E
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2 Ψ
with Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) := exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)]
, (4.36)
the sign of which is determined by θ−1θ , as α ∈ (0, 1) and P, µE , µY ,CVY ,CVE ,Ψ > 0. It
holds that θ−1θ R 0 ⇐⇒ θ R 1.
4.7.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Differentiating µWTP given in Eq. (4.9) with respect to CVY yields
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ CVY
= k′
1− θ
θ2
CVY
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 Ψ + k′
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 Ψ ρ
θ − 1
θ2
ln(1 + CV2E)√
ln(1 + CV2E) ln(1 + CV
2
Y )
CVY
1 + CV2Y
= k′ΨCVY
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2
1− θ
θ2
+ ρ
θ − 1
θ2
ln(1 + CV2E)√
ln(1 + CV2E) ln(1 + CV
2
Y )

= k′Ψ
1− θ
θ2
CVY
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2
[
1− ρ
√
ln(1 + CVE2)
ln(1 + CVY 2)
]
, (4.37)
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where Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) := exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)]
, (4.38)
k′(µY , µE ,CVE) :=
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E . (4.39)
As CVE , k′ and Ψ are strictly positive, Eq. (4.37) can only become negative if either
1−θ
θ2
< 0, or 1 − ρ
√
ln(1+CV2E)
ln(1+CVY
2)
< 0, while the respective other factor is strictly positive. It
holds that
1− θ
θ2
R 0 ⇐⇒ θ Q 1, (4.40)
and
1− ρ
√
ln(1 + CVE2)
ln(1 + CVY 2)
R 0 ⇐⇒ ρ Q
√
ln(1 + CVY 2)
ln(1 + CVE2)
. (4.41)
The combination of the sign of both factors establishes the Proposition.
4.7.5 Proof of Corollary 4.1
Differentiating µindWTP given in Eq. (4.10) with respect to income inequality, CVY , yields
∂ µindWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE)
∂ CVY
=
1− θ
θ2
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1/θ
Y CVY
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (4.42)
As α ∈ (0, 1) and θ, P, µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE > 0 the sign of this derivative is determined
by the sign of 1−θ
θ2
. It holds that 1−θ
θ2
Q 0 ⇐⇒ θ R 1.
4.7.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The proof is completely analogous to the one for Proposition 4.2. Differentiating µWTP given
in Eq. (4.9) with respect to CVE yields
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ CVE
= k′′
1− θ
θ2
CVE
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 Ψ
[
1− ρ
√
ln(1 + CVY 2)
ln(1 + CVE2)
]
, (4.43)
where Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) := exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)]
, (4.44)
k′′(µY ,CVY , µE) :=
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E . (4.45)
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As CVE , k and Ψ are strictly positive, the sign of Eq. (4.43) is determined by the sign
of the factors 1−θ
θ2
< 0 and 1 + ρ
√
ln(1+CVY
2)
ln(1+CVE
2)
< 0. It holds that
1− θ
θ2
R 0 ⇐⇒ θ Q 1, (4.46)
and
1− ρ
√
ln(1 + CVY 2)
ln(1 + CVE2)
R 0 ⇐⇒ ρ Q
√
ln(1 + CVE2)
ln(1 + CVY 2)
. (4.47)
The combination of the sign of both factors establishes the Proposition.
4.7.7 Proof of Corollary 4.2
Differentiating µindWTP given in Eq. (4.10) with respect to environmental inequality, CVE ,
yields
∂ µindWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE)
∂ CVE
=
1− θ
θ2
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1/θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E CVE
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (4.48)
As α ∈ (0, 1) and θ, P, µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE > 0 the sign of this derivative is determined
by the sign of 1−θ
θ2
. It holds that 1−θ
θ2
Q 0 ⇐⇒ θ R 1.
4.7.8 Household sorting with respect to the distribution of the environ-
mental local public good
Household sorting generally affects the correlation between income and endowment with
environmental goods. I outline how this can be formally proven for CES preferences and
common assumptions on the housing market in the following. To this end, I present a stylized
model of how the distribution of environmental goods affects the residential choice (`sorting')
of households that differ in income. The endowment with the environmental good is now a
choice variable in the household's decision problem.
Consider a city, region, or country with an environmental amenity, the exposure to which
is distributed unevenly and continuously over locations. Following Tiebout (1956) each
household i is perfectly mobile and chooses its location with the aim of enjoying a desired
level of the environmental good, Ei > 0. For instance, the environmental good endowment
Ei could be measured as the inverse of the Euclidean distance to the environmental amenity.
It is therefore illustrative to consider Ei ∈ (0, 1).
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As before, households have identical preferences over a consumption good, Xi, and the
environmental good, Ei, represented by a CES utility function (see Eq. (6.1)). Thus, like Lee
and Lin (2018) and Heblich et al. (2017), I abstract from other property characteristics (such
as size) and implicitly assume non-environmental property characteristics to be identical
across locations.
Household i's decision problem is then to maximize utility by choosing any combination
of these goods subject to a budget constraint,
max
Xi,Ei
U(Xi, Ei) s.t. PXi +R(Ei) = Yi, (4.49)
where Yi is household income and R(Ei) is the annual rent collected by absentee landlords.
Studying rents rather than property prices makes it possible to consider a static setting and
abstract from dynamic effects. To save on notation, I assume P = 1, i.e. Xi is the numeraire
good. Rearranging the budget constraint and substituting for Xi, household's utility can be
rewritten as U(Yi −R(Ei), Ei).
In equilibrium, the rent R(Ei) has to vary over Ei so that utility is uniform across
locations (e.g., Brueckner et al. 1999, Phaneuf and Requate 2017, 532). Let u¯ denote the
reference utility level so that
u¯ = U(Yi − R¯(Ei), Ei), (4.50)
where R¯(Ei) is by definition the maximum household i is willing to pay for a home in
a location characterized by an environmental good at level (Ei) and hence referred to as
household's bid function.
The slope of the bid function or the marginal WTP for an increase in the environmental
good is then given as derivative of the implicit bid function R¯(Ei) with respect to the
environmental good:
∂R¯(Ei)
∂Ei
=
∂U
∂Ei
(Yj − R¯j(Eˆ), Ei)
∂U
∂Xi
(Yj − R¯j(Eˆ), Ei)
. (4.51)
Substituting the partial derivatives
∂U(Xi, Ei)
∂Ei
= (1− α)E−1/θ
[
αX
θ−1
θ
i + (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
i
] 1
θ−1
and (4.52)
∂U(Xi, Ei)
∂Xi
= αX−1/θ
[
αX
θ−1
θ
i + (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
i
] 1
θ−1
(4.53)
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into Eq. (4.51) I obtain the slope of the bid function with respect to a change in Ei
∂R¯(Ei)
∂Ei
=
1− α
α
(
Yi − R¯(Ei)
Ei
)1/θ
, (4.54)
which is strictly increasing in income as by definition Yi > R(Ei) and α ∈ (0, 1), Ei > 0.
Note that Eq. 4.54 almost resembles the marginal WTP derived for an exogenously given Ei
(see Eq. (4.30)), except that the household has to pay rent R¯(Ei) to enjoy the environmental
good at level Ei.
Now, I extend this model to a situation with two groups of households j, k, that only
differ in income Yj 6= Yk. Without a loss of generality, I assume Yj > Yk. For the remainder,
I proceed analogously to the argument presented by Brueckner et al. (1999). Landlords rent
houses to the households that pay the highest rent. Thus, the income group that outbids the
other income group on the housing market will live where the endowment with E is high.
Let Eˆ denote the threshold level of E where the group's bids are equal R¯j(Eˆ) = R¯k(Eˆ).
The relative slopes of the bid-price curves at the threshold Eˆ determine whether the poor
or the rich live in the part of the city (or region or country) where the endowment with the
environmental good is high (cf. Brueckner et al. 1999: 96-97): If ∂R¯j∂E (Eˆ) is greater (smaller)
∂R¯k
∂E (Eˆ) than the rich (poor) will live where environmental quality is higher. The differences
between the slopes of the bid-functions is given as:
∆ :=
∂R¯j
∂E
(Eˆ)− ∂R¯k
∂E
(Eˆ) (4.55)
Eq.(4.54)
=
1− α
α
(Yj − R¯j(Eˆ)
Eˆ
)1/θ
−
(
Yk − R¯k(Eˆ)
Eˆ
)1/θ , (4.56)
which is strictly greater than zero, as by definition Yj > Yk and R¯j(Eˆ) = R¯k(Eˆ).
Thus, if the marginal WTP matters for sorting on the housing market and as the marginal
WTP increases with income, rich (poor) households will sort into locations with high (low)
environmental quality. As a result, sorting will increase the correlation between income and
endowment with the environmental local public good ρ.
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4.7.9 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Differentiating µWTP given in Eq. (4.9) with respect to ρ yields
∂ µWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
∂ ρ
=
θ − 1
θ2
1− α
α
P
θ−1
θ µ
1
θ
Y
(
1 + CV2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2 µ
θ−1
θ
E
(
1 + CV2E
) 1−θ
2θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)
Ψ,
where Ψ(CVY ,CVE , ρ) := exp
[
ρ
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln
(
1 + CV2E
)
ln
(
1 + CV2Y
)]
,
the sign of which is determined by θ−1
θ2
, as α ∈ (0, 1) and P, µE , µY ,CVY ,CVE > 0. It holds
that θ−1
θ2
R 0 ⇐⇒ θ R 1.
4.7.10 Proof of Proposition 4.5
The transfer function, defined as the quotient of mean WTPs at the policy site, p, and at
the study site, s, is given as:
T (P p, µpY ,CVpY , µpE ,CVpE , ρp;P s, µsY ,CVsY , µsE ,CVsE , ρs)
:=
µpWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
µsWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE , ρ)
Eq.4.9
=
P p
θ−1
θ (µpY )
1
θ (1 + CVp 2Y )
1−θ
2θ2 (µpE)
θ−1
θ (1 + CVp 2E )
1−θ
2θ2 exp
[
ρp
θ − 1
θ2
√
ln (1 + CVpY
2
) ln (1 + CVpE
2
)
]
P s
θ−1
θ (µsY )
1
θ (1 + CVs 2Y )
1−θ
2θ2 (µsE)
θ−1
θ (1 + CVs 2E )
1−θ
2θ2 exp
[
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θ − 1
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√
ln (1 + CVsY
2) ln (1 + CVsE
2)
]
=
(
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·
(
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µsY
) 1
θ
·
(
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µsE
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θ
·
(
1 + CVp 2Y
1 + CVs 2Y
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·
(
1 + CVp 2E
1 + CVs 2E
) 1−θ
2θ2
· exp
[
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(
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√
ln (1 + CVpY
2
) ln (1 + CVpE
2
)− ρs
√
ln (1 + CVsY
2) ln (1 + CVsE
2)
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. (4.57)
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If the environmental good and income are distributed independently at both study and
policy site, ρp = ρs = 0, the transfer function simplifies to:
T ind(P p, µpY ,CVpY , µpE ,CVpE ;P s, µsY ,CVsY , µsE ,CVsE)
:=
µind, pWTP (µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE)
µind, sWTP(µY ,CVY , µE ,CVE)
Eq.(4.10)
=
1− α
α
(P p)
θ−1
θ (µpY )
1
θ (1 + CVp 2Y )
1−θ
2θ2 (µpE)
θ−1
θ (1 + CVp 2E )
1−θ
2θ2
1− α
α
(P s)
θ−1
θ (µsY )
1
θ (1 + CVs 2Y )
1−θ
2θ2 (µsE)
θ−1
θ (1 + CVs 2E )
1−θ
2θ2
=
(
P p
P s
) θ−1
θ
·
(
µpY
µsY
) 1
θ
·
(
1 + CVp 2Y
1 + CVs 2Y
) 1−θ
2θ2
·
(
µpE
µsE
) θ−1
θ
·
(
1 + CVp 2E
1 + CVs 2E
) 1−θ
2θ2
,
which can also be obtained by assuming ρp = ρs = 0 in Eq. 4.57.
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4.7.11 Histograms on Y and E in empirical application (Section 4.4)
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of the distribution of net monthly household income [in 2011-PLN] in Poland as assessed in
the forest preservation survey by Czajkowski et al. (2014a).
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Inverse average distance to nearest forest [km^−1]
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of the distribution of the inverse average Euclidean distance to the nearest forest (`forest
proximity') from any point of the 10× 10km2 grid square where respondent lives as used by
Czajkowski et al. (2017).
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Figure 4.5: Relationship between the transfer factor to adjust societal WTP for differences in the distribution of
income and the local environmental public good, TCVY ,CVE ,ρ, and different correlations of income
and endowment with the environmental good at the policy site ρp. In the hypothetical transfer
depicted, the societal WTP for forest protection in Poland is adjusted to a situation where income
inequality and environmental inequality is identical at study and policy site, but the correlation
between Y and E differs.
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5 Inter- and Intragenerational Distribution
and the Valuation of Natural Capital
Abstract: This paper studies how the intra- and intergenerational distribution of income
affects the economic valuation of non-use environmental public goods derived from natural
capital. We show that society's mean WTP for natural capital decreases (increases) with
intratemporal income inequality if environmental goods derived from natural capital and
consumption goods are substitutes (complements). We further find that the intergenerational
distribution affects the intertemporal valuation of environmental goods derived from natural
capital. Specifically, societal WTP elicited as a constant payment fraction increases with
income growth for complements or the Cobb-Douglas case. However, it is possible that
WTP declines with income growth in the case of substitutes. Finally, we obtain closed-form
adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in dynamic aspects between
study and policy sites, such as income growth, the growth rate of the environmental goods,
and interest rates. These results are in particular relevant for natural capital accounting and
management.
Keywords: Environmental valuation, inequality, natural capital, ecosystem services, envi-
ronmental goods, WTP, benefit transfer
Reference: Meya, J.N., Drupp, M.A., Baumgärtner, S., Quaas, M.F. (2018). Inter- and
Intragenerational Distribution and the Valuation of Natural Capital. Conference paper at
SURED 2018 and WCERE 2018.
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5.1 Introduction
Sustainability economics is concerned with a just distribution of economic resources within
and across generations, and efficiency in the attainment of these normative goals (Baumgärt-
ner and Quaas 2010). The economic valuation of environmental goods and natural capital
has gained considerable interest both in science (Kinzig et al. 2011, Fenichel and Abbott
2014, Pascual et al. 2017) and policy advice (UN et al. 2014, Inclusive Wealth Project 2016).
Likewise, recent years have shown an increased interest in the effects of economic inequality
that has been rising in many countries around the world (Piketty 2014, Alvaredo et al. 2017,
2018).
Economic efficiency requires that non-market environmental goods that have public good
characteristics are supplied to the extent that the aggregate willingness to pay (WTP),
that is the sum of household WTPs, equals the marginal (opportunity) cost of supplying
environmental goods (Lindahl 1928, Samuelson 1954). This requires determining society's
aggregate WTP, which in general depends on the distribution of income within and across
generations. Yet, the literature on non-market valuation does not explicitly consider the
distribution of income with very few exceptions (Kriström and Riera 1996, Drupp et al.
2018b, Hsiang et al. 2018).
This paper studies how the intra- and intertemporal distribution of income affect the
economic valuation of environmental goods derived from natural capital that exhibit charac-
teristics of public goods. We thereby extend upon the static setting in the recent literature
on how the intra-temporal distribution of income affects the valuation of environmental
public goods (Ebert 2003, Baumgärtner et al. 2017a). To examine the effect of economic
inequality on societal valuation of environmental goods, this literature employs a stylized
modelling framework that abstracts from how natural capital translates into ecosystem ser-
vices or environmental goods. Specifically, Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) study a setting in
which a household has constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences concerning a
market-traded consumption good and a non-market traded environmental public good. For
households that have identical preferences but differ in exogenously given income approxi-
mated with a log-normal distribution, they find that societal WTP for environmental public
goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if the environmental public
good and manufactured goods are substitutes (complements).
Since a core aspect of sustainability concerns distributional issues over time and how
scarce natural resources and services can be managed to the benefit of future generations,
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an analysis of how the intertemporal distribution of income affects mean WTP is lacking
for a comprehensive valuation from a sustainability perspective (Drupp et al. 2018b). This
is important not least because currently living societies value environmental goods that
derive from a stock of natural capital and evolve over timefor example, the existence of
evolving species or climate stability, just to name a few. Extending the analysis of how the
intra- and intertemporal distribution affects society's intertemporal WTP for environmental
goods relates to recent work in the literature on social discounting. For example, Fleurbaey
and Zuber (2015), Gollier (2015) and Emmerling (2018) study inter- and intra-generational
distribution in the context of discounting of a single consumption good. As far as the
intertemporal distribution of market-traded and non-market-traded goods is concerned, our
paper is related to the literature on dual discounting and relative price changes (e.g. Weikard
and Zhu 2005, Gollier 2010, Traeger 2011, Baumgärtner et al. 2015, Drupp 2018). The
change in relative prices of non-market environmental goods is determined by their degree of
substitutability vis-a-vis market goods as well as the difference in their good specific growth
rates. These determinants will also feature prominently in our analysis.
This paper generalizes the static model of Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) to an intertem-
poral setting. To capture the intertemporal dimension in a way that allows for closed-form
solutions, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we consider a proportional
mapping of natural capital to the environmental goods and services it provides. We thereby
focus in particular on non-use environmental services, such as the existence value of bio-
diversity.64 It is in particular for these non-use services that WTP information is crucial
for public policy; Second, we consider specific exogenously given time paths of consumption
or income and the provision of environmental goods. We thus abstract from savings and
optimal management and follow the approach that Arrow et al. (2003) have taken for com-
puting shadow prices in non-optimal economies to determine the household and aggregate
WTP for environmental goods for a given `resource allocation mechanism'. In particular,
we study the case of exponential growth or decline as a special case. However, we also show
how this setting of exponential growth of income can be derived from an endogenous growth
model; Third, we assume that income and consumption are log-normally distributed in each
period. This implies that given positive growth, absolute income inequality will increase
over time while relative income inequality will remain constant; Fourth, in extending the in-
stantaneous CES utility function to a dynamic setting, we assumefollowing recent models
64For an analysis of wealth reallocation due to climate change of provisioning services derived from natural
capital, such as the fishery, featuring more complex dynamics see, e.g., Fenichel et al. (2016).
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on intertemporal decision-making (e.g. Golosov et al. 2014, Quaas and Bröcker 2016)that
there is a specific relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution with respect to the aggregate consumption bundle. This allows
deriving a closed-form intertemporal utility function under reasonable conditions on the re-
lationship between growth rates, discount rates and the elasticity of substitution. Given this
set-up, we consider compensating surplus as WTP for two different payment schemesa
single payment in the initial period as well as a constant payment fraction paid at each
point in timeand for two different marginal changes to the provision of the environmental
public gooda change in the initial level as well as in the growth rate of the environmental
good.
We confirm key results from the static analysis in this more general dynamic setting and
derive novel results regarding the effect of intergenerational distribution on non-use natural
capital valuation. We show that societal WTP as single or constant payment fractions
elicited for levels or growth rates of the environmental goods increases with initial mean
income, and decreases (increases) with initial relative income inequality if and only if the
environmental good and the manufactured are substitutes (complements). In addition, we
show that societal WTP elicited as a constant payment fraction increases with income growth
for complements or the Cobb-Douglas case, but that it is possible that societal WTP declines
in the case of substitutes. Furthermore, we show that societal WTP elicited for the level of
the environmental goods increases (decreases) with the growth rate of environmental goods
if and only if environmental goods are a substitute (complement) to manufactured goods.
Finally, we derive transfer factors for value or benefit transfer to account for differences in
the distribution of income, income growth, growth of the environmental good, interest rates
and other characteristic between a study and a policy site. We illustrate and quantify the
effect sizes of our results for a global case study on the intertemporal valuation of non-use
environmental public goods.
Our results are relevant for the economic appraisal of environmental policy. The incomes
of those who benefit from natural capital are highly unequal. An adequate valuation of
natural capital requires taking the effects of inequality into account. Failing to do so may
lead to inadequate values for natural capital accounting, among others. Our model provides a
guideline on how practical studies can proceed to adequately take the distribution of income
into account in natural capital valuation. Furthermore, our results add to the emerging
literature on structural benefit transfer (e.g. Smith et al. 2002, 2006, Baumgärtner et al.
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2017a, Meya et al. 2017, Meya 2018). We derive novel closed-form adjustment factors for
benefit transfer to control for differences in dynamic aspects between study and policy sites,
such as income growth, the growth rate of the environmental goods, and interest rates. This
is in particular needed when valuing ecosystem services derived from natural capital.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present the model in Section 5.2,
our valuation concepts in Section 5.3 and results in Section 5.4. We apply our findings
empirically for global biodiversity conservation in Section 5.5. We discuss limitations in
Section 5.6 and conclude in Section 5.7. The Appendix contains all proofs.
5.2 Model
We generalize the static model of Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) to an intertemporal setting.
A society s consists of a population of n households, labelled i = 1, . . . , n, who derive utility
from the consumption of two composite goodsa market-traded private consumption good
Ci and an environmental good E. The environmental good derives from a stock of natural
capital N in the form of instantaneous dividends or services, with E = ψ × N , where
ψ maps the stock of natural capital into environmental goods provided at each point in
time. While this mapping is very simple, it is a useful approximation among others for
non-use environmental services derived from natural capital, such as the existence value
of biodiversity. Furthermore, all households consume the environmental good at the same
fixed level, i.e. Ei = E. We therefore consider a pure public good. Individuals have identical
preferences over the human-made consumption good and the environmental public good,
represented by the instantaneous constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function
ui(Ci, E) =
(
αCi
θ−1
θ + (1− α)E θ−1θ
) θ
θ−1
, (5.1)
where θ, with 0 < θ < +∞, is the CES between the two goods, and 0 < α < 1 is a
share parameter determining the initial weight of the consumption good in utility. The CES
function contains the special cases where the consumption good and the environmental good
are substitutes (θ > 1), Cobb-Douglas (θ = 1) and perfect complements (θ < 1).
To focus the model on the task of valuation only, both goods evolve over time t and their
time path is exogenously given, with t = 0, ..., T . This implies that we are not concerned here
about the optimal management of natural capital and abstract from the possibility of optimal
intertemporal consumption smoothing through savings. The time path of the environmental
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public good is denoted {Et}, and consumption at time t as Et. Furthermore, all exogenously
provided income Yt is consumed at each point in time and has to be paid for at given market
prices Pt, i.e. Ct = Yt/Pt. In the remainder of the paper, we set Pt = 1. We therefore refer
to the distribution of consumption C and income Y interchangeably and substitute income
Y for the level of consumption of market goods C in the remainder of this paper. Where
appropriate, we refer to their distribution over time as `intertemporal distribution', and to
the distribution over households at a given point in time as `intratemporal distribution'.
As exemplary time paths for income and the environmental public good we study
Y it = Y
i
0 (1 + gY )
t, and (5.2a)
Et = E0 (1 + gE)
t, (5.2b)
where Y i0 is household i's levels of income and thus private consumption in period t = 0,
E0 is the level of the environmental good in period t = 0, gE ∈ (−1, 0) is the growth rate
of the environmental good, and gY > 0 is the growth rate of income. We demonstrate in
Appendix 5.8.1 how the time-constant income growth rate, gY , can be derived as the balanced
growth path of a general equilibrium endogenous growth model. As in Baumgärtner et al.
(2017a) we moreover assume that consumption in t = 0 is log-normally distributed over
households i
Y i0 ∝ LN(µY0 , σY0), (5.2c)
where µY0 is the mean level of income in society at t = 0, and σY0 is the standard deviation
of income in t = 0.65
To measure inequality, we focus on the coefficient of variation CVY0 :=
σY0
µY0
as a measure
of relative income inequality in society. It captures the width of the distribution of income
relative to mean income. While there are a number of different notions of income inequality
in use, concepts of relative income inequalityoften in the form of income sharesfeature
prominently in academic and policy circles, such as in the recent World Inequality Report
(Alvaredo et al. 2018). Note that our model set-up makes the assumption that the growth
rate of consumption is the same for all households, i.e. giY = gY . This implies that abso-
lute income inequalityas measured by the standard deviation, for examplewill increase
65There is empirical evidence that the income distribution can be approximated with a log-normal dis-
tribution (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009). This assumption is also used to study the related issue of
inequality and discounting (Emmerling et al. 2017).
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over time, while relative income inequality, as measured by the CV , will stay constant. In
particular, income at each later point in time, Yt, is also log-normally distributed.
In our benchmark model, households have the same pure rates of time preference and
household i's intertemporal utility is given as aggregated discounted instantaneous utility
U i({Y it }, {Et}) =
∞∑
t=0
ρt
1
1− η u
i(Y it , Et)
1−η , (5.3)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the pure time discount factor and η, with 0 ≤ η < ∞, is the inverse
of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to the within-period
aggregate consumption bundle, composed of E and Y . Thus, we consider a setting in which
each (dynastic) household only cares about the consumption of her own dynasty, has a
preference against inequality in comprehensive consumption over time but only a limited
altruism towards future selves or decendants (see, for example, Asheim and Nesje (2016) for
a discussion of intergenerational altruism).
As the measure of economic value for household i, we consider the time path {xit} of
compensating surplus for a change in the time path of environmental goods from {Et} to
{E′t}.66 We often just consider the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a marginal improvement of
{Et} instead of compensating surplus, as WTP features more prominently in the (applied)
environmental valuation literature. In general, we measure the value of environmental good
in units of the market consumption good or income, respectively:
U i({Y it − xit}, {E′t}) = U i({Y it }, {Et}). (5.4)
The time path xit is not a scalar, and for general preferences it is not uniquely defined.
We therefore add more structure to our model to be able to capture compensating surplus
or WTP as a scalar. One may consider the problem of the household as a hypothetical
choice problem (Neary and Roberts 1980, Hanemann 1991, Flores and Carson 1997), where
each household maximizes her intertemporal utility subject to each period's intra-temporal
budget constraint, Ct = Yt, as well as the exogenously fixed levels of the environmental good
Et and the market consumption good Ct:
max
{Cit},{Et}
U i({Cit}, {Et}) s.t. Cit = Y it and Et fixed . (5.5)
66In a similar fashion, one can consider the equivalent surplus.
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A households income-equivalent valuation of the environmental good is the valuation per unit
(Lindahl price) times the level of the environmental good. We study WTP for two different
types of environmental policies, so that {Et} and {E′t} differ in either E0 or gE . When the
environmental good differs only in E0, but not in gE , we refer to this as a (marginal) change
in the level of the environmental good. This might be, for instance, an increase in forest cover
or a small re-establishment of a species. When the environmental good differs in gE but not
in E0, we refer to this as a (marginal) change in the growth rate of the environmental good.
This might be, for instance, protecting breeding or enhancing nursing ground for pollinators
or birds, or slowing down coral bleaching.
To facilitate closed-form analytic solutions, we assume that the inverse of the constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to the aggregate consumption bundle,
η, equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between market consumption goods and
environmental goods, 1/θ. This assumption follows theoretic work by Quaas and Bröcker
(2016), who build a solvable analytic climate-economy model that extends upon the previous
Cobb-Douglas cases in the literature (cf. Golosov et al. 2014). While there is no apparent
reason why the assumption η = 1/θ should be fulfilled, there is considerable scope for it to
hold if we consider suggested values for η, which range from 0 to 5 (e.g. Drupp et al. 2018,
Groom and Maddison 2018), and those for 1/θ, which range from 0.14 to 2 (e.g. Sterner and
Persson 2008, Drupp 2018).
For these assumptions we obtain the intertemporal utility function for the initial lev-
els and growth rates of the market consumption good, or income respectively, and of the
environmental public good (Appendix 5.8.2):
U i(
{
Y it
}
, {Et}) = θ
θ − 1
 αY i θ−1θ0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
 . (5.6)
This intertemporal utility function (Eq. 5.6) only exist for time paths for which the following
conditions for the growth rates hold
ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ < 1, (5.7a)
ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ < 1. (5.7b)
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Table 5.1: Overview of the four studied WTP cases.
Payment scheme Change in natural capital
marginal change dE in
initial level E0
marginal change dgE in
growth rate gE
single payment (SP) in t=0 (1) WTPSP,dE (2) WTPSP,dgE
constant payment fraction (CPF) (3) WTPCPF,dE (4) WTPCPF,dgE
5.3 Valuation concepts
We now analyze the individual and societal valuation for the environmental good for different
payment schemes and objects of valuation. Our analysis focusses on WTP and societal mean
WTP, denoted as WTP. We consider WTP for two payment types, pt: (i) a single payment
in the initial time period (pt = SP ), and (ii) a constant payment fraction of income over
time (pt = CPF ).67 Moreover, for each payment scheme we study WTPs for two different
environmental policies, ep, that induces changes in the stream of the environmental good:
marginal changes in the (a) the level (ep = dE) and (b) the growth rate (ep = dgE) of the
environmental good. This yields four cases, with two payment schemes and two changes of
the environmental good (see Table 5.1).
5.3.1 Individual Valuation
We consider two specific cases for compensating surplus or WTP that are prevalent in the
literature: First, a payment to be made in a single period only (hereafter: single payment
or SP), usually in the initial period t = 0. Second, a payment to be made as a relative
fraction of consumption in each period (hereafter: constant payment fraction or CPF). Both
payment types are used in the applied valuation literature, while CPF accounts for the bulk
of payment vehicles used, often via taxes.68
67While the dynastic household has a preference for consumption smoothing over time, our model abstracts
from savings. Therefore, as noted before, a household's amount of the consumption good is equal to disposable
household income (C = Y ).
68For instance, of the 98 reported WTP values elicited with stated preference methods ('contingent val-
uation', 'choice modeling') in the TEEB-Database (Van der Ploeg and de Groot 2010) 91 WTP-estimates
have been elicited as annual payments (categories 'annual' and 'annual (range)') while 3 WTP-estimates
have been elicited as single payments (category 'one time payment/ WTP').
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First, if we assume standard time preferences and that the single payment is made in
period t = 0 only, the compensating surplus {xit} = (xiSP, 0, . . .) is defined as
1
1− η u
i(Y i0 − xiSP, E′0)1−η +
1
1− η
∞∑
t=1
ρt ui(Y it , E
′
t)
1−η =
1
1− η
∞∑
t=0
ρt ui(Y it , Et)
1−η.
(5.8)
Second, another straightforward way to measure the compensating surplus as a scalar
is to consider a constant payment fraction xi by which income is reduced in each period,
{xit} = {(1− xiCPF)Y it }, given by
1
1− η
∞∑
t=0
ρt ui((1− xiCPF)Y it , E′t)1−η =
1
1− η
∞∑
t=0
ρt ui(Y it , Et)
1−η. (5.9)
As a first step, we compute compensating surplus for both a single payment as well as
for a constant payment fraction. To avoid notational overload, we suppress the index for
individual households i for now.
Regarding a single payment in the initial period (Eq. 5.8) the compensating surplus, x,
is determined by (see Appendix 5.8.3)
xSP = Y0
1−
1 + Y 1−θθ0
 1−αα E θ−1θ0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α E
′ θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
 θθ−1
 . (5.10)
The compensating surplus does not depend on the income growth rate in this case. This
is due to the assumption η = 1/θ, which links the preference for intertemporal inequality
aversion in consumption or income and the substitutability between goods at each point in
time.69
Regarding a constant payment fraction (Eq. 5.9) the compensating surplus, x, is deter-
mined by (see Appendix 5.8.4)
xCPF = 1−
1− 1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
αY
θ−1
θ
0
 (1− α)E′0 θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
− (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
 θθ−1 .
(5.11)
69This may also be different in a setting with endogenous saving decisions and where WTP is large enough
in relation to aggregate income. In a case with endogenous savings, one would need to assume that the
environmental good only has a marginal contribution to overall welfare (cf. Gollier (2017)).
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We are now equipped to derive the four possible cases of WTP (cf. Table 5.1), distin-
guished by the mode of payment (single vs. constant fraction) and whether the marginal
change in the environmental goods affects only the initial level or the growth rate.
First, WTP measured as a single payment at t = 0 for a marginal change in the initial
level of the environmental good, E′0 = E0 + dE, that is leaving the environmental growth
rate unchanged gE = g′E is given by (see Appendix 5.8.5)
WTPSP,dE =
1− α
α
Y
1/θ
0 E
−1/θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
dE. (5.12)
This is a direct generalization of Ebert (2003) and Baumgärtner et al. (2017a).
Second, the WTP for a marginal change in the growth rate of the environmental good,
g′E = gE + dgE , that is leaving the level of the environmental good unchanged, E0 = E
′
0,
measured as a single payment is (see Appendix 5.8.6)
WTPSP,dgE =
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ Y
1/θ
0
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE . (5.13)
Third, the WTP measured as a constant payment fraction for a marginal change in
the initial level of the environmental good, E′0 = E0 + dE and gE = g′E , is given by (see
Appendix 5.8.7)
WTPCPF,dE =
1− α
α
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
Y
1−θ
θ
0 E
−1/θ
0 dE. (5.14)
Fourth, assuming g′E = gE + dgE and E0 = E
′
0, we derive the WTP as a constant
payment fraction for a marginal change of the growth rate of the environmental good (see
Appendix 5.8.8)
WTPCPF,dgE =
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 Y 1−θθ0 E θ−1θ0 dgE . (5.15)
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5.3.2 Societal Valuation
We now turn to aggregating individual WTPs within a society. Mean WTP in terms of a
single payment at t = 0 is given by
WTPSP,ep(µY0 , σY0 , gE) =
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPSP,ep(Y0, gE) dY0 , (5.16)
for both objects of valuation, ep, and where fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0) is the density function of the
log-normal distribution of initial income Y0 with mean µY0 and standard deviation σY0 .
Compensating surplus for a single payment in t = 0 and a marginal change in the initial
level of the environmental good is given by Eq. (5.12). Mean WTP in terms of a single
payment at t = 0 (Eq. 5.16) for a marginal change in the initial level of the environmental
good can be reformulated as (see Appendix 5.8.9)
WTPSP,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gE) = κµ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.17)
with κ =
1− α
α
E
−1/θ
0 dE
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
,
where CVY0 is the initial relative income inequality.
The corresponding mean WTP as single payment for a marginal change in the growth
rate is given by (see Appendix 5.8.10)
WTPSP,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gE) = κ
′ µ1/θY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.18)
with κ′ =
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE .
Thus, the value of a marginal increase in the level of the environmental good elicited as a
single payment in t = 0 (Eqs. 5.17 and 5.18) does not depend on income growth, gY . The
mean WTP function obtained (Eq. 5.17) is structurally identical to the one in the static
setting obtained by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a), with differences in κ.
Next, we turn to societal WTP elicited as a constant payment fraction. Note that we
now have to multiply the CPF with the respective level of income in each period, with
Yt = (1 + gY )
t Y0, to obtain the overall mean WTP. While individual pure time preferences
affect the individual CPF, the planner applies her own discount rate when aggregating yearly
mean WTPs over time. The planner's discount rate may be given by the (risk-free) market
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discount rate, where 0 < δτ < 1 is the interest factor at time τ .70
The (undiscounted) mean WTP at time t for an environmental policy (ep) that induces
a marginal change in E0 or gE is
WTPCPF,ep;t(µY0 , σY0 , gY , gE) =
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPCPF,ep(Y0, gY , gE)(1 + gY )
tY0 dY0 ,
(5.19)
with the associated present value  discounted at market interest rates  given by
WTPCPF,ep(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) =
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
WTPCPF,ep;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE). (5.20)
For a marginal change in the initial level of the environmental good the (undiscounted)
mean WTP at time t measured as a constant payment fraction can be rewritten as a function
of the moments of the income distribution and the growth rates (see Appendix 5.8.11)
WTPCPF,dE;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) = κ
′′ µ1/θY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.21)
with κ′′ =
1− α
α
(
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(1 + gY )
t
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 dE,
with the following associated present value mean WTP (see Appendix 5.8.11)
WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) = κ
′′′
µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.22)
with κ
′′′
=
1− α
α
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 dE
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
(1 + gY )
t
]
.
Analogously, for a marginal change in the growth rate of the environmental good the
mean WTP at time t as constant payment fraction is (see Appendix 5.8.12)
WTPCPF,dgE ;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) = κ
′′′′ µ1/θY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.23)
with κ′′′′ =
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE(1 + gY )tE θ−1θ0 ,
70We show in Appendix 5.8.1 how the time-constant interest factor, δt = δ, can be derived from an
one-sector endogenous growth model.
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with the corresponding present value (see Appendix 5.8.12)
WTPCPF,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) = κ
′′′′′
µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV 2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 , (5.24)
with κ′′′′′ =
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgEE θ−1θ0
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
(1 + gY )
t
]
.
5.4 Results
In this section, we study how a change in (i) mean income, µY0 , or (ii) intratemporal income
inequality, CVY0 , affects societal intertemporal WTP for an increase in the level or the
growth rate of the environmental public good (Eqs. 5.17, 5.18, 5.22, and 5.24). Moreover,
we study how a change in (iii) the growth rate of income, gY , determining the intertemporal
distribution of income, affects WTP measured as a constant payment (Eqs. 5.22 and 5.24) or
(iv) the growth rate of the environmental good, gE , affects societal WTP for the level of the
environmental public good (Eqs. 5.17 and 5.22). Finally, we (v) derive adjustment factors for
applications such as benefit transfer, environmental cost-benefit analysis or natural capital
accounting. We address these five analyses in turn.
First, how does society's current mean income affect the intertemporal mean WTP ?
Proposition 5.1
Mean WTP elicited as a single payment or a constant payment fraction for an increase
in the level or the growth rate of the environmental public good WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17),
WTPSP,dgE (Eq. 5.18), WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22), and WTPCPF,dgE (Eq. 5.24)increases with
initial mean income, µY0 :
∂WTPpt,ep(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ µY0
> 0. (5.25)
Proof. See Appendix 5.8.13.
Proposition 5.1 states that the effect of societies (initial) mean income on societal WTP
is unambiguous: Mean WTP for the level or the growth rate of the environmental good
increase with mean income. Proposition 5.1 generalizes the result from the static setting
obtained in Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) to a dynamic setting and to different objects of
valuation.
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Second, how does the current relative income inequality affect intertemporal mean WTP?
Proposition 5.2
Mean WTP elicited as a single payment or a constant payment fraction for an increase in
the level or the growth rate of the environmental public good WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17),
WTPSP,dgE (Eq. 5.18), WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22), WTPCPF,dgE (Eq. 5.24)decreases (in-
creases) with relative intratemporal income inequality, CVY0 , if and only if the environmental
public good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂WTPpt,ep(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ CVY0
Q 0 if and only if θ R 1. (5.26)
Proof. See Appendix 5.8.14.
Proposition 5.2 states that (initial) relative intratemporal income inequality affects mean
WTP for natural capital and that the sign of the effect depends on whether the environmental
public goods derived from natural capital are a substitute or a complement to market-
traded manufactured consumption goods. If they are substitutes, mean WTP for natural
capital decreases with income inequality. If they are complements, mean WTP for natural
capital increases with income inequality. Proposition 5.2 generalizes the central finding in
Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) to an intertemporal setting: The degree of substitutability is
the key determinant of how intratemporal income inequality affects societal WTP. Having
established these two findings for the intratemporal distribution, we now turn to scrutinizing
the intertemporal distribution and specifically examine how growth rates affect WTP.
Third, how does the intertemporal distribution of income, given by the growth rate of income,
affect intertemporal mean WTP?
Proposition 5.3
Mean WTP elicited as a constant payment fraction for an increase in the level or the growth
rate of the environmental public goodWTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22), WTPCPF,dgE (Eq. 5.24)for
a time-constant market interest factor, δ < 11+gY , increases with the growth rate of income,
gY , if the environmental public good and the private consumption good are complements or
Cobb-Douglas:
∂WTPCPF,ep(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ gY
> 0 if θ ≤ 1. (5.27)
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Proof. See Appendix 5.8.15.
How the intertemporal distribution of income affects societal WTP depends on the level
of the growth rate of income, the relative sizes of the pure time discount and market interest
factors as well as the degree of substitutability. For the case of complements, we find that an
increase in intertemporal inequality in terms of consumption goods increases societal WTP
for the public environmental good. As a larger growth rate of consumption leads to more
private goods consumption relative to the complementary environmental good, the household
is willing to sacrifice more of the private good to have a more balanced consumption of private
and environmental goods when the two goods are complements. We find the same effect
for the special case of Cobb-Douglas substitutability. However, if the environmental good
is a substitute to manufactured goods there are cases where an increase in intertemporal
inequality in terms of consumption goods leads to a decrease of societal WTP, depending on
the relative magnitudes of the elasticity of substitution, the growth rate of income as well as
pure time and market interest rate factors. We illustrate the range of conditions for which
WTP for an increase in the level of the environmental good and the case of substitutes may
fall with the growth rate of income in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 in Appendix 5.8.16.
Societal WTP elicited as a single payment  WTP SP,dE (Eq. 5.17) and WTP SP,dgE
(Eq. 5.18)  does not depend on the growth rate of income, gY . Thus, WTP measured as a
single payment is not affected by a change in the gY .
Fourth, how does the intertemporal distribution, given by the growth rate of the environmental
good, affect intertemporal mean WTP for a change in the level of the environmental good?
Proposition 5.4
Mean WTP elicited as a single payment or a constant payment fraction for an increase in the
level of the environmental public good WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17), WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22)
increases (decreases) with the growth rate of the environmental good, gE , if and only if the
environmental public good and the private consumption good are substitutes (complements):
∂WTPpt,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ gE
R 0 if and only if θ R 1. (5.28)
Proof. See Appendix 5.8.17.
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The intertemporal distribution of natural capital, captured by the growth rate of en-
vironmental goods, has no effect on societal WTP for the special case of Cobb-Douglas
substitutability. For substitutes, an increase in intertemporal inequality in terms of environ-
mental goods increases societal WTP, while it is the reverse case when the environmental
good is a complement to manufactured goods. Thus, if there is a complementarity rela-
tionship, a ceteris paribus higher growth rate and thus consumption of environmental goods
tends to make consumption goods relatively scarcer and thus decreases WTP for an extra
unit of the environmental goods.
Fifth, how should one adjust intertemporal mean WTP for differences in the distribution of
income when conducting value transfer from a study to a policy site?
We now derive adjustment factors for site specific differences in the distribution of in-
come, growth rates and interest rates. Benefit transfer has become a primary method of
environmental valuation (Richardson et al. 2015) and a crucial input to inform government
decision making (OECD 2018). As most of the benefit transfer literature and practice em-
ploys empirical meta-regression approaches, there have been calls to base benefit transfers
approaches more firmly in economic theory (Bateman et al. 2011). Several government
guidelines for economic appraisal already propose to use an explicit transfer factor to ac-
count for differences in mean income between the study context of the primary valuation
('study site') and the decision making contest ('policy site'), e.g. in Germany (UBA 2012)
and the UK (Defra 2007). This was complemented and taken further by Baumgärtner et al.
(2017a), who provided additional theory-driven adjustment factors, in particular for income
inequality. Empirical evidence from a multi-country valuation study shows that employing
this theory-driven adjustment factor for income inequality increases the accuracy of benefit
transfers (Meya et al. 2017).
With the model setting presented here we can show that these transfer factors for differ-
ences in the income distribution also hold more generally in a dynamic setting and we derive
additional transfer factors for growth rates and market interest rates. Thereby, we specify
the benefit transfer function (e.g. Loomis 1992) to explicitly account for the time dimension.
These generalizations and extensions make the benefit function approach more suitable for
natural capital accounting. Mean WTP for a policy site, WTP
policy
, can than be estimated
as the product of a simple transfer function T with the mean WTP elicited at a study site,
WTP
study
.
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Proposition 5.5
Assume that households' preferences (θ, α, ρ) are identical in the study and the policy sites.
Mean WTP as a single payment for a marginal change in the level of the environmental
public good in a policy site, WTP
policy
SP,dE , is given by
WTP
policy
SP,dE = TSP,dE(Epolicy0 , dEpolicy, gpolicyE , µpolicyY0 ,CV
policy
Y0
;
Estudy0 , dE
study, gstudyE , µ
study
Y0
,CVstudyY0 ) · WTP
study
SP,dE , (5.29)
with the following transfer function
TSP,dE(. . .) =T (dE)E (Epolicy0 , Estudy0 ; θ) · TdE(dEpolicy, dEstudy) · T (dE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ)
· Tµ(µpolicyY0 , µ
study
Y0
; θ) · TCV(CVpolicyY0 ,CV
study
Y0
; θ). (5.30)
The mean WTPs, WTPpt,ep, for the other three cases of payment types and environmental
good changes yield the following transfer functions for transferring WTP
study
pt,ep into WTP
policy
pt,ep :
TSP,dgE (. . .) =T (dgE)E (Epolicy0 , Estudy0 ; θ) · TdgE (dgpolicyE , dgstudyE ) · T (dgE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ)
· Tµ(µpolicyY0 , µ
study
Y0
; θ) · TCV(CVpolicyY0 ,CV
study
Y0
; θ), (5.31)
TCPF,dE(. . .) =T (dE)E (Epolicy0 , Estudy0 ; θ) · TdE(dEpolicy, dEstudy) · T (dE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ)
· Tµ(µpolicyY0 , µ
study
Y0
; θ) · TCV(CVpolicyY0 ,CV
study
Y0
; θ)
· TgY ,δτ (gpolicyY , δpolicyτ , gstudyY , δstudyτ ; θ, ρ), (5.32)
TCPF,dgE (. . .) =T (dgE)E (Epolicy0 , Estudy0 ; θ) · TdgE (dgpolicyE , dgstudyE ) · T (dgE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ)
· Tµ(µpolicyY0 , µ
study
Y0
; θ) · TCV(CVpolicyY0 ,CV
study
Y0
; θ)
· TgY ,δτ (gpolicyY , δpolicyτ , gstudyY , δstudyτ ; θ, ρ), (5.33)
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The corresponding disentangled transfer factors are given by:
T (dE)E (Epolicy0 , Estudy0 ; θ) =
(
Epolicy0
Estudy0
)−1/θ
, (5.34)
T (dgE)E (Epolicy0 , Estudy0 ; θ) =
(
Epolicy0
Estudy0
) θ−1
θ
, (5.35)
TdE(dEpolicy, dEstudy) = dE
policy
dEstudy
, (5.36)
T (dE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ) =
1− ρ(1 + gstudyE )
θ−1
θ
1− ρ(1 + gpolicyE )
θ−1
θ
, (5.37)
T (dgE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ) =
ρ(1 + gpolicyE )
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gstudyE )
θ−1
θ
)2
ρ(1 + gstudyE )
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gpolicyE )
θ−1
θ
)2 , (5.38)
TdgE (dgpolicyE , dgstudyE ) =
dgpolicyE
dgstudyE
, (5.39)
Tµ(µpolicyY0 , µ
study
Y0
; θ) =
(
µpolicyY0
µstudyY0
)1/θ
, (5.40)
TCV(CVpolicyY0 ,CV
study
Y0
; θ) =
(
1 + CVpolicy 2Y0
1 + CVstudy 2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
, (5.41)
TgY ,δτ (gpolicyY , δpolicyτ , gstudyY ,δstudyτ ; θ, ρ)
=
1− ρ (1 + gpolicyY )
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gstudyY )
θ−1
θ
·
∑∞
t=0
(∏t
τ=0 δ
policy
τ
)
(1 + gpolicyY )
t∑∞
t=0
(∏t
τ=0 δ
study
τ
)
(1 + gstudyY )
t
.
(5.42)
Proof. See Appendix 5.8.18.
Proposition 5.5 develops a set of four specific transfer functions for different payment vehi-
cles and objects of valuation. It shows that adjustment for differences in the income distribu-
tion can be done in the same way for all four cases by exploiting information on the intratem-
poral income distribution. Thereby, TCV(CVpolicyY0 ,CV
study
Y0
; θ) and Tµ(µpolicyY0 , µ
study
Y0
; θ) make
the results in Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) applicable for the specific intertemporal setting
considered here. Moreover, Proposition 5.5 shows that one has to apply specific transfer
factors for differences in the level of the environmental public good or the growth rates
depending on the component of natural capital one seeks to value. Finally, for WTP elicited
as a constant payment fraction  which is the more common approach in primary valuation
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 our dynamic model shows how to adjust mean WTP for differences in income growth and
interest rates by using TgY ,δτ (gpolicyY , δpolicyτ , gstudyY , δstudyτ ; θ, ρ).
Furthermore, our dynamic model provides guidance how to adjust mean WTP for differ-
ences in the growth rate of the environmental good by employing T (dE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ)
or T (dgE)gE (gpolicyE , gstudyE ; θ, ρ) depending on whether a change in the level or the growth rate
of the environmental good is valued.
5.5 Application: Global biodiversity conservation
5.5.1 Data
This section introduces our case study onWTP for global ecosystem services and biodiversity.
An overview of the inputs to our empirical application is given in Table 5.2.
For the initial global income distribution we draw on Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin
(2009), who estimate the global per-capita income distribution for 2006 finding a mean
of µY0 = 9, 550 [2006-PPP-USD] and a standard deviation of σY0 = 15, 400 [2006-PPP-
USD] (Pinkovskiy, personal communication). This corresponds to a coefficient of variation
of CVY0 = 1.61. For the forecasted growth rate of income, gY , we draw on an expert survey
by Drupp et al. (2018). Almost two hundred experts on long-term societal decision-making
were asked to provide their best guess of the global average, long-term (> 100 years) annual
growth rate of real per-capita consumption. They find a mean consumption growth rate
of gmeanY = 1.7 percent. The lower bound (abbreviated as `lb') is -2 percent and the upper
bound (`ub') is gubE = 5 percent. As only three experts stated negative growth rates and,
in order to stay consistent with our model assumptions, we take glbY = 0.1 percent as lower
bound value in our application.
We normalize the initial level of the global environmental good to E0 = 1. For the growth
rate of the environmental good, gE , we focus on non-use ecosystem services, as this provides
the best fit for our simple mapping from natural capital to ecosystem service provision-
ing. We take the global mean annual growth rate of cultural ecosystem services estimated
by Baumgärtner et al. (2015), based on the best available time-series data for different
ecosystem services and countries. These include as ecosystem service measures landscape
connectedness, forest area, living planet index, red-list-index and national biodiversity indi-
cators. Baumgärtner et al. (2015) estimate the global average growth rate as gmeanE = −0.52
with a lower bound of glbE = −1.28 percent and an upper bound of gubE = −0.08 percent.
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Table 5.2: Variable and parameter values used in the application
Parameter Value(s) Description Source
CVY0 1.61 Coefficient of variation of global per-
capita income
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-
Martin (2009)
µY0 9,550 Mean global per-capita income in
2006-PPP-USD
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-
Martin (2009)
gY 0.017 Annual real per-capita Drupp et al. (2018)
[0.001; 0.050] (consumption) growth rate
E0 1 Normalized to one 
gE −0.0052 Growth rate of global non-use Baumgärtner
[−0.0128;−0.0008] environmental goods et al. (2015)
α 0.85 [0.7; 1] Utility share parameter for con-
sumption goods
Kopp et al. (2012)
θ 2.31 [0.86; 7.14] Elasticity of substitution Drupp (2018)
ρ 0.989 [0.926; 1] Pure time discounting factor Drupp et al. (2018)
δ 0.977 [0.94; 1] Risk-free market interest factor Drupp et al. (2018)
Note: Numbers in brackets correspond to lower and upper bound values. We approximate the up-
per bound discount and interest factors with 0.999 instead of 1.
We take preference parameters from the literature, in particular from meta-studies and
international expert surveys. For the utility share parameter of consumptions goods relative
to environmental goods, α, we draw on the parameter range considered by Kopp et al.
(2012), ranging from 0 to 0.3, with a mean of 0.15, for the environmental good. Thus, the
parameter value for the consumption good ranges from 0.7 to 1, with a mean of 0.85.71 For
the elasticity of substitution between the environmental and the market-traded consumption
good, we use data from a meta-study by Drupp (2018), who gathers indirect evidence from 18
environmental valuation studies. This yields a mean elasticity of substitution of θmean = 2.31,
implying that environmental goods are considered as substitutes to market-traded goods on
average, with a lower and upper bound of θlb = 0.86 and θub = 7.14 respectively.72 For the
pure time discount factor, the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and the market
interest factor, we again draw on survey data from Drupp et al. (2018), who elicited expert
recommendations and long-run forecasts. They obtain a mean rate of pure time preference
of 1.1 percent, with a lower and upper bound of 0 and 8 percent. This translates into an
initial mean pure time discount factor of ρmean = 0.989, with a lower and upper bound of
71This encompasses parameter values chosen by Sterner and Persson (2008), who assume 1−α = 0.1, and
Gollier (2010), who assumes 1− α = 0.29.
72Note that values implying stronger complementarity have been used in the applied theory and modelling
literature. For example, Sterner and Persson (2008) used a central value of 0.5.
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0.926 and 1.73 The mean forecasted real risk-free market interest rate is 2.38 percent, with
a lower and upper bound of 0 and 6 percent. This translates into an initial mean market
interest factor δmean = 0.977, with a lower and upper bound of δlb = 0.943 and δub = 1.74
We quantify our results for a time horizon of hundred years, T = 100, and a hypothetical
one percent increase in the level of the environmental good. The corresponding change dE =
0.01 that we seek to value is a pure scaling factors in the mean WTP-function (Eq. 5.14).
Before quantifying our main results, we need to make sure, that the conditions on the
growth paths hold (Eqs. 5.7a and 5.7b). The set of growth rates that meet the existence con-
dition for the closed-form intertemporal utility function for a given elasticity of substitution,
θ, and discount factor, ρ, is given as75
ρ(1 + g)
θ−1
θ < 1 ⇐⇒

g < ρ
−θ
θ−1 − 1 =: gmax for θ > 1
g > ρ
−θ
θ−1 − 1 =: gmin for θ < 1
. (5.43)
Thus, the growth path condition for substitutes implies a supremum defined by gmax,
which is always positive and thus bites only for the income growth rate gY , but not for the
growth rate of the environmental good which is by definition always negative, gE < 0. In
contrast, the growth rate condition for complements implies a infimum for the growth rates
gmin, below which the closed-form intertemporal utility function does not exist. As gmin is
always negative, this condition is generally fulfilled for the income growth rate, gY > 0, but
applies for the growth rate of the environmental good, gE < 0.
Figure 5.1 displays this frontier for the growth rates of income and the environmen-
tal good for a range of empirical elasticities of substitution, θ, and pure time discount
factors, ρ, depicted in Table 2. The supremum for the income growth rate in the mean
case of substitutes, with θmean = 2.31, depends on ρ = 0.989 [0.926; 0.999] and is given by
gmaxθ=2.31 = 0.0197 [0.1452, 0.0018]. For the upper bound substitutability, with θ
ub = 7.14,
it is given by gmaxθ=7.14 = 0.0129 [0.0935; 0.0012]. For the lower bound complementarity
case, with θlb = 0.86, the infimum for the growth rate of the environmental good is
gminθ=0.86 = −0.0657 [−0.3764;−0.0061]. We observe that the closer the discount factor ρ
is to one, i.e. the closer the pure time prefernece rate is to zero, the smaller is the set of gE
in case of complements and of gY in case of substitutes that fulfils the growth path condition.
73We use a value of 0.999 instead of 1 to ensure that our intertemporal welfare function is bounded.
74We use a value of 0.999 instead of 1 to ensure that the present value WTP as a constant payment fraction
is bounded.
75As the condition is identical for gE and gY we suppress the subscript on the growth rate in the following
formula and only write g.
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Figure 5.1: Minimal value for gE in case of complements, θ < 1, (left side) and maximal value for gY in case of
substitutes, θ > 1, (right side) to ensure the existence of a closed-form intertemporal utility function
(Eq. 5.3) for different values of the discount factor, ρ, and the elasticity of substitution, θ. The shaded
area depicts the set of growth rates gE (left side) or gY (right side) that meets the growth path
condition (Eq. 5.7b or 5.7a) for the transfer factor for the mean pure time discount factor, ρ = 0.989.
Moreover, the higher the degree of substitutability, θ →∞, the smaller is the set of gY that
still meets the condition, and the stronger the complementarity, θ → 0, the larger is the set
of gE that meets the condition.
When we compare these infima and suprema of the growth rates, gE and gY , for which
a closed-form intertemporal utility function exists, with empirical data on growth rates, we
see that these conditions appear generally uncritical for the loss rate of ecosystem services
gE . This is not the case for the income growth rate gY . For the mean estimate on the pure
time discount factor, ρmean = 0.989, and complements with the strongest complementarity,
θlb = 0.86, estimated from valuation studies reviewed in Drupp (2018), the growth rate
infimum gminθ=0.86 = −0.0657 is well below the lower bound rate of global loss of ecosystem
services glbE = −0.0128 estimated by Baumgärtner et al. (2015). Also for the mean pure time
discount factor and the best guess estimate for the degree of substitutability, θmean = 2.31,
the income growth rate supremum is with gmaxθ=2.31 = 0.0197 higher than the mean of the long
term growth rate expected by international experts of gmeanY = 0.017. Thus, for the main
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specification of our model the growth path condition is fulfilled. However, the upper bound
of the expected annual global income growth rate of gubY = 0.05 does not meet the growth
path condition for the mean substitutability parameter gmaxθ=2.31. Moreover, for the upper
bound of the substitutability parameter, θ = 7.14, the mean growth rate, gmeanY , is already
higher than the supremum gmaxθ=7.14 and thus the growth path condition is not fulfilled.
5.5.2 Quantification of main results
We estimate how intra- and intertemporal distribution affects mean WTP for global ecosys-
tem services derived from biodiversity. Moreover, we compute transfer factors that allow
controlling for the intertemporal aspects of natural capital valuation. We focus on the case
of mean WTP measured as a constant payment fraction for a marginal change in the envi-
ronmental good, WTPCPF,dE , throughout this subsection, as the bulk of empirical valuation
studies falls within this category.
Figure 5.2 depicts how mean income (left side) and income inequality (right side) affect
global mean WTP measured as a constant payment fraction for an initial increase in global
ecosystem services. First of all, it is apparent that the degree of substitutability, θ, is crucial
in determining mean WTP, WTPCPF,dE . For initial global mean income and the mean
substitutability estimate θmean = 2.31, we obtain a mean WTP of 0.63 [2006-PPP-USD].
However, if ecosystem services were a complement to manufactured consumption goods,
θlb = 0.86, mean WTP would be magnitudes higher and amount to 8.40 × 103 [2006-PPP-
USD]. These estimates highlight that the societal value of global ecosystem services strongly
depends on their substitutability: The harder it is to substitute ecosystem services with
human-made goods, the higher is their societal value.
Mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation is increasing with mean income (see
Proposition 5.1). For substitutes mean WTP is a strictly increasing concave function of
mean income (Figure 5.2 top left subplot), while it is a convex function for complements
(bottom left subplot). For a hypothetical doubling of global per-capita income, mean WTP
would be 34.99% higher for the mean substitutability estimate. In this case WTP-estimates
would need to be adjusted with a factor of Tµ(2µGLOY0 , µGLOY0 ; θmean) = 1.35. For the lower
bound range of complements, θlb = 0.86, it would be even 123.89% higher as initially,
corresponding to an adjustment factor of Tµ(2µGLOY0 , µGLOY0 ; θlb) = 2.24.
The subplots on the right of Figure 5.2 illustrate how mean WTP for global biodiversity
conservation changes for a change in relative intratemporal income inequality as measured
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Figure 5.2: Effect of mean income, µY0 , (left side) or relative intratemporal income inequality, CVY0 , (right side)
on the present value mean WTP for a one percent increase in global non-use environmental goods
measured as a constant payment fraction, WTPCPF,dE , for different degrees of substitutability
between the consumption and the environmental good, θ.
by the coefficient of variation of per-capita income, CVY0 . While mean WTP decreases
with income inequality for the mean case of substitutes (top right subplot), it increases for
complements (bottom right subplot) (see Proposition 5.2). A hypothetical reduction of the
current level of global income inequality, CVGLOY0 = 1.61, to zero would increase mean WTP
by 17.00% corresponding to a transfer factor of TCV(0,CVGLOY0 ; θmean) = 1.17 given the mean
empirical estimate for the elasticity of substitution, θmean = 2.31. To the contrary, the lower
bound elasticities of substitution, θlb = 0.86, produces a decrease by 11.40% corresponding
to a transfer factor of TCV(0,CVGLOY0 ; θlb) = 0.89.
The left side of Figure 5.3 illustrates how mean WTP for global biodiversity conservation
changes with the income growth rate. Mean WTP increases with income growth for comple-
ments and Cobb-Douglas substitutability (Proposition 5.3). Yet, for the case of substitutes,
mean WTP can also decreases with income growth.76 We find that for a hypothetical re-
duction of the currently expected global income growth rate by half, mean WTP would
increase by 192.83% for a substitutability of θmean = 2.31 and decrease by 36.54% for a
substitutability of θlb = 0.86.
76In our central calibration and for an infinite time horizon, mean WTP starts to decrease with income
growth at gmeanY already for a medium-degree of substitutability θ
∗ = 1.93 (see Figure 5.8 and Eq. 5.96).
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Figure 5.3: Effect of global per-capita income growth rate, gY , (left side) or growth rate of non-use environmental
goods, gE , (right side) on the present value mean WTP for a one percent increase in global non-use
environmental goods measured as a constant payment fraction, WTPCPF,dE , for different degrees of
substitutability between the consumption and the environmental good, θ. Grey coloured lines indicate
parameter combinations that do not meet the growth path condition for the closed-form
intertemporal utility function (Eq. 5.7a).
Concerning the effect of the growth rate of environmental goods, the right side of Fig-
ure 5.3 shows that mean WTP increases with the growth rate of the environmental good
for substitutes, but decreases for complements (Proposition 5.4). For the non-use environ-
mental goods from global biodiversity, a hypothetically slowing down of the loss rate by
half will increase mean WTP by 11.72% for substitutes, θmean = 2.31, and decrease mean
WTP by 3.97% for complements, θlb = 0.86. In this empirical illustration, the effect of
income growth on societal WTP is relatively stronger as compared to the growth rate of
environmental goods.
Next, we study whether the new structural benefit transfer factors for differences in
growth rates and market interest rates (Proposition 5.5) lead to notable WTP adjustments.
Specifically, we perform hypothetical transfers of meanWTP elicited at the mean of empirical
estimates to a site characterised with the lower or upper bound parameters within the
empirically plausible parameter a value ranges (cf. Table 5.2).
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Figure 5.4: Transfer factor to adjust mean WTP for a one percent increase in the level of the environmental good
from a study site with a growth rate of gstudyE = −0.0052 to the growth rate at a policy site. Colours
depict different degrees of substitutability between the manufactured consumption and the
environmental good, θ.
First, we turn to the transfer factor for differences in the growth rate of the environmen-
tal good T (dE)gE (Eq. 5.38). Figure 5.4 displays the required adjustment when transferring
mean WTP from a study site with the global average growth rate of non-use ecosystem
services, gmeanE = −0.0052, to a policy site with a growth rate within the range of global
growth rates for different non-use ecosystem services estimated by Baumgärtner et al. (2015).
Applying environmental values elicited at a study site with gstudyE := g
mean
E at a policy site
with a higher growth rate of the environmental good, that is where the loss of biodiversity
is at a lower rate, equal to gubE = −0.0008, would require an upward adjustment of soci-
etal WTP by 21.58%, corresponding to a transfer factor of T (dE)gE (gubE , gmeanE ; θmean) = 1.22.
To the contrary, societal WTP-estimates for a transfer to a policy context with a higher
rate of biodiversity loss of glbE = −0.0128 would need to be lowered by 23.51%, i.e. be
adjusted by the factor T (dE)gE (glbE , gmeanE ; θmean) = 0.77. Again, the transfer factor cru-
cially depends on the substitutability between the two goods. A higher degree of sub-
stitutability would reinforce these required adjustments, T (dE)gE (gubE , gmeanE ; θub) = 1.32 and
T (dE)gE (glbE , gmeanE ; θub) = 0.70, but complementarity would reverse the direction of the re-
quired adjustments, T (dE)gE (gubE , gmeanE ; θlb) = 0.94 and T (dE)gE (glbE , gmeanE ; θlb) = 1.14.
Second, adjusting environmental values for differences in income growth rates, TgY ,δτ
(Eq. 5.42), can be substantial (Figure 5.5). To isolate the effect of the income growth rate,
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we assume for now that the market interest factor is identical at the policy and the study
site and constant over time, δpolicy = δstudy. Thus, the market interest factors cancel out of
the transfer factor TgY ,δτ (Eq. 5.42). Note that depending on the degree of substitutability,
θ, we end up in parameter constellations in which the growth path condition on gY is not
fulfilled and the closed-form transfer factor TgY ,δτ cannot be applied any more. In Figure 5.5
the estimates of the transfer factor for income growth rates are coloured grey at growth
rate where the growth path condition does not hold (Eq. 5.7a). Applying WTP-estimates
elicited for an income growth rate at the expected global mean, gstudyY := g
mean
Y = 0.017,
in a policy context where the income growth rate is glbY = 0.001 would imply a transfer
factor of TgY ,δτ (glbY , gmeanY ; θmean) = 3.75. That is, the societal WTP-estimate would have
to be adjusted upwards by 274.65%. The direction of adjustment is reversed for comple-
ments requiring a downward adjustment with TgY ,δτ (glbY , gmeanY ; θlb) = 0.44. For the upper
bound substitutability estimate, θub = 7.14, the growth path condition is not meet at gmeanY .
Hence, we cannot apply the transfer factor. The required adjustments TgY ,δτ are even more
pronounced, when applying WTP-estimates in contexts with higher income growth equal
to the maximal expected rate, gubY = 0.05. However, for the parameter constellation in
this empirical application the growth path condition is also not met for the mean sub-
stitutability estimate, θmean, at gubY = 0.05.
77 For the case of complements, θlb = 0.86,
applying WTP-estimates from a site characterised by the mean expected income growth
rate in a context characterised by the maximal expected rate implies a transfer factor of
TgY ,δτ (gubY , gmeanY ; θlb) = 8.76 and thus an upward adjustment of societal WTP of 776.30%.
Third, Figure 5.6 depicts again the transfer factor TgY ,δτ , but this time for differences in
the market interest factor between a study and a policy site. For illustration, the market
interest rate is kept constant over time at both sites, thus δτ = δ ∀ τ , and the income growth
rate at policy and study site are identical and equal to the global average, gstudyY = g
policy
Y =
gmeanY . For identical growth rates at both sites the first factor in TgY ,δ reduces to one and
hence the entire transfer factor does not depend on the elasticity of substitution, θ, any more.
It shows that differences in market interest rates within the range expected by international
experts lead to substantial WTP adjustments: For a hypothetical transfer of mean WTP
elicited at δmean = 0.977 to a policy site with δub = 0.999 the required adjustment would
be TgY ,δ(gmeanY , δub, gmeanY , δmean) = 3.35 and thus increase mean WTP by 235.39%. To
the contrary a hypothetical transfer to the lower bound forecasted market interest factor,
77The maximum value for applying TgY ,δτ is for θmean = 2.31 at gmaxθ=2.31 = 0.0197, where the transfer
factor approaches zero, while it is generally uncritical for complements.
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Figure 5.5: Transfer factor to adjust societal WTP for a one percent increase in the level of the environmental
good from a study site with an income growth rate of gstudyY := g
mean
Y = 0.017 to an income growth
rate at a policy site, such as the lower bound growth rate glbY = 0.001. Coloured lines depict different
degrees of substitutability between the manufactured consumption and the environmental good, θ.
Grey coloured lines indicate parameter combinations that do not meet the growth path condition for
the closed-form intertemporal utility function (Eq. 5.7a).
δlb = 0.94, i.e. a situation with a high market interest rate, would imply a transfer factor
of TgY ,δ(gmeanY , δlb, gmeanY , δmean) = 0.29. Moreover, we see that the required adjustment of
mean WTP in absolute terms, i.e. |TgY ,δ − 1|, is larger for higher levels of the common
income growth rate at study and policy site.
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Figure 5.6: Transfer factor to adjust mean WTP for a one percent increase in the level of the environmental good
from a study site with a market interest rate of δstudy = 0.977 to the market interest rate at the
policy site when the income growth rate at both the study and policy site is identical. Colours
indicate different levels of the income growth rate common to the study and policy site.
5.6 Discussion
In this section we discuss several assumption that limit the generality of our analysis. Among
others, these encompass (i) the proportional mapping between natural capital and environ-
mental services, (ii) the exponential growth of income or decline of environmental services
derived from natural capital, (iii) the self-regarding dynastic household, (iv) the direct rela-
tionship between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution between consumption goods and environmental goods, (v) the representative
household setting, (vi) the intragenerational (spatial) distribution of environmental goods,
as well as (vii) uncertainty about growth rates and other model parameters.
First, we considered a simple proportional mapping between natural capital and envi-
ronmental good and services. Certainly, the mapping of different forms of natural capital
into the services it provides are multifaceted (Fenichel and Abbott 2014). At this stage, it
is therefore clear that our analysis is only relevant for those cases of non-use environmental
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services that may be reasonably described by this simplification. In particular, our work fo-
cusses on non-use services derived from natural capital for which WTP information is crucial
for public policy. Moreover, our analyses might by relevant for other non-use environmen-
tal services like regulatory services as well as provisioning services of sustainably managed
stocks of natural capital.
Second, as exemplary paths for the development of income, respectively consumption,
and environmental services derived from natural capital we have considered exponential
growth or decline. While this is a prominent case in the long-term analysis of environmental-
economic problems (e.g. Hoel and Sterner 2007, Baumgärtner et al. 2015),78 there may be
many different relevant growth or decline paths. As non-market valuation studies often do
not specify the exact time path of the evolution of natural capital or environmental goods
and services, we leave an analysis of other types of growth dynamics that may be relevant
for natural capital valuation for future research.
Third, our analysis assumes purely self-regarding dynastic households. Yet, there may
also be behavioral responses to income inequality within and across generations. These
may include relative consumption concerns (e.g. Johansson-Stenman and Sterner 2015) or
variants of inequality aversion. Again, we leave these extensions to future work.
Fourth, we made the rather strong assumption of a direct relationship between the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between consumption goods and environmental goods, η = 1/θ, to be able to derive a closed-
form solution of the intertemporal utility function. This assumption follows theoretic work
by Quaas and Bröcker (2016), who build a solvable analytic climate-economy model that
extends upon the previous Cobb-Douglas cases in the literature (cf. Golosov et al. 2014). In
our central calibration, the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, 1/θ, equals 0.43. This
is considered a rather low value of η by most experts (Drupp et al. 2018). Future work
should try to relax this assumption drawing, for example, on simulations. An alternative
route would be to model diverse direct relationships between η and θ that are more suitable
in the context of natural capital and biodiversity. For instance future research could assume
3
2θ = η implying for our central calibration a η = 0.65 closely related to the
2
3 found in the
asset pricing literature (cf. Gollier et al. 2017).
Fifth, we have assumed that dynastic households are identical except that they differ in
initial income. Yet, households may have heterogenous preferences. They may also differ
78We derive this case for income as the result of a balanced growth path in an endogenous growth model
in Appendix 5.8.1.
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not only in their initial income but can also face different income or consumption growth
rates. For example, recent empirical evidence from the World Inequality Report (Alvaredo
et al. 2018) shows that the growth rate of income differs substantially over income groups.
Expert forecasts on consumption growth rates also differ substantially, but appear to be
roughly normally distributed (Drupp et al. 2018). Different growth rates of income give rise
to convergence or divergence of income and hence a change in relative income inequality over
time. Future work should try to relax the assumption of equal growth rates for all households.
With respect to heterogenous preferences, Baumgärtner et al. (2017, Appendix A.12) have
already shown how the static results can be extend to feature a normal distribution of
preference parameters for the utility weight of environmental goods, α, as well as for the
degree of substitutability, θ. We expect that similar extensions could be madeperhaps
under stronger assumptionsin an intertemporal context such as we consider in the present
paper. Furthermore, there is a literature on heterogeneity in pure rates of time preference
(Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005, Millner 2016). This emerging body of research tends to
suggest that the societal pure time discount rate falls over time in the presence of such
heterogeneities. In our setting, this may imply that over time the WTPs of the more patient
households will dominate. Again, we leave an extension to heterogenous discount rates to
future work.
Sixth, we have restricted our analysis to the case of pure public environmental goods.
While this is a reasonable representation for several important goods and services humans
derive from natural capital, such as the existence value of biodiversity studied in our appli-
cation, there are certainly several environmental goods that vary spatially. The provision
of these locally public environmental goods will frequently be correlated with income. For
instance, Lee and Lin (2018) show for US metropolitan areas that neighbourhoods close to
environmental amenities, such as hills or coastlines, have persisted a high level of income
since 1880, and that a heterogeneous endowment with environmental amenities shapes the
spatial distribution of incomes. An extension of the model from Baumgärtner et al. (2017a)
to local public goods is developed in Meya (2018). He shows that for local public goods
the effect of income inequality on mean WTP generally also depends on how their provision
is correlated with income. The main result of Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) on how income
inequality affects mean WTP generalizes to local public goods being distributed indepen-
dently of income. We leave an extension of our analysis to a heterogeneous endowment with
environmental goods from natural capital and how this distribution evolves over time for
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future research.
Finally, we have considered a deterministic setting throughout. However, when it comes
to issues of intertemporal distribution the world is, of course, full of uncertainties. Besides
parameter uncertainty, this applies in particular to uncertainty about the growth rates of
income or consumption and of environmental goods derived from natural capital. There
is a large body of literature on discounting in the presence of uncertainty about baseline
consumption growth (e.g. Gollier 2002, 2008). Gollier (2010) considers uncertainty about the
growth rate of environmental goods. More recently, Gollier (2017) analyzes how uncertainty
about the elasticity of substitution interacts with other forms of uncertainty about growth
rates.
5.7 Conclusion
We have studied how the intra- and intergenerational distribution of income affects the
intertemporal valuation of non-use environmental goods derived from natural capital. To
this end we developed a model in which income is distributed unevenly among otherwise
identical households, who have constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences and whose in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between
environmental goods and manufactured consumption goods.
We find that (i) societal WTP for a marginal increase in the initial stock or the growth
rate of natural capital increases with society's mean income; (ii) societal WTP for a marginal
increase in the stock or the growth rate of natural capital decreases (increases) with society's
income inequality at the time of the valuation if and only if natural capital is a substitute
(complement) to manufactured consumption goods; (iii) societal WTP for a marginal in-
crease in stock of natural capital increases with income growth for the case of Cobb-Douglas
and complements, but it might decrease for substitutes; (iv) societal WTP for a marginal
increase in the stock of natural capital increases (decreases) with the growth rate of envi-
ronmental goods if and only if natural capital is a substitute (complement) to manufactured
goods. Moreover, we derive closed-form adjustment factors for differences in the initial in-
come distribution, growth rates and interest rates. Note that our findings are not confined
to environmental public goods, but hold more generally for the valuation of public goods,
such as culture, knowledge, open access journals or national security.
Our results are relevant in several respects: First, for benefit transfer in the context of
natural capital accounting. Most countries of the world committed themselves to mainstream
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the value of biodiversity in decision making and to integrate biodiversity in national accounts
(Convention on Biological Diversity, Aichi Target 2). For instance, EU member states agreed
to promote the integration of these [economic values of ecosystems and their services] into
accounting and reporting systems at EU and national level by 2020" (European Commission
2011, p.15). Approaches to account for natural capital and ecosystem services in monetary
units, usually draw on a set of environmental values and scale these up by means of benefit
transfer. As the value of natural capital in accounting systems is defined as the net present
values of future ecosystem flows (Obst et al. 2016), the need to apply benefit transfer methods
becomes even more evident implying to estimate future flows based on existing valuation
studies. Consequently, within the revision process of the System of Environmental-Economic
Accounting  Experimental Ecosystem Accounting its is emphasised that "[g]enerally, it will
be necessary to apply benefit transfer methods" (United Nations 2017, p.102) for natural
capital accounting. However, so far there is limited theory-based guidance for benefit transfer
(Bateman et al. 2011) and several international government bodies call for improving benefit
transfer methods to enable more accurate ecosystem service and national capital accounting
(UN et al. 2014). Here we derive theory-based transfer factors for a dynamic context, which
is necessary for a sound accounting of natural capital. In particular, we show that adjustment
can be done by exploiting information on the income distribution at the time of valuation
and develop transfer factors to control for expected income growth, rates of environmental
degradation as well as interest rates.
Second, these adjustment factors can also be used for sustainability policies targeted at
natural capital management that are concerned with both efficiency and equity by employing
equity-adjusted societal WTP-estimates in environmentally-extended cost-benefit analysis
(Drupp et al. 2018b).
Finally, our results hold implications for the economic valuation of natural capital. In
particular, primary valuation studies should pay attention to the income distribution in the
process of aggregating WTPs and report the necessary data to enable a more sophisticated
natural capital accounting and determination distributional effects.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Endogenizing the growth and interest rates in a general equilibrium
endogenous growth model
The constant growth rate of income, gY , considered in this paper can be derived as the
balanced growth path outcome of an endogenous growth model. To demonstrate this, con-
sider a model with product innovation. Output Yt is produced by means of labor L and
a mass Mt of different types i of machines with input quantities qt(i), according to the
constant-returns-to-scale production function
Yt =
1
ϕ
L1−ϕ
∫ Mt
0
qt(i)
ϕ di , (5.44)
where ϕ is the output elasticity of machinery input.
We normalize labor input to one, L = 1, based on the assumption that each of the n
households inelastically supplies 1/n units of labor. We choose the final output good as the
numeraire. Machines fully depreciate after one period of use.
Using pt(i) to denote the price of a machine of type i, input demand by competitive firms
in the final goods sector is given by the condition that the value of the marginal product of
this machine is equal to its price, i.e.
qt(i)
ϕ−1 = pt(i). (5.45)
Blueprints for new types of machines are generated by research and development, which uses
the output as the final good as input. Using Zt to denote the input into R&D at time t, the
expected mass of new varietis developed is
Mt+1 = Mt +
1
Φ
Zt, (5.46)
with a constant Φ > 0. A firm being successful in R&D becomes the monopolistic supplier
for this type of machine. Machines are produced using the final good, such that one unit
of the final good is required to build one unit of a machine. The profit-maximizing price
pt(i) of a machine of type i is obtained by maximizing pt(i) qt(i) − qt(i) subject to 5.45,
which yields pt(i) = 1/ϕ. Using this in 5.45, market equilibrium input of machine type i is
181
Theory Intergenerational Distribution and Natural Capital
qt(i) = ϕ
1/(1−ϕ), and total output is
Yt = Mt ϕ
1
1−ϕ . (5.47)
We consider a balanced growth path, such that the interest factor δt is constant, δt = δ. The
present value of monopoly profits for a firm successful in R&D is (p−1) q/δ = (1−ϕ)/(δ ϕ).
Under free entry, the expected present value of profits from one dollar spent on R&D must
just be equal to this one dollar, i.e.
Φ
δ
1− δ
1− ϕ
ϕ
= 1, (5.48)
from which we obtain the interest factor
δ =
(
1 +
1− ϕ
Φϕ
)−1
. (5.49)
Market equilibrium for final goods implies
Yt = nCt + Zt +
∫ Mt
0
qt(i) di = nCt + Φ (Mt+1 −Mt) +Mt ϕ
ϕ
1−ϕ . (5.50)
In a balanced growth path, Yt, Ct,and Mt must thus all grow at the same rate gY .
Households choose the intertemporal distribution of consumption such as to maximize
∞∑
t=0
ρt
θ
θ − 1
(
αC
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)Et
θ−1
θ
)
, (5.51)
where ρ is the pure time discount factor of the household. As households are facing a con-
stant interest factor δ, the optimal intertemporal distribution of consumption is determined
by the discrete-time Keynes-Ramsey rule
(1 + gY )
1
θ =
ρ
δ
(5.52)
⇔ gY = (ρ/δ)θ − 1 =
(
ρ
(
1 +
1− ϕ
Φϕ
))θ
− 1. (5.53)
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5.8.2 Derivation of the intertemporal utility function (Eq. 5.6)
Using Eq. 5.1 in Eq. 5.3, and suppressing the index for household i, gives
U({Yt} , {Et}) =
∞∑
t=0
ρt
1
1− η
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)Et
θ−1
θ
) (1−η)θ
θ−1
(5.54)
η= 1
θ=
∞∑
t=0
ρt
θ
θ − 1
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)Et
θ−1
θ
)
5.2a, 5.2b
=
∞∑
t=0
ρt
θ
θ − 1
(
α
(
Y0 (1 + gY )
t
) θ−1
θ + (1− α) (E0 (1 + gE)t) θ−1θ )
=
θ
θ − 1
( ∞∑
t=0
ρtα
(
Y0 (1 + gY )
t
) θ−1
θ +
∞∑
t=0
ρt (1− α) (E0 (1 + gE)t) θ−1θ )
=
θ
θ − 1
(
α
∞∑
t=0
(
ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ
)t
Y
θ−1
θ
0 + (1− α)
∞∑
t=0
(
ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ
)t
E
θ−1
θ
0
)
.
As |ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ | < 1 and |ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ | < 1 hold by assumption (Eq. 5.7a and Eq. 5.7b),
the geometric series can be simplified so that one derives the following intertemporal utility
function
U(Y0, gY , E0, gE) =
θ
θ − 1
α Y θ−1θ0
1− ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ
+ (1− α) E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ
 . (5.55)
5.8.3 Derivation of the compensating surplus measured as a single pay-
ment, xSP (Eq. 5.10)
The compensating surplus, xSP, measured as a single payment in t = 0 is derived by using
the instantaneous utility function (Eq. 5.1) in the definition of the compensation surplus for
a single payment in t=0 (Eq. 5.8):
1
1− η
(
α (Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ + (1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ
) (1−η)θ
θ−1
+
∞∑
t=1
ρt
1
1− η
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)E′t
θ−1
θ
) (1−η)θ
θ−1
=
∞∑
t=0
ρt
1
1− η
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)Et
θ−1
θ
) (1−η)θ
θ−1
.
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Assuming η = 1θ this simplifies to
α (Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ + (1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ +
∞∑
t=1
ρt
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)E′t
θ−1
θ
)
(5.56)
=
∞∑
t=0
ρt
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)Et
θ−1
θ
)
⇔ α (Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ +
∞∑
t=1
ρt αY
θ−1
θ
t +
∞∑
t=0
ρt(1− α)E′t
θ−1
θ =
∞∑
t=0
ρt
(
αY
θ−1
θ
t + (1− α)Et
θ−1
θ
)
Appendix5.8.2⇔ α (Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ +
∞∑
t=1
ρt αY
θ−1
θ
t +
(1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
. (5.57)
Where
∞∑
t=1
ρt αY
θ−1
θ
t =
∞∑
t=1
(ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ )t αY
θ−1
θ
t
=
∞∑
t=0
(ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ )t αY
θ−1
θ
t −
(
ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ
)0
αY
θ−1
θ
t
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
− αY
θ−1
θ
t
=
(
1− 1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
=
ρ (1 + gY )
θ−1
θ αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
,
so that Eq. 5.57 becomes
α (Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ +
αY
θ−1
θ
0 ρ (1 + gY )
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E0 θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
. (5.58)
On the left side of this equation is the intertemporal utility (in present value) from
consumption of manufactured goods or income and environmental goods split in two terms:
The first term represents the utility from consumption of manufactured goods in period
t = 0, for which consumption or income Y0 is reduced by the one-time paid compensating
surplus xSP. The second term represents the utility from consumption of manufactured
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goods starting in period t = 1 until the infinite future, for which consumption or income
Y0 (1+gY ) increases with the constant growth rate gY . Finally, the third term is the share of
utility from the consumption of environmental goods, which decrease from E′0 at the constant
rate g′E . The right side of this equation is the the present value of the intertemporal utility
from the stream of consumption, growing from Y0 at the constant rate gY , and the stream
of environmental goods, that decreases from E0 by the constant rate gE .
This can be reformulated for the compensating surplus, xSP, as follows
α (Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ +
(1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
(
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E0 θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
(Y0 − xSP)
θ−1
θ = Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1−α
α E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α E
′
0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
(5.59)
xSP = Y0 −
(
Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1−α
α E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α E
′
0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
) θ
θ−1
= Y0 −
(
Y
θ−1
θ
0
(
1 + Y
− θ−1
θ
0
(
1−α
α E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α E
′
0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
))) θ
θ−1
= Y0
1−
1 + Y 1−θθ0
 1−αα E θ−1θ0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α E
′ θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
 θθ−1
 .
(5.60)
5.8.4 Derivation of the compensating surplus measured as a constant pay-
ment fraction, xCPF (Eq. 5.11)
Compensating surplus, xCPF, measured as a constant fraction of consumption (Eq. 5.9) for
the intertemporal utility function specified in Eq. 5.6 is given as
U
(
(1− xCPF)Y0, gY , E′0, g′E
)
= U (Y0, gY , E0, gE) (5.61)
α (1− xCPF) θ−1θ Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
(5.62)
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α
(
1− (1− xCPF) θ−1θ
)
Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
=
(1− α)E′0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
− (1− α)E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
(5.63)
1− (1− xCPF)
θ−1
θ =
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
αY
θ−1
θ
0
 (1− α)E′0 θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
− (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ

(5.64)
xCPF = 1−
1− 1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
αY
θ−1
θ
0
 (1− α)E′0 θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + g′E)
θ−1
θ
− (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
 θθ−1 . (5.65)
5.8.5 Derivation of WTP as a single payment for a marginal change in
the initial environmental good, WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.12)
Assuming gE = g′E and E
′
0 = E0 + dE in Eq. 5.59 we can consider the WTP at t = 0 for a
marginal change in the initial environmental good
(Y0 −WTPSP,dE)
θ−1
θ = Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1−α
α E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α (E0 + dE)
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
= Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1− α
α
E
θ−1
θ
0 − (E0 + dE)
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
. (5.66)
Using first degree Taylor expansion evaluated at WTPSP,dE = 0 we approximate (Y0 −
WTPSP,dE)
θ−1
θ ≈ Y
θ−1
θ
0 − θ−1θ Y
−1/θ
0 WTPSP,dE and again using first degree Taylor expansion
evaluated at dE = 0 we approximate (E0 + dE)
θ−1
θ ≈ E
θ−1
θ
0 +
θ−1
θ E
−1/θ
0 dE. This gives
Y
θ−1
θ
0 −
θ − 1
θ
Y
−1/θ
0 WTPSP,dE = Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1− α
α
E
θ−1
θ
0 − E
θ−1
θ
0 − θ−1θ E
−1/θ
0 dE
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
(5.67)
Y
−1/θ
0 WTPSP,dE =
1− α
α
E
−1/θ
0 dE
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
(5.68)
WTPSP,dE =
1− α
α
Y
1/θ
0 E
−1/θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
dE. (5.69)
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5.8.6 Derivation of WTP as a single payment for a marginal change in
the growth rate, WTPSP,dgE (Eq. 5.13)
Assuming g′E = gE + dgE and E0 = E
′
0 in Eq. 5.59 we can consider the WTP at t = 0 for a
marginal change in the growth rate of environmental goods:
(Y0 −WTPSP,dgE )
θ−1
θ = Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1−α
α E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
1−α
α E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE + dgE) θ−1θ
= Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ
(
1
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
− 1
1− ρ (1 + gE + dgE) θ−1θ
)
. (5.70)
Conducting a first degree Taylor expansion for f(dgE) = 1
1−ρ (1+gE+dgE)
θ−1
θ
at dgE = 0 yields
1
1− ρ (1 + gE + dgE) θ−1θ
≈ 1
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
+
θ−1
θ ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE . (5.71)
Using 5.71 and (Y0 −WTPSP,dgE )
θ−1
θ ≈ Y
θ−1
θ
0 − θ−1θ Y
−1/θ
0 WTPSP,dgE we get
Y
θ−1
θ
0 −
θ − 1
θ
Y
−1/θ
0 WTPSP,dgE =
Y
θ−1
θ
0 +
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ
 1
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
− 1
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
−
θ−1
θ ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE

− θ − 1
θ
Y
−1/θ
0 WTPSP,dgE = −
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ
θ−1
θ ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE
WTPSP,dgE =
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ Y
1/θ
0
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE .
5.8.7 Derivation of WTP as a constant payment fraction for a marginal
change in the initial environmental good, WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.14)
Assuming gE = g′E and E
′
0 = E0 + dE in Eq. 5.62 we can consider the WTP in terms of a
constant payment fraction for a marginal change in the initial environmental good
α (1−WTPCPF,dE) θ−1θ Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α) (E0 + dE) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
0 =
α(1−WTPCPF,dE) θ−1θ Y
θ−1
θ
0 − αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)(E0 + dE) θ−1θ − (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
.
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Applying Taylor series expansion of degree one at WTPCPF,dE = 0 and dE = 0, respec-
tively, yields the following approximations (1−WTPCPF,dE) θ−1θ ≈ 1 + 1−θθ WTPCPF,dE and
(E0 + dE)
θ−1
θ ≈ E
θ−1
θ
0 +
θ−1
θ E
−1/θ
0 dE. Using these in the formula above yields
0 =
α 1−θθ Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
WTPCPF,dE +
(1− α) θ−1θ E0−1/θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
dE
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
WTPCPF,dE =
(1− α)E0−1/θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
dE (5.72)
WTPCPF,dE =
1− α
α
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
Y
1−θ
θ
0 E
−1/θ
0 dE. (5.73)
5.8.8 Derivation of WTP as a constant payment fraction for a marginal
change in the growth rate of the environmental good, WTPCPF,dgE
(Eq. 5.15)
Assuming E0 = E′0 and g′E = gE + dgE in Eq. 5.62 we can consider the WTP in terms of
a constant payment fraction for a marginal change in the growth rate of the environmental
good
α (1−WTPCPF,dgE )
θ−1
θ Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gE + dgE) θ−1θ
=
αY
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+
(1− α)E0
θ−1
θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
0 =
αY
θ−1
θ
0 − α(1−WTPCPF,dgE )
θ−1
θ Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
+ (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
(
1
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
− 1
1− ρ(1 + gE + dgE) θ−1θ
)
.
Applying Taylor series expansion of degree one at WTPCPF,dgE = 0 and dgE = 0, respec-
tively, yields the following approximations (1−WTPCPF,dgE )
θ−1
θ ≈ 1− θ−1θ WTPCPF,dgE and
1
1−ρ (1+gE+dgE)
θ−1
θ
≈ 1
1−ρ(1+gE)
θ−1
θ
+
θ−1
θ
ρ(1+gE)
−1/θ(
1−ρ(1+gE)
θ−1
θ
)2 dgE . Using these in the formula above
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yields
0 =
αY
θ−1
θ
0 − α(1− θ−1θ WTPCPF,dgE )Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
− (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
ρ θ−1θ (1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE
0 =
α θ−1θ Y
θ−1
θ
0
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
WTPCPF,dgE − (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
ρ θ−1θ (1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE
WTPCPF,dgE = (1− α)E
θ−1
θ
0
θ−1
θ ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE 1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
αθY
θ−1
θ
0
WTPCPF,dgE =
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 Y 1−θθ0 E θ−1θ0 dgE .
5.8.9 Derivation of mean WTP as a single payment for a marginal change
in the initial level of the environmental good, WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17)
The density function of the log-normal distribution of income Y0 in t = 0 with mean µY0
and standard deviation σY0 is given by
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0) =
1
Y0
√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
(5.74)
with m = lnµY0 −
1
2
ln
(
1 + σ2Y0/µ
2
Y0
)
, (5.75)
s2 = ln
(
1 + σ2Y0/µ
2
Y0
)
. (5.76)
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Then mean compensating surplus in terms of a single payment at t = 0 (Eq. 5.16) can be
reformulated as
WTPSP,dE(µY0 , σY0 , gE)
=
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPSP,dE(Y0, gE) dY0
5.12, 5.74
=
∞∫
0
1
Y0
√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
1− α
α
Y
1/θ
0 E
−1/θ
0 dE
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
dY0
=
1− α
α
E
−1/θ
0 dE
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ
∞∫
0
Y
1/θ
0
Y0
√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
dY0
= κ
∞∫
0
Y
1−θ
θ
0√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
dY0
= κ exp
[
1
2θ2
s2 +
1
θ
m
]
5.75, 5.76
= κ exp
[
1
2θ2
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
)
+
1
θ
lnµY0 −
1
2θ
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
)]
= κ exp
[
1− θ
2θ2
ln
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
)
+
1
θ
ln(µY0)
]
= κ exp
ln
(1 + σ2Y0
µ2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
 exp [ln(µ 1θY0)]
= κµ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
, (5.77)
or, equivalently, for relative inequality in initial income CVY0 =
σY0
µY0
WTPSP,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gE) = κµ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (5.78)
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5.8.10 Derivation of mean WTP as a single payment for a marginal
change in the growth rate of the environmental good, WTPSP,dgE
(Eq. 5.18)
Analogue to Appendix 5.8.9 we derive the mean WTP for a marginal change in the growth
rate as follows
WTPSP,dgE (µY0 , σY0 , gE) =
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPSP,dgE (Y0, gE) dY0
5.13, 5.74
=
∞∫
0
1
Y0
√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ Y
1/θ
0
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgEdY0
=
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ′
∞∫
0
Y
1−θ
θ
0√
2pis2
exp
(
−(lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
dY0
= κ′ exp
[
1
2θ2
s2 +
1
θ
m
]
= κ′ µ1/θY0
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
, (5.79)
or, equivalently, for relative inequality in initial income CVY0 =
σY0
µY0
WTPSP,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gE) = κ
′ µ1/θY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (5.80)
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5.8.11 Derivation of mean WTP at time t, WTPCPF,dE;t (Eq. 5.21), and
the present value of mean WTP, WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22), as a con-
stant payment fraction for a marginal change in initial level of the
environmental good
The mean WTP at time t measured as a constant payment fraction is
WTPCPF,dE;t(µY0 , σY0 , gY , gE)
=
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPCPF,dE(Y0, gY , gE)Yt(Y0) dY0
5.2a
=
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPCPF,dE(Y0, gY , gE) (1 + gY )
tY0 dY0
5.74, 5.14
=
∞∫
0
1
Y0
√
2pis2
exp
(
− (lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
1− α
α
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 Y
1−θ
θ
0 dE(1 + gY )
tY0dY0
=
1− α
α
(
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(1 + gY )
t
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 dE︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ′′
∞∫
0
Y
1−θ
θ
0√
2pis2
exp
(
− (lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
dY0
Sec.5.8.9
= κ′′ µ1/θY0
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
, (5.81)
and for relative inequality in initial income, CVY0 =
σY0
µY0
,
WTPCPF,dE;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) = κ
′′ µ1/θY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (5.82)
The associated present value - discounted at market interest rates - is
WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
=
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
WTPCPF,dE;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
5.21
=
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
1− α
α
(
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(1 + gY )
t
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 dE µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
=
1− α
α
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 dE
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
(1 + gY )
t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ′′′
µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
= κ
′′′
µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (5.83)
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5.8.12 Derivation of mean WTP at time t, WTPCPF,dgE ;t (Eq. 5.23), and
the present value of mean WTP, WTPCPF,dgE (Eq. 5.24), as a con-
stant payment fraction for a marginal change in the growth rate
of the environmental good
WTPCPF,dgE ;t(µY0 , σY0 , gY , gE)
=
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPCPF,dgE (Y0, gY , gE)Yt(Y0) dY0
5.2a
=
∞∫
0
fln(Y0;µY0 , σY0)WTPCPF,dgE (Y0, gY , gE) (1 + gY )
tY0 dY0
5.74, 5.15
=
∞∫
0
1
Y0
√
2pis2
exp
(
− (lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2
Y
1−θ
θ
0 E
θ−1
θ
0 dgE(1 + gY )
tY0dY0
=
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE(1 + gY )tE θ−1θ0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ′′′′
∞∫
0
Y
1−θ
θ
0√
2pis2
exp
(
− (lnY0 −m)
2
2s2
)
dY0
= κ′′′′ µ1/θY0
(
1 +
σ2Y0
µ2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
, (5.84)
and for relative inequality in initial income, CVY0 =
σY0
µY0
,
WTPCPF,dgE ;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE) = κ
′′′′ µ1/θY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (5.85)
The associated present value - discounted at market interest rates - is
WTPCPF,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
=
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
WTPCPF,dgE ;t(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
5.85
=
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE(1 + gY )tE θ−1θ0 µ1/θY0 (1 + CV 2Y0) 1−θ2θ2
=
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgEE θ−1θ0 ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
(1 + gY )
t
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ′′′′′
µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV 2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
= κ
′′′′′
µ
1/θ
Y0
(
1 + CV 2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 . (5.86)
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5.8.13 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Differentiating WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17) with respect to initial mean income, µY0 , yields
∂WTPSP,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gE)
∂ µY0
= κ
1
θ
µ
1−θ
θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.87)
with κ =
1− α
α
E
−1/θ
0 dE
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
,
which is strictly greater zero for a marginal increase in the environmental good (dE > 0),
as E0, µY0 ,CVY0 , θ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and by assumption ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ < 1.
Differentiating WTPSP,dgE (Eq. 5.18) with respect to initial mean income, µY0 , yields
∂WTPSP,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gE)
∂ µY0
= κ′
1
θ
µ
1−θ
θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.88)
with κ′ =
1− α
α
E0
θ−1
θ
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgE ,
which is strictly greater zero for a marginal increase in the growth rate of the environmental
good (dgE > 0), as E0, µY0 ,CVY0 , θ, ρ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and gE > −1.
Differentiating WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22) with respect to initial mean income, µY0 , yields
∂WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gE , gY )
∂ µY0
= κ
′′′ 1
θ
µ
1−θ
θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.89)
with κ
′′′
=
1− α
α
1− ρ (1 + gY ) θ−1θ
1− ρ (1 + gE) θ−1θ
E
−1/θ
0 dE
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
(1 + gY )
t
]
,
which is strictly greater zero for a marginal increase in the environmental good (dE > 0),
as E0, µY0 ,CVY0 , θ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and by assumption ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ < 1, ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ < 1.
Differentiating WTP (Eq. 5.24) with respect to initial mean income, µY0 , yields
∂WTPCPF,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ µY0
= κ
′′′′′ 1
θ
µ
1−θ
θ
Y0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2 (5.90)
with κ′′′′′ =
1− α
α
ρ(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
)
(
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
)2 dgEE θ−1θ0 ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ
)
(1 + gY )
t,
which is strictly greater zero for a marginal increase in the growth rate of the environmental
good (dgE > 0), as α ∈ (0, 1), gE > −1, ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ < 1 and gY , E0,CVY0 , µY0 , θ, ρ > 0.
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5.8.14 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Differentiating WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17) with respect to relative intratemporal income inequal-
ity, CVY0 , yields
∂WTPSP,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gE)
∂ CVY0
= κ
1− θ
θ2
µ
1/θ
Y0
CVY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (5.91)
The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the factor (1−θ), as µY0 ,CVY0 , κ > 0.
It holds that 1− θ Q 0 if and only if θ R 1.
Differentiating WTPSP,dgE (Eq. 5.18) with respect to relative intratemporal income in-
equality, CVY0 , yields
∂WTPSP,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0gE)
∂ CVY0
= κ′
1− θ
θ2
µ
1/θ
Y0
CVY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (5.92)
The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the factor (1−θ), as µY0 ,CVY0 , κ′ > 0.
It holds that 1− θ Q 0 if and only if θ R 1.
Differentiating WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22) with respect to relative intratemporal income in-
equality, CVY0 , yields
∂WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ CVY0
= κ
′′′ 1− θ
θ2
µ
1/θ
Y0
CVY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (5.93)
The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the factor (1−θ), as µY0 ,CVY0 , κ
′′′
> 0.
It holds that 1− θ Q 0 if and only if θ R 1.
Differentiating WTPCPF,dgE (Eq. 5.24) with respect to relative intratemporal income
inequality, CVY0 , yields
∂WTPCPF,dgE (µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ CVY0
= κ
′′′′′ 1− θ
θ2
µ
1/θ
Y0
CVY0
(
1 + CV2Y0
) 1−θ−2θ2
2θ2 . (5.94)
The sign of which is determined by the factor (1− θ), as µY0 ,CVY0 , k
′′′′
> 0. It again holds
that 1− θ Q 0 if and only if θ R 1.
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5.8.15 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Assume time-constant market interest factor, i.e. δt = δ ∀t. Differentiating WTPCPF,dE
(Eq. 5.22) with respect to the growth rate of income, gY , yields
∂WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂gY
= K
([
1− ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ
] ∞∑
t=0
tδt(1 + gY )
t−1 − θ − 1
θ
ρ(1 + gY )
−1/θ
∞∑
t=0
δt(1 + gY )
t
)
= K
(
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ
δ
∞∑
t=1
t[δ(1 + gY )]
t−1 − θ − 1
θ
ρ(1 + gY )
−1/θ
∞∑
t=0
[δ(1 + gY )]
t
)
withK :=
1− α
α
E
−1/θ
0 dE µ
1/θ
Y0
(1 + CV2Y0)
1−θ
2θ2
1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ
> 0.
For
δ(1 + gY ) < 1, (5.95)
the geometric series converge as t→∞ and this becomes
∂WTPCPF,dE
∂gY
= K
[
(1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ )
δ (1− δ(1 + gY ))2 −
θ−1
θ ρ(1 + gY )
− 1θ
1− δ(1 + gY )
]
= K
1− ρ(1 + gY ) θ−1θ − δ (1− δ (1 + gY )) ρ θ−1θ (1 + gY )−
1
θ
δ(1− δ(1 + gY ))2
=
K
δ(1− δ(1 + gY ))2
[
1− ρ(1 + gY )− 1θ
(
(1 + gY ) +
θ − 1
θ
δ (1− δ (1 + gY ))
)]
=
K
δ(1− δ(1 + gY ))2
[
1 + ρ(1 + gY )
− 1θ
(
−(1 + gY ) + 1− θ
θ
δ (1− δ (1 + gY ))
)]
=
K (1 + gY )
− 1θ
δ(1− δ(1 + gY ))2
[
(1 + gY )
1
θ + ρ
(
−(1 + gY ) + 1− θ
θ
δ (1− δ (1 + gY ))
)]
=
K (1 + gY )
− 1θ
δ(1− δ(1 + gY ))2
[
(1 + gY )
1
θ − ρ(1 + gY ) + 1− θ
θ
ρ δ (1− δ (1 + gY ))
]
=
K (1 + gY )
− 1θ
δ(1− δ(1 + gY ))2
(1 + gY )((1 + gY ) 1−θθ − ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, cf. Eq. 5.7a
+
1− θ
θ
ρ δ (1− δ (1 + gY ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, cf. Eq. 5.95
 .
(5.96)
Recall the growth path condition ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ < 1 (Eq. 5.7a) which is equivalent to (1 +
gY )
1−θ
θ > ρ, and thus (1+gY )
(
(1 + gY )
1−θ
θ − ρ
)
> 0. As E0, µY0 ,CVY0 , θ, ρ, gY , δτ > 0, α ∈
(0, 1), ρ(1+gE)
θ−1
θ < 1 (Eq. 5.7b) the only term that can turn negative is 1−θθ ρ (1− δ (1 + gY )).
The sign of this term is fully determined by the factor 1− θ, as by assumption δ(1 + gY ) < 1
(Eq. 5.95). It thus holds that
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∂WTPCPF,dE
∂gY
> 0 if θ ≤ 1.
The reader might stumble when comparing the term in square brackets of Eq. 5.96,
with Figure 5.3 or Figure 5.7. The difference in parameter values zeroing the derivative
∂WTPCPF,dE
∂gY
results from different time horizons. While we here consider t→∞, we assume
t ∈ (0, T ) with T = 100 for the application (Section 5.5) as this is a common time horizon
in cost-benefit analysis. For longer time horizons the parameter values setting the derivative
to zeros in the Figures 5.3 and Figure 5.7 converge to the ones implicit given by Eq. 5.96.
As the components relating to the growth rate of income in Eq. (5.24) are the same as
those in Eq. (5.22), the proof for
∂WTPCPF,dgE
∂gY
> 0 if θ ≤ 1 proceeds analogously.
Likewise, the conditions for which the sign of the effect changes from positive to negative
are the same. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 in Appendix 5.8.16 is therefore relevant for both WTP
cases.
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5.8.16 Conditions for WTP that declines with income growth
Figure 5.7: The derivative of mean WTP for a constant payment fraction with respect to the growth rate of
income and how its sign and magnitude depend on the elasticity of substitution, θ, and the pure time
discount factor, ρ. The remaining parameter values are those of the central calibration in the global
biodiversity conservation case study (Table 5.2), in particular the time horizon goes to T = 100.
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Figure 5.8: The derivative of mean WTP for a constant payment fraction with respect to the growth rate of
income and how its sign depends on the elasticity of substitution, θ, for different pure time discount
factors, ρ, (left subplot) or market interest rates, δ (right subplot). In the left subplot the sign of the
derivative is only depicted where the growth path conditions are fulfilled (Eqs. 5.7a and 5.7b). In the
right subplot the convergence condition given by Eq. 5.95 is not fulfilled for the upper bound interest
factor, δub, and therefore the supremum δsup = (1 + gmeanY )
−1 is depicted. Results are given for
t→∞ by populating Equation 5.96 with the parameter values of the central calibration in the global
biodiversity conservation case study (Table 5.2).
5.8.17 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Differentiating WTP SP,dE (Eq. 5.17) with respect to the growth rate of the environmental
good, gE , yields
∂WTPSP,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂gE
= K ′
θ − 1
θ
ρ
(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ )2
(5.97)
withK ′ :=
1− α
α
E
−1/θ
0 dE µ
1/θ
Y0
(1 + CV2Y0)
1−θ
2θ2 .
As E0, µY0 ,CVY0 , θ, ρ, α ∈ (0, 1), gE > −1, ρ(1+gE)
θ−1
θ < 1 (Eq. 5.7b) the sign of ∂WTPSP,dE∂gE
is determined by the sign of θ − 1 and it follows directly that
∂WTPSP,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ gE
R 0 if and only if θ R 1.
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Differentiating WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22) with respect to the growth rate of the environ-
mental good, gE , yields
∂WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂gE
= K ′′
θ − 1
θ
ρ
(1 + gE)
−1/θ
(1− ρ(1 + gE) θ−1θ )2
(5.98)
withK ′′ :=
1− α
α
(1− ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ )E
−1/θ
0 dE
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=0
δτ )(1 + gY )
t
]
µ
1/θ
Y0
(1 + CV2Y0)
1−θ
2θ2 .
As E0, µY0 ,CVY0 , θ, ρ, gY , δτ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), ρ(1 + gY )
θ−1
θ < 1 (Eq. 5.7a), ρ(1 + gE)
θ−1
θ < 1
(Eq. 5.7b) the sign of ∂WTPCPF,dE∂gE is determined by the sign of θ − 1 and it follows directly
∂WTPCPF,dE(µY0 ,CVY0 , gY , gE)
∂ gE
R 0 if and only if θ R 1.
5.8.18 Proof of Proposition 5.5
The transfer function is defined by the quotient of the mean WTPs at the policy site and
study site. For mean WTP elicited at study site and policy site as a single payment for
a change in the initial level of the environmental good, WTPSP,dE (Eq. 5.17), the transfer
function is given as
TSP,dE() =
WTP
policy
SP,dE()
WTP
study
SP,dE()
Eq (5.17)
=
1−α
α
Epolicy0
−1/θ
dEpolicy
1−ρ (1+gpolicyE )
θ−1
θ
µpolicyY0
1/θ
(1 + CVY0
policy2)
1−θ
2θ2
1−α
α
Estudy0
−1/θ
dEstudy
1−ρ (1+gstudyE )
θ−1
θ
µstudyY0
1/θ
(1 + CVY0
study2)
1−θ
2θ2
=
(
Epolicy0
Estudy0
)−1/θ
· dE
policy
dEstudy
· 1− ρ(1 + g
study
E )
θ−1
θ
1− ρ(1 + gpolicyE )
θ−1
θ
·
(
µpolicyY0
µstudyY0
)1/θ
·
(
1 + CVpolicy 2Y0
1 + CVstudy 2Y0
) 1−θ
2θ2
.
(5.99)
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For WTP as a single payment and a change in the growth rate of the environmental
good, WTPSP,dgE (Eq. 5.18), the transfer function is given as
TSP,dgE () =
WTP
policy
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()
WTP
study
SP,dgE
()
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For WTP as a constant payment fraction and a change in the initial level of the envi-
ronmental good, WTPCPF,dE (Eq. 5.22), the transfer function is given as
TCPF,dE() =
WTP
policy
CPF,dE()
WTP
study
CPF,dE()
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For WTP as a constant payment fraction and a change in the growth rate of the envi-
ronmental good, WTPCPF,dgE (Eq. 5.24), the transfer function is
TCPF,dgE () =
WTP
policy
CPF,dgE ()
WTP
study
CPF,dgE ()
Eq. 5.24
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6 Income Inequality and the International
Transfer of Environmental Values
Abstract: How the valuation of non-market environmental goods is related to income is
a key question for economics, but the role of income inequality is often neglected. We
study how income inequality affects the international transfer of the estimated value of
non-market goodsa practice called value or benefit transfer. Specifically, we apply theory-
driven, structural transfer factors to examine whether adjusting for income inequality affects
errors made in benefit transfer, drawing on a multi-country valuation study on water quality
improvement. Our convergent validity analysis shows that the structural income inequality
adjustment reduces benefit transfer errors by more than 1.5 percentage points on average
across all transfers. The adjustment for inequality is particularly important when income is
distributed more unequally at the policy site relative to the study site, yielding reductions
in transfer errors of up to 33 percentage points. Our results are relevant for policy appraisal,
environmental accounting, and more generally for the role of income inequality in non-market
valuation.
Keywords: benefit transfer, convergent validity, income, inequality, stated preferences,
transfer errors
Reference: Meya, J.N., Drupp. M.A., Hanley, N. (2017). Income inequality and the
international transfer of environmental values. Kiel Economics Working Paper No 2017-03.
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6.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest within economics and in society at large in the implications
of income inequality.79 A crucial question for economics concerns how the valuation of
non-market environmental goods is related to income. Numerous studies investigate this
relationship by estimating how willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental goods depends
on the level of income. They usually find that WTP increases with individual income,
but at a lower than proportionate rate.80 This implies that poorer households value these
non-market benefits disproportionately and it suggests an important role of economic dis-
tribution for environmental valuation that has been neglected until recently (Drupp et al.
2018). In a recent Science perspective, Frank and Schlenker (2016: 652) conjecture that
the income distribution might [...] be as important as overall economic growth" for the
valuation of environmental goods. Related to this conjecture, Baumgärtner et al. (2017a)
theoretically examine how mean WTP for environmental public goods within a society de-
pends on the distribution of income. They find that mean WTP decreases (increases) with
income inequality if the income elasticity of WTP is below (above) one, but that itexcept
for extreme caseschanges more elastically with mean income than with income inequality.
In this paper, we demonstrate that adjusting for income inequality in a structural, theory-
driven fashion can improve one of the most frequently used methods for non-market valua-
tion: benefit transfer. Benefit transferalso often called value transfermakes use of WTP
estimates for an environmental good derived from a study site to estimate values for a pol-
icy site, where this information is to be used to inform decision-making for environmental
management (Johnston et al. 2015). As sites and affected populations often differ in many
ways, it is crucial to control for variations in key explanatory variables, including income, as
part of the transfer. This paper is the first to utilize theory-driven benefit transfer factors
for income inequality, which have recently been developed by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a), to
scrutinize whether controlling for differences in income inequality across sites improves the
WTP estimates derived from benefit transfer in a multi-country convergent validity study.
Obtaining theoretically sound, empirically relevant and easy-to-use methods for benefit
transfer is of first order importance as WTP-estimates from such transfers are increasingly
79For example, Piketty's (2014) work on economic inequality has received widespread attention, and while
Google searches for income inequality have increased by more than 200 [110] percent in the USA [UK] from
2008 to 2016, searches for income only increased by 10 [19] percent (cf. Google Trends).
80Technically, these studies estimate the income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods, which is the
percentage change in WTP relative to a percentage change in income. Almost all studies thus find that the
income elasticity of WTP is positive and smaller than unity.
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used to inform policy decisions (Richardson et al. 2015). International and inter-regional
benefit transfer have been frequently applied to inform environmental policy making in the
European Union and the United States. For example, to inform the policy process on Natura
2000, the economic benefits from Natura 2000 sites were assessed for all of Europe (European
Commission 2013).81 As only limited primary valuations for ecosystem services from Natura
2000 sites were available (34 values from 20 studies), these were scaled up using the benefit
transfer method. Consequently, the resulting value estimates entail scope for substantial
benefit transfer errors. Furthermore, the U.S. EPA has been required to conduct benefit-
cost analysis on environmental regulation for more than three decades (Griffiths et al. 2012).
Benefit transfer has been applied, for instance, to estimate the recreational benefits of water
quality improvements under the 2002 Combined Animal Feeding Operations rule (U.S. EPA
2014). WTP estimates from a national contingent valuation survey by Carson and Mitchell
(1993) were used to value predicted water quality improvements across U.S. states.
As benefit transfer has become the bedrock of practical policy analysis to inform reg-
ulatory decision-making (Pearce et al. 2006: 266), improving its accuracy is an important
research area. Kaul et al. (2013) review 20 years of studies that scrutinize the errors made by
using benefit transfer. Their analysis suggests that benefit transfer should control for a range
of covariates of WTP with their levels calibrated to policy-case conditions. Other studies
find that simple transfers adjusted for only purchasing power parity and income perform
best (Czajkowski et al. 2017, Ready et al. 2004). A central finding of most studies is that
accounting for income plays an important role for the accuracy of benefit transfer. Many
policy applications of international benefit transfer, such as for Natura 2000, adjust WTP
estimates exclusively for differences mean income, government guidance documents suggest
the use of formulas for mean income correction (UBA 2012, Pearce et al. 2006, Defra 2007),
and many academic studies on benefit transfer have employed this approach (e.g. Krupnick
et al. 1996, Ready et al. 2004). However, while it is common practice to control for differ-
ences in mean income across sites, adjusting for differences in income inequality has, to our
knowledge, not been considered in benefit transfer evaluations.82
81Natura 2000 is Europe's most important legislation to protect nature and biodiversity. The network of
protected areas has the objective to conserve Europe's unique biodiversity including endangered species, rare
habitats and genetic diversity. Covering over 18 percent of the EU's terrestrial area it is globally the largest
coordinated network of protected areas (European Commission 2008, 2013).
82We surveyed a number of academics and practitioners working on benefit transfer and the general
response was that `no study ever controlled for differences in income inequality'. Furthermore, it is not
mentioned as a potential control factor in the guidelines of i.a. Germany (UBA 2012), the OECD (Pearce et
al. 2006), the UK (Defra 2007, HM Treasury 2011) as well as the USA (U.S. EPA 2014).
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The literature on benefit transfer has been mainly driven by empirical approaches such
as using meta-regressions, with only very few exceptions of studies following a more struc-
tural utility theoretic approach.83 Bateman et al. (2011) argue that parameters controlled
for in benefit transfer should be based on economic theory rather than ad-hoc statistical
approaches that may be over parametrized when applied out of the sample. As far as we
know, Smith et al. (2002) first proposed a structural approach to benefit transfer, which
requires specifying a utility function as well as all relevant additional conditions, such as the
budget constraint, and then calibrating the function's parameters with information from the
study site. Despite several advantages of such a theory-driven approach, its application has
been limited among others due to the advanced micro-economic skills that may be required
(Phaneuf and Requate 2017). Recently, Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) have shown how aggre-
gate WTP for an environmental public good depends on the distribution of income, based
on a structural model with constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences and an unequal
distribution of income, and have derived theory-based and easy-to-apply benefit transfer
factors, in particular for mean income and income inequality.
This paper builds on these theory-driven transfer factors to systematically examine the
effects of a structural benefit transfer approach to income inequality adjustment using data
from a valuation study on water quality improvement in all nine Baltic Sea countries (Ah-
tiainen et al. 2014). The unique feature of this study making it an ideal test-bed for our
theory-driven approach to benefit transfer is that the contingent valuation study employed
the same survey instrument across countries with substantial differences in income distribu-
tions for a well-defined change in environmental quality that has region-wide public good
characteristics. It thereby offers the possibility to compare transferred WTPs across coun-
tries with actual primary valuations. Specifically, we calculate transfer factors to account
for differences in mean income, income inequality and combinations of both, and evaluate
transfer errors on a country-by-country basis.
By confronting theory-driven benefit transfer factors with a unique multi-country data
set, this paper adds to the literature by providing a convergent validity excercise to test
whether structual adjustment for income inequality can reduce errors made in benefit trans-
fer. For the nine-country Baltic Sea study on water quality improvement, we find that (i)
83Bergstrom and Taylor (2006) survey theory-based approaches to benefit transfer and distinguish three
approaches: non-structural as well as weak and strong structural utility theoretic approaches. While the
strong structural approach explicitly specifies the relationship between WTP and its explanatory variables,
this is only loosely the case in the weak structural approach. We are only aware of very few strong structural
approach studies (Baumgärtner et al. 2017a; Smith et al. 2002, 2006).
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income inequality adjustment decreases transfer errors by more than 1.5 percentage points
on average; (ii) Income inequality adjustment becomes particularly relevant when income
is more unequally distributed at the policy relative to the study site. It decreases transfer
errors by more than 5 percentage points on average when inequality at the study site is less
than 80% of the policy site's income inequality; (iii) Even though adjustment for income
inequality is of second-order compared to adjusting for the level of mean income, our study
shows that accounting for income inequality can further improve benefit transfers and that
its application is straightforward. We perform a number of robustness checks and find that
our main conclusion is not affected by considering other transfer factorsfor differences in
the price level or the mean level of the environmental goods accross countriesin addi-
tion. Finally, we show that a naive transfer adjustment for income inequality would increase
benefit transfer errors, emphasizing the importance of employing structural theory-driven
factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model framework
and transfer factors derived from this in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 we present data from the
Baltic Sea study and describe in Section 6.4 our strategy to empirically test the proposed
transfer factors. We report our main results in Section 6.5.1 and test their robustness in
Section 6.5.2. Finally, we discuss limitations to our analysis in Section 6.6 and conclude in
Section 6.7.
6.2 Theory-driven benefit transfer factors
This paper tests the effect of income inequality on the convergent validity of benefit transfer.
For this, we draw on recent theoretical work by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a), who have
derived a generic transfer function, which disentangles transfer factors for mean income and
income inequality. In the following, we apply their modelling framework for our setting of
benefit transfer, which seeks to transfer willingness to pay (WTP) estimates from a primary
valuation study in one country or region s (the `study site') to inform environmental policy
making in another country or contect p (the `policy site'):
Assume that in each country c, with c ∈ {s, p}, there are N c individuals, denoted by i,
who derive utility from the consumption of a market-traded private good, Xci , and a non-
market-traded pure public environmental good, Ec. The consumption good Xci is traded at
a given market price P c > 0, while the consumption of the environmental good is fixed at
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level Ec > 0.84 Individuals have identical preferences over the two goods represented by a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function
U(Xci , E) =
(
αXc
θ−1
θ
i + (1− α)Ec
θ−1
θ
) θ
θ−1
, (6.1)
where θ ∈ (0,+∞) is the CES between market-traded consumption goods and non-market-
traded public environmental goods, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a preference parameter capturing the
weight of market-traded consumption goods as part of overall utility.85
The decision problem of each individual i is then to maximize utility over the consumption
of these two goods subject to the income constraint and the fixed level of Ec. While we
assume that individuals have the same preferences, they differ in their individual incomes
Y ci , which are given exogenously. Specifically, income is assumed to be distributed log-
normally with mean, µcY , and standard deviation, σ
c
Y .
86
Individual i's WTP for the environmental good Ec is then determined by the level of
income Y ci and the parameters of the utility function and the level of E
c
WTP(Y ci ) = κ
c Y c
η
i with κ
c =
1− α
α
(P cEc)1−η, η =
1
θ
, (6.2)
where η is the income elasticity of WTP. The CES utility function implies that the income
elasticity of WTP, η, is the inverse of the CES, θ, between the market-traded consumption
good, Xci , and non-market-traded public environmental good, E
c, and thus also a constant.87
While this simple model of individual WTP explicitly captures some fundamental determi-
nants of WTP, such as individual income, the level of the environmental good and the price
level, the parameter α can be thought of as a residual that may capture, for example, the
effect of culture on WTP for environmental goods.
84In Section 6.5.2, we discuss how this theory can be extended to the case of local public goods. We can
show that if the consumption of a local environmental public good is uncorrelated with income, then the
transfer factors for mean income and income inequality remain unchanged.
85While the assumption of identical preferences may seem demanding, it is often implicitly made in the
benefit transfer literature. We discuss how this assumption can be relaxed in Section 6.6.
86 The assumption of log-normality allows for simple closed-form solutions (Baumgärtner et al. 2017a).
While there may often be more complex distributions that yield better fits (McDonald 1984), the log-normal
distribution provides a decent approximation for many income distributions at a national level, as well as
for the world as a whole (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009).
87While the assumption of a constant income elasticity of WTP has been challenged (Barbier et al. 2016),
it is superior to other functional forms in benefit transfer for the Baltic Sea study that we use in this paper
(Czajkowski et al. 2017), and it is typically applied by practitioners of benefit transfer.
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Based on this modelling set-up, mean WTP for a marginal change in Ec depends, inter
alia, on mean income and income inequality as follows
µcWTP(µ
c
Y ,CV
c
Y , P
c, Ec) = µcY
η
(
1 + CVcY
2
) η(η−1)
2
1− α
α
(P cEc)1−η , (6.3)
where CVcY := σ
c
Y /µ
c
Y is the coefficient of variation of income, which measures the spread of
the income distribution relative to the income level. Equation 6.3 implies that mean WTP
increases with mean income in society, yet decreases (increases) with income inequality if
the income elasticity of WTP is below (above) unity (cf. Baumgärtner et al. 2017a). The
effect of income inequality on mean WTP can intuitively be explained as follows: For the
case of an income elasticity of WTP smaller than unity, an increase in an individuals income
results in an increase in WTP, but at a lower-than-proportional rate as compared to the
increase in income (cf. Equation 6.2). Thus, individuals with a low income are willing to
pay a larger share of their income than individuals with a higher income. Now, consider
a society in which income is redistributed such that income inequality decreases but mean
income remains constant, i.e. at least one individual with income below average has more
and one individual with income above average has less income. As WTP increases at a
lower-than-proportional rate than income, the increase in WTP of the poorer individual
overcompensate the decrease in WTP of the richer individual, thus establishing the effect
of changes in income inequality on mean WTP that we will make use of for our analysis of
benefit transfers.88
The benefit transfer function, T (· · · ), for transferring mean WTPs from the study site,
µsWTP, to the policy site, µ
p
WTP, while controlling for the variables that differ across sites in
this theoretical equal-preference framework, is now defined as the ratio of the mean WTPs
at the policy and the study sites:
T (µpY ,CVpY , P p, Ep; µsY ,CVsY , P s, Es) :=
µpWTP(µ
p
Y ,CV
p
Y , P
p, Ep)
µsWTP(µ
s
Y ,CV
s
Y , P
s, Es)
(Equ. 6.3)
=
(µpY )
η(1 + CVpY
2
)
η(η−1)
2 (P pEp)1−η
(µsY )
η(1 + CVsY
2)
η(η−1)
2 (P sEs)1−η
88The rationale is reversed for an income elasticity of WTP larger than unity: In this case, an increase in
income inequality would lower mean WTP.
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This transfer function neatly disentangles into four individual transfer factors, with:
µpWTP = f(µ
s
WTP )
= Tµ(µpY , µsY ) · TCV(CVpY ,CVsY ) · Tp(P p, P s) · TE(Ep, Es) · µsWTP . (6.4)
In particular, this transfer function yields the transfer factors for differences in the level of
mean income and income inequality that will be the main focus of our analysis:89
Tµ(µpY , µsY ) =
(
µpY
µsY
)η
, (6.5)
TCV(CVpY ,CVsY ) =
(
1 + CVpY
2
1 + CVsY
2
) η(η−1)
2
. (6.6)
It is common practice in benefit transfer to adjust WTP-estimates for differences in
mean income using Tµ(µpY , µsY ). For instance, Krupnick et al. (1996) adjusted estimates in
this fashion for health impacts from Western Europe and the US to evaluate benefits from
reductions in ambient air pollution in Central and Eastern European countries. Pearce (2000)
stated this formula in policy advice used by the European Commission for international
benefit transfer on health estimates. Moreover, policy guidance on benefit transfer, for
instance for the UK (Defra 2007), Germany (UBA 2012) and from the OECD (Pearce et al.
2006), propose this formula to adjust WTP estimates for differences in mean income. Yet,
none of these studies or guidelines on benefit transfer (UBA 2012, Defra 2007, Pearce et al.
2006, U.S. EPA 2014) mentions income inequality.
The income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods, η, plays a central role for the
transfer factors. We therefore discuss different parameter values for η. First, we focus on the
simplest case of η = 1 that is most often assumed in the literature on benefit transfer (see,
e.g., Barton (2002) and Czajkowski and Scasny (2010)) and in policy applications (see, e.g.,
89The theory also yields transfer factors for the market price level TP (P p, P s) =
(
Pp
Ps
)1−η
and the quantity
of the environmental good TE(Ep, Es) =
(
Ep
Es
)1−η
. As there is empirical evidence that the environmental
good under study is a region-wide public good (see Section 6.3), we assume Ep = Es for the main part
of our analysis. We ease this assumption to a local public good in a sensitivity analysis in Section 6.5.2,
where we apply TE(Ep, Es). We show that including this additional transfer factor does not alter our main
result. Furthermore, we directly use the income and WTP data from the Baltic Sea study, which have
already been made internationally comparable by using PPP-corrected currency exchange rates. As such
our analysis starts out from a situation where differences in the market price levels between policy and study
site are accounted for and hence we take P p = P s. To further establish the robustness of our main result
for inequality, we also explicitly apply TP (P p, P s) in Section 6.5.2.
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Figure 6.1: Relationship between the transfer factor for income inequality TCV(·) and the ratio of income
inequality in the study and policy country for η = 0.28 and CV sY = 0.56.
ten Brink et al. (2011)). The theory-driven transfer factors suggest that controlling only
for the difference in mean incomes is correct if and only if the income elasticity is equal to
unity, which is often assumed for simplicity. However, as the income elasticity of WTP for
environmental goods is in general not equal to unity, we also have to consider not only the
transfer factor for mean income but also income inequality.
As there is only sparse empirical evidence for η > 1, we focus on the empirically most
relevant case of η < 1 (see Figure 6.1).90 For income elasticities below unity, η < 1, WTP-
estimates have to be adjusted by the ratio of mean income in the policy and study sites to the
power of the income elasticity of WTP, Tµ(µpY , µsY ). A closer inspection of this theory-driven
transfer factor from Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) for income inequality, TCV(CVpY ,CVsY ),
reveals that it increases in the ratio of income inequality at the study and the policy site,
CV sY
CV pY
, at a decreasing rate (Figure 6.1). This suggests that it is in particular relevant to
control for income inequality when income inequality is higher at the policy site than on the
study site (i.e. in the lower-left part of Figure 6.1).
6.3 Data
We investigate the empirical relevance of income inequality adjustment in benefit transfer
using data from a multi-country contingent valuation study on the benefits of a water quality
90Most studies find an income elasticity of WTP between 0 and 1. This is also the case for the Baltic Sea
study (Barbier et al. 2016). Surveying recent evidence on income elasticities, Drupp (2018) finds that only
two of 18 considered studies imply mean income elasticities greater than unity.
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improvement in the Baltic Sea (Ahtiainen et al. 2014). Respondents were asked for their
WTP for a nutrient reduction programme with associated consequences for water clarity,
blue-green algal blooms, the abundance of sea grass beds, and fish species composition.
Figure 6.2 shows a map of the Baltic sea and its neighboring countries, with levels of income
inequality and mean WTP for water quality improvement.
The data is particularly suitable to study the performance of the theory-driven transfer
factors as the same survey instrument was used to elicit the WTP for a common change in
this environmental good across populations with substantially different mean income levels
and income inequalities. Ahtiainen et al. (2014) designed the survey such that it is both
comparable and meaningful to the population in each country bordering the Baltic See.
Respondents were informed that the benefits of nutrient reductions would occur in open-sea
areas across the whole Baltic Sea (Czajkowski et al. 2017), suggesting region-wide public
good characteristics.91
The payment vehicle was framed as a 'Baltic Sea tax' for nutrient reduction levied in all
countries bordering the Baltic Sea. A payment card with country specific bid vectors based
on the WTP distributions in pilot studies was employed to elicit WTP. In the following
we take individual maximum WTP to equal the mid point of the stated WTP interval, as
previously done by Ahtiainen et al. (2014) and Barbier et al. (2016).
The survey was conducted from October to December 2011 in all nine countries bordering
the Baltic Sea: Denmark (DEN), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), Germany (GER), Latvia
(LAT), Lithuania (LIT), Poland (POL), Russia (RUS) and Sweden (SWE). For comparison
all WTP figures were converted to units of 2011-purchasing-power-converted-EUR ["2011-
PPP-EUR"]. Country samples show substantially different estimated mean WTPs, µ˜cWTP
(Table 6.1).92 These range from 5.74 [2011-PPP-EUR] elicited in Latvia to 80.64 [2011-
PPP-EUR] in Sweden.
Respondents were asked to state their personal mean monthly net income by selecting
the applicable interval. Income was then set to the interval mean, for all but the highest
category, where it was set to the lower interval boundary.
91Respondents understanding was validated by the following survey questions: "Did you consider the whole
Baltic Sea or a certain area of the Baltic Sea when answering how much you were willing to pay?", "To what
extent did you consider open sea and coastal areas when answering how much you were willing to pay?" It
shows that respondents indeed predominantly state that they considered the whole Baltic Sea opposed to
the shore line when stating their WTP values. Moreover, Ahtiainen et al. (2014) find in their fully specified
regression models a significant negative effect of respondents distance to the Baltic Sea on WTP for water
quality improvement in only one out of nine countries.
92We qualify estimates with a tilde to distinguish them from the true values in the population.
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Figure 6.2: Countries neighboring the Baltic Sea with mean WTP for water quality improvement, µ˜cWTP, and
income inequality, C˜V
c
Y , of surveyed population.
Income distributions of the countries bordering the Baltic Sea differ substantially regard-
ing both mean income and income inequality (Figure 6.2). Respondents mean monthly net
income, µ˜cY , ranges from 343 [2011-PPP-EUR] in Lithuania up to 1,659 [2011-PPP-EUR] in
Denmark. The surveyed income inequality is lowest in Sweden with a coefficient of variation,
C˜V
c
Y , of 0.36 and highest in Estonia with a C˜V
c
Y of 0.71, corresponding to Gini-coefficients,
GinicY , of 0.20 and 0.37, respectively.
93
93 Compared to national statistics, sample mean income is below the national averages for most countries
(exceptions are Poland and Estonia where sample mean income is slightly higher). The mean absolute
deviation from the national income level is 14.48(±15.09)%. Concerning income inequality the picture is more
mixed: Income inequality within the sample as measured with the GiniY is below official national figures
for four countries (DEN, LIT, RUS, SWE), but higher for the other five countries (EST, FIN, GER, LAT,
POL). The majority of differences are mostly below ten percentages points, with mean absolute deviation
of 11.95(±8.92)%. Russia is an exception, where the surveyed income in the exclave Kaliningrad Oblasthas
shows a substantially lower GiniY than for the whole country.
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Table 6.1: Sample statistics by country
Country N˜ c µ˜cY C˜V
c
Y Gini
c
Y µ˜
c
WTP
Denmark (DEN) 1, 061 1, 659 0.46 0.26 31.50
Estonia (EST) 505 857 0.71 0.37 21.23
Finland (FIN) 1, 645 1, 585 0.51 0.28 42.84
Germany (GER) 1, 495 1, 559 0.60 0.33 25.59
Latvia (LAT) 701 483 0.66 0.36 5.74
Lithuania (LIT) 617 343 0.53 0.30 9.61
Poland (POL) 2, 029 841 0.69 0.33 12.99
Russia (RUS) 1, 508 666 0.50 0.28 8.57
Sweden (SWE) 1, 003 1, 431 0.36 0.20 80.64
Note: Monthly net income and WTP per year in 2011-PPP-EUR.
6.4 Empirical strategy
For each pair of countries in our dataset we hypothetically transfer WTP-estimates from one
country to the other and compare the transferred WTP with the actually surveyed WTP-
estimates. This approach is often termed convergent validity, as it cross-validates the results
of the benefit transfer with another estimate for the true WTP.94
The accuracy of benefit transfer is assessed by calculating transfer errors, which are a
common measurement to study the convergent validity of benefit transfers (e.g. Kaul et
al. 2013). Accordingly, the relative transfer error associated with a single benefit transfer
is measured as the difference between the mean WTP estimate transferred from the study
site f(µ˜sWTP ), and the actually observed mean WTP-estimate at the policy site, µ˜
p
WTP ,
expressed as a percentage (Kirchhoff et al. 1997):
|TE| = |WTPtrans −WTPobs|
WTPobs
=
∣∣f(µ˜sWTP )− µ˜pWTP ∣∣
µ˜pWTP
. (6.7)
Each transfer is conducted using unadjusted unit transfer, income inequality adjusted
transfer, mean income adjusted transfer as well as mean income and income inequality
adjusted transfer.
For simple unit transfer the transferred WTP-estimate, f(µ˜sWTP ), equals the WTP sur-
veyed at the study site, µ˜sWTP , and this becomes:
|TE|unit =
∣∣µ˜sWTP − µ˜pWTP ∣∣
µ˜pWTP
. (6.8)
94Note that the estimate from the primary valuation at the policy site, µ˜sWTP , might itself be a biased
estimate of the 'true' WTP, µsWTP .
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To adjust for differences in income inequality, the level of mean income between policy and
study sites, or the combination of both we draw on the theory-driven benefit transfer factors
for income inequality TC˜V (C˜V
p
Y , C˜V
s
Y ) =
(
1+C˜V
p 2
Y
1+C˜V
s 2
Y
) η˜(η˜−1)
2
(Equation 6.6), and for mean
income Tµ(µ˜Y p, µ˜Y s) =
(
µ˜Y
p
µ˜Y
s
)η˜
(Equation 6.5). The transfer errors after correcting for
income inequality, |TE|TCV , mean income, |TE|Tµ , as well as both income inequality and
mean income, |TE|TCV,µ , read:
|TE|TCV =
∣∣∣TCV (C˜V pY , C˜V sY , η˜) · µ˜sWTP − µ˜pWTP ∣∣∣
µ˜pWTP
, (6.9)
|TE|Tµ =
∣∣Tµ(µ˜pY , µ˜sY , η˜) · µ˜sWTP − µ˜pWTP ∣∣
µ˜pWTP
, (6.10)
and
|TE|TCV,µ =
∣∣∣TCV (C˜V pY , C˜V sY , η˜) · Tµ(µ˜pY , µ˜sY , η˜) · µ˜sWTP − µ˜pWTP ∣∣∣
µ˜pWTP
. (6.11)
The performances of benefit transfers after adjusting for income inequality, mean income
and both, TCV , Tµ, TCV,µ , are evaluated against unit transfer. Accordingly, reductions in
mean transfer errors are measured (in percentage points) as
∆ |TE|TCV := |TE|TCV − |TE|unit ,
∆ |TE|Tµ := |TE|Tµ − |TE|unit ,
and
∆ |TE|TCV,µ := |TE|TCV,µ − |TE|unit .
To investigate whether income inequality adjustment increases the validity of benefit
transfers, we are interest in the change in transfer errors when adjusting for income inequality
and mean income compared to pure income-adjustment, and refer to this as additional
income inequality adjustment, ∆ |TE|TCV,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ = |TE|TCV,µ − |TE|µ.
The theory assumes that the income elasticity of WTP, η, is common to the population
at the study and the policy site. In practical applications of benefit transfer this would
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be reflected in applying an estimate for the income elasticity, η˜, from a meta-study such
as Jacobsen and Hanley (2009).95 In the context of this Baltic Sea study, we assume that
there is an income elasticity of the WTP for water quality improvements of the Baltic Sea
common to all neighboring countries. We therefore rely on the estimate for pooling income
and WTP data across all countries in Barbier et al. (2016), who estimate a pooled income
elasticity for a range of model specifications, and use the estimate of η˜ = 0.28 from the
Box-Cox regression in the constant income elasticity specification with heteroskedascity and
apply it throughout formulas (6.9) to (6.11).96
For nine countries this yields a set of 9× 8 = 72 possible transfers for each specification,
based on which we calculate summary statistics (mean, standard deviation and median) for
the transfer errors |TE|·. We perform this analysis for the full set of benefit transfers as well
as for sub-samples for different ratios in income inequality between study site and policy site
in order to identify conditions under which income adjustment is likely to reduce transfer
errors.
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Main result
Calculating transfer factors for mean income, Tµ(·), for income inequality, TCV (·), and for
both together, TCV,µ = Tµ(·) × TCV (·), is straightforward by plugging in countries' mean
income, CV of income (from Table 6.1) and income elasticities of WTP for the environmental
good, η˜, in Equations (6.5) and (6.6).
Transfer factors for income inequality, TCV (·), range from 0.97 (Sweden to Estonia) to
1.03 (Estonia to Sweden), which have the lowest (Sweden) and highest (Estonia) levels of
income inequality. Populating the conceptual sketch from Figure 6.1 with data from our case
study, Figure 3 now depicts the relationship between the transfer factor for income inequality
TCV (·) and the ratio of income inequality in the study and policy sites. In particular, we
depict the two extreme cases, using Estonia (left panel) and Sweden (right panel) as the
study sites and all countries as potential policy sites, respectively.
95We also explore the option of country-specific income elasticities and report the corresponding results in
the discussion (Section 6.6).
96Alternatives to determine a pooled income elasticity of WTP could be to use an estimate from another
global case study, such as Jacobsen and Hanley (2009), to use an average of individual country's income
elasticities, µη˜i , or to construct a pooled estimates of the income elasticity that incorporates subjects from
individual countries relative to the countries' population sizes.
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Figure 6.3: Relationship between the transfer factor for income inequality TCV (·) and the ratio of income
inequality in the study and policy sites, for Estonia (Sweden) as the study site in the left (right)
panel. Each blue dot represents a possible benefit transfer.
Adjusting WTP-estimates for differences in mean income requires higher transfer factors,
Tµ(·), ranging from 0.64 (Denmark to Lithuania) to 1.56 (Lithuania to Denmark), which have
the highest and lowest mean income in our data set.
Simple unit transfers result in substantial transfer errors, with a mean absolute transfer
error of 152.35%. This mean transfer error is reduced by ∆ |TE|TCV = −1.80 percentage
points to |TE|TCV = 150.55% when WTP-estimates are adjusted for income inequality.97 It
is reduced by ∆ |TE|Tµ = −36.88 percentage points to |TE|Tµ = 115.48% when adjusting
for mean income, underscoring that this is the more important adjustment in quantitative
terms. Combining income inequality with mean income adjustment produces the best result
(|TE|TCV,µ = 114.02%), where mean transfer errors are reduced by ∆ |TE|TCV,µ = −38.33
percentage points. Thus, additional income inequality adjustment reduces mean transfer
errors by ∆ |TE|TCV,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ = −1.46 percentage points (see Table 6.2, row 1). We find
that changes in transfer errors from both income inequality adjustment, ∆ |TE|TCV , and
additional income inequality, ∆ |TE|TCV,µ , are significantly different from a zero transfer
error reduction at p < 0.01 for all 72 transfers.98
97The transfer errors associated with each individual benefit transfer are reported on a country-by-country
basis in Tables 6.3 to 6.6 in the Appendix. Summary statistics on the absolute transfer errors for each
specification of the benefit transfers are reported in Table 6.8.
98This also holds for non-parametric tests, such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. If we only consider
uni-directional transfers, i.e. half the sample, we find that the results still hold at p < 0.05 on aver-
age. Moreover, if we measure transfer errors as absolute changes instead of relative changes, i.e. define
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Table 6.2: Mean differences in transfer errors (in percentage points) for pure and additional income inequality
adjustment, ∆ |TE|TCV and ∆ |TE|TCV,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ .
∆ |TE|TCV ∆ |TE|TCV,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ Ntransfer
all −1.80 −1.46 72
CV s
CV p < 1 −3.82 −3.01 36
CV s
CV p < 0.8 −6.31 −4.96 20
We now examine under which conditions (additional) income inequality adjustment
particularly reduces benefit transfer errors.99 Figure 6.4 depicts the relationship between
reductions in absolute transfer errors through additional income inequality adjustment,
∆ |TE|TCV,µ , and the ratio of income inequality at study and policy site, C˜V
s
C˜V
p . We find
that income inequality adjustment substantially reduces transfer errors in cases where in-
come inequality is higher at the policy compared to the study site. For the 36 transfers
where income inequality is higher at the policy site than at the study site, reduction in mean
transfer errors roughly doubles compared to the whole set of transfers to ∆ |TE|TCV = −3.82
percentage points for pure income inequality adjustment and to ∆ |TE|TCV,µ−∆ |TE|Tµ−3.01
percentage points for additional income inequality adjustment (see Table 6.2, row 2). The
improvements in transfer accuracy due to income inequality adjustment are even more pro-
nounced for the 20 transfers where inequality in the study sites is less than 80% of the
policy site's estimate. Here, reductions in mean transfer errors are ∆ |TE|TCV = −6.31 and
∆ |TE|TCV,µ−∆ |TE|Tµ = −4.96 percentage points for pure and additional income inequality
adjustment (see Table 6.2, row 3). The most substantial reduction of transfer errors is for
a benefit transfer from Sweden to Latvia. Here, accounting for income inequality, over and
above adjusting for differences in mean income, reduces the transfer error by 24.51 percent-
age points. Compared to the unit transfer, accounting for income inequality even reduces
transfer errors by up to 33.31 percentage points. This is driven by both the large differences
in mean WTP and income inequality between Sweden and Latvia.
|TE′| := |WTPtrans −WTPobs|, two-sided t-tests reveal that (additional) income inequality adjustment
reduces transfer errors even at p < 0.001.
99Note that transfers for mean income as well as income inequality lead to some cases in which adjustments
to not improve transfer errors. See Tables 6.4 to 6.6 in the Appendix, and Figure 6.5 for the case of additional
income inequality adjustment.
219
Empirical applications Income Inequality and Benefit Transfer
Income inequality at study site relative to policy site,  
CVY
s
CVY
p
|T
E
| τ µ
,C
V
 −
 |T
E
| τ µ
−20
−10
0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Figure 6.4: Relationship between reductions in transfer errors after additional income inequality adjustment,
|TE|TCV,µ − |TE|Tµ , and the ratio of income inequality in the study and policy country for η˜ = 0.28.
6.5.2 Robustness checks
We perform a number of checks to examine the robustness of our main resultthat theory-
driven (additional) adjustment for income inequality improves benefit transfer. In particular,
we extend our main analysis to consider (i) differences in level of the environmental good,
(ii) differences in market prices as well as (iii) naive, non-structural adjustment for income
inequality.
First, we test whether our main result still holds when we also consider differences in
the level of the environmental good across countries. We thus depart from the simplifying
assumption of a region-wide public good and allow E˜p 6= E˜s. We assume that a respondent's
level of consumption of the environmental good depends on her exposure to it, approximated
by her distance to the shore. A respondent's distance to the Baltic Sea, di, is measured from
the geometrical centre point of the municipality or postal codes area they live in to the
Baltic Sea (Ahtiainen et al. 2014). There are large country differences in respondents' mean
distance to the Baltic Sea reflecting that countries vary substantially in length of their
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coastline relative to their land area and geographical population density.100 Since distance
would give disutility, we take as an estimate for a country's level of the environmental good,
E˜c, the average of respondent's negative distance rescaled to the [0,1]-interval
E˜c =
1
N c
Nc∑
1
max (d)− dci
max (d)−min (d) , (6.12)
where the sample's minimum and maximum distance to the Baltic Sea are min (d) = 0 and
max (d) = 9.300 km.101 Thus, to stay in line with the model, we consider differences in the
level of the environmental good across countries, but not within a country.102
We adjust WTP-estimates for differences in the closeness to the Baltic Sea in the hypo-
thetical benefit transfers by using E˜c in TE(E˜p, E˜s) =
(
E˜p
E˜s
)1−η
and additionally adjusting
for differences in mean income and income inequality. We find that the adjustment for the
level of the environmental good, ∆ |TE|TE , reduces the average transfer error compared to
the unit transfer by 2.87 percentage points.103 However, this does not much affect our main
results on how adjusting for income inequality affects transfer errors: We find that account-
ing for income inequality over and above for differences in the level of the environmental
good, ∆ |TE|TE −∆ |TE|TE,CV , reduces transfer errors on average by 1.78 percentage points.
This is almost the same effect size as if we had not controlled for differences in the level of
the environmental good, which leads to a reduction of 1.80 percentage points. When ad-
justing for income inequality additionally to both transfers for the environmental good and
mean income differences, ∆ |TE|TE,CV,µ−∆ |TE|TE,µ , we find that it further reduces average
transfer errors by 1.45 percentage points. Recall that the effect size without controlling for
differences in the level of the environmental good was 1.46. Thus the effect sizes presented
in the main results section remain largely unchanged.
100Denmark and Estonia have the shortest average distances to the Baltic Sea (dDEN = 10 km and dEST =
30 km), while Germany and Russia have the largest (dGER = 360 km and dRUS = 880 km).
101As an alternative proxy one could also use a country's average inverse distance (restricting di to a
minimum of 0.1 km to avoid infinite values of Ei), with Ei = di−1 for di > 0.001 and Ei = 0.001−1 = 1000
for di < 0.001. While this approach would increase transfer errors compared to a unit transfer, adjusting for
inequality still reduces transfer errors on a comparable magnitude.
102Meya (2018) extends the theory of Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) to local public goods. He shows that the
transfer factors for income inequality employed here also hold for environmental local public goods if their
consumption is uncorrelated with income. Otherwise, one also needs to account for environmental inequality
and the correlation between the environmental good and income when adjusting for income inequality. Yet,
in this case, one cannot neatly disentangle transfer factors. For the Baltic Sea dataset correlating a possibly
differential level of the environmental good, approximated as respondents' closeness to the Baltic Sea, and
income produces mixed results, As there is no significant correlation (at p < 0.05) in the majority of cases,
we refrained from further extending our analysis in this direction.
103Summary statistics on the absolute transfer errors for the closeness-adjusted benefit transfers are depicted
in Table 6.9 in the Appendix.
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Second, we test whether our main result still holds when we explicitly adjust for dif-
ference in the market price level, that is allowing P˜ p 6= P˜ s. For this we take the annual
average exchange rates of the national currency in Euro for 2011 from OECD.Stat. Di-
viding countries PPP-estimates used in Czajkowski et al. (2017) by their exchange rates
yields their market price level, P˜ c.104 In contrast to our previous approach of starting off
with PPP-corrected WTP-estimates, we now first convert WTP-estimates to 2011-EUR and
then explicitly adjust for differences in the market price level in benefit transfers by applying
TP (P˜ p, P˜ s) =
(
P˜ p
P˜ s
)1−η
. Simple unit transfer to a single currency converted WTP-estimates
results in a mean transfer error of 302.01%, which is substantially reduced when adjusting for
the market price level, |TE|TP = 179.91%. Thus, this approach yields higher transfer errors
than in our main results specification (compare it to the mean transfer error of 152.35 for
unit transfer of the PPP-adjusted WTP-estimates). However, additional income inequality
adjustments continue to reduce transfer errors: Adjusting for income inequality in addition
to the market price level reduces mean transfer errors by ∆ |TE|TCV,P − ∆ |TE|TP=−2.28
percentage points. When also adjusting for mean income or for mean income and the level
of the environmental good the reduction are still ∆ |TE|TCV,P,µ − ∆ |TE|TP,µ = −1.85 and
∆ |TE|TCV,P,µ,E −∆ |TE|TP,µ,E = −1.84 percentage points, respectively.
Finally, we test whether adjusting WTP-estimates for income inequality in a naive, non-
theory driven fashion also reduces transfer errors. Without being informed by economic
theory, a natural `naive' approach to adjust for income inequality in benefit transfer would
most likely be to follow common practice in mean income adjustment using income ratios
and thus to adjust WTP-estimates from the study site by the ratio of income inequality at
policy and study site, i.e. applying T ′CV(CVpY ,CVsY ) =
CVpY
CVsY
=
σpY
σsY
. All other things equal
to Section 6.5.1, using such a naive income inequality adjustment increases transfer errors
compared to unadjusted unit transfer by ∆ |TE|T ′CV = 57.55 percentage points instead of
reducing them and results in mean transfer errors of |TE|T ′CV = 209.90%. Compared with
mean income adjustment additional inequality adjustment in such a naive way worsens the
accuracy of benefit transfer by ∆ |TE|T ′CV,µ−∆ |TE|T ′µ = 47.54 percentage points.105 This
finding highlights the important role of theory for specifying functional forms.
104The estimated market price level is only P˜LAT = 0.48 in Latvia but P˜DEN = 1.37 in Denmark.
105Adjusting WTP-estimates adhoc for differences in the Gini-coefficient yields similar results. Applying
naively TGini(GinipY ,GinisY ) =
Gini
p
Y
Ginis
Y
would worse the accuracy of benefit transfer by ∆ |TE|TGini = 55.01
and ∆ |TE|TGini,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ = 44.51 percentages points.
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6.6 Discussion
This section provides a discussion of crucial assumptions and major limitations of our anal-
ysis. These include (i) the public good characteristics of the environmental quality im-
provement employed in the contingent valuation survey, (ii) the quality of the income data,
(iii) alternative measures of income inequality, (iv) the potential for non-constant income
elasticities, as well as (v) the assumption of identical preferences.
First, our theoretical basis for the benefit transfer factors relies on the assumption of a
pure public good character of the environmental good in question. Yet, water quality im-
provement is not always a pure public good and may entail a number of benefits that have
a mixed-use character. As such it may also be classified as a local public good, in which
exposure to the good differs depending on one's distance to it. In our case, however, respon-
dents were informed that the benefits of nutrient reductions would occur in open-sea areas
across the whole Baltic Sea. Indeed, respondents predominantly stated that they considered
the whole Baltic Sea, as opposed to only their country's shore line when stating their WTP
values (Czajkowski et al. 2017). This is also reflected in the finding by Ahtiainen et al.
(2014) that respondents' distance to the Baltic Sea negatively effects their WTP in only one
out of nine countries. It thus seems a reasonable assumption that the environmental good in
question matches the pure (region-wide) public good characteristics in the theoretical model
used to derive the transfer factors. Nevertheless, we eased this assumption in Section 6.5.2
finding that the effect of (additional) income inequality adjustment remains unchanged.
Second, the quality of the income data is not ideal, as income was only elicited on a
limited interval scale (Ahtiainen et al. 2014). As such this is a typical initial situation for
benefit transfer, since income data elicited in valuation studies is usually coarsely-grained.
We followed Ahtiainen et al. (2014) in setting individual income estimates to the interval
mean for all but the highest category, where it was set to the lower interval boundary. This
provides conservative estimates of both mean income and income inequality and implies that
the reported effect of inequality adjustment is likely a conservative estimate of the actual
effect of inequality. This limited information on income data also does not allow for a proper
test of the assumption of a log-normal distribution of income. As there is mixed evidence
on how well the log-normal distribution fits actual income data within countries and for the
world as a whole (e.g. McDonald 1984, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009), our results only
hold in approximation.
Third, there are a number of different measures for income inequality that one could
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use to develop transfer functions (see, e.g., Cowell 2009). In particular, one can distinguish
notions of absolute and relative income inequality. Measures of absolute income inequality
include the standard deviation of income, σcY , as well as the GiniY -coefficient. It is possible
to derive transfer factors for benefit transfer for differences in these measures of absolute
income inequality (Baumgärtner et al. 2017a). However, as transfer factors for mean income
and income inequality cannot be disentangled for these two absolute measures of income
inequality, we have restricted our analysis to the coefficient of variation, CV cY , as a measure
of relative income inequality to isolate the effects. As country-level GiniY -coefficient data
may be more widely accessible, we also conduct a simple check on whether it is particularly
worthwhile to adjust for income inequality in benefit transfer, based on the GiniY for data
from the Baltic Sea study. For this, we consider those 16 cases for which a GiniY -coefficient
ratio between the study and the policy site is smaller than 0.8 and compute mean reductions
in transfer errors by including the transfer factors. For these cases, we find that as compared
to unit transfer or mean income adjustment, respectively, additionally considering income
inequality adjustment reduces transfer errors by 7.73 percentage points for ∆ |TE|TCV and by
6.15 percentage points for ∆ |TE|TCV,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ . This suggests that our rule-of-thumb
that income inequality adjustment is particularly relevant for cases in which inequality at
the study site is below 80 percent of the policy site's level of inequalitymight even be more
pronounced when considering the GiniY -coefficient.
Fourth, the theory-driven transfer factors employed in our analysis rest on the assumption
of a constant elasticity of substitution utility function and an associated constant income
elasticity of WTP. This assumption is most often adopted in the practice of benefit transfer
(e.g. ten Brink et al. 2011), is supported by some primary valuation studies (e.g. Jacobsen
and Hanley 2009, Broberg 2010) and has been shown to produce the best fit in terms of
reducing transfer errors in the benefit transfer analysis of the Baltic Sea study by Czajkowski
et al. (2017). Despite these encouraging results and the attractiveness of a constant elasticity
approach for tractability reasons, it is unlikely that the elasticity is constant in general.
Recently, Barbier et al. (2016) have provided evidence that suggests a non-constant income
elasticity of WTP, varying with the level of mean income, based on a different analysis of the
Baltic Sea study. Additionally, some theoretical studies have provided arguments for non-
constant income elasticities, for example, by taking into account a subsistence consumption
level of environmental goods (Baumgärtner et al. 2017b, Drupp 2018), or environmental risk
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and individual risk-aversion (Baumgärtner et al. 2017c). While this paper provides a theory-
driven analysis of income inequality adjustment in benefit transfer that rests on the most
widely used framework, further theoretical research on benefit transfer functions is required.
Finally, the theory-driven transfer factors rely on the assumption of homogeneous pref-
erences within and across countries. Specifically, we assumed (a) that the utility weight
individuals put on the environmental good relative to consumption good, α, is the same,
and (b) that the elasticity of substitution and thus the income elasticity of WTP, η, is the
same for all individuals. However, it is possible to introduce heterogeneities. First, we ad-
dress assumption (a), i.e. the share parameter α. For simplicity consider a case where the
mean weight parameters differ across countries, perhaps due to cultural differences or edu-
cation leading to a higher or lower weight put on environmental goods (think, for example,
of Sweden versus Latvia).106 The transfer function would then need to be extended by a
factor for the weight parameter: Tα(αp, αs) = α
s
αp
(
1− αp
1− αs
)
.
Assumption (b) has implicitly been made also by benefit transfer approaches that assume
a single, constant income elasticity of WTP. It is, however, possible to relax this assumption.
For example, Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) consider heterogenous preferences for the case
where individual-specific income elasticities are normally distributed and uncorrelated with
income. Different distributions of η-types in two countries would then lead to mean income
elasticities that differ across countries. Detailed data on η-estimates in both countries is
usually not available in the context of benefit transfer and often times no pertinent meta-
study is available. The more relevant case in practice is to only consider the income elasticity
from the study country. We therefore also estimated the income elasticity of WTP, η˜i, for
all nine countries individually and applied the study sites estimate in the transfer factors
given in formulas (6.9) to (6.11).107 We find that income elasticities of WTP of seven
out of nine countries fall within the usual range of 0.1 to 0.6. Yet, the estimates vary
substantially. Employing the country specific income elasticities, η˜i, in the benefit transfers
further reduces transfer errors over the case of a common income elasticity, η˜. It shows that
mean transfer errors decrease by ∆ |TE|TCV = −2.26 and ∆ |TE|TCV,µ −∆ |TE|Tµ = −1.69
percentages points for pure and additional income inequality adjustment down to a total
average transfer errors of |TE|TCV,µ = 108.28 percent when controlling for mean income and
income inequality. This shows that our main results also hold when the income elasticity
106Hynes et al. (2013) study how international benefit transfer may be adjusting for cultural differences.
107We assume that the income elasticity is constant within each country, estimated with an OLS regression
in log-log specification without control variables. The assumption of a log-log WTP-income relation seems
to outperform other functional forms in benefit transfer (Czajkowski et al. 2017).
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from the study site is applied, and that this might even be more accurate than using the
pooled estimate.108
6.7 Conclusion
This paper has shown how benefit transfer can account for differences in income inequality
in a theory-driven fashion and has scrutinized the applicability of this approach drawing on
a multi-country study on water quality improvement in the Baltic Sea.
Improving benefit transfer is of tremendous importance for environmental policy ap-
praisal, as it has perhaps become the most important method of environmental valuation
(Richardson et al. 2015). A number of different approaches to benefit transfer have been de-
veloped over the past decades, ranging from simple unit transfer to sophisticated individual
study based calibrations. Kaul et al. (2013) review studies including more than 1000 benefit
transfers and find substantial mean (median) transfer errors of 172 (39) percent. Based on
the same Baltic Sea data employed in the present paper, Czajkowski et al. (2017) analyze
which functional form should be chosen for international benefit transfer. They find that a
constant income elasticity function that controls for differences in the level of mean income
between the study and the policy site performs best. As many previous approaches to benefit
transfer have been somewhat ad-hoc, Bateman et al. (2011) among others have called for
benefit transfer parameters to be more firmly grounded in economic theory and underlying
preferences. Responding to these calls, we build on theory-driven transfer factors for mean
income and income inequality that were recently developed by Baumgärtner et al. (2017a)
to scrutinize whether and to what degree income inequality adjustments can improve benefit
transfer.
We find that income inequality adjustment reduces benefit transfer errors by more than
1.5 percentage points on average for the Baltic sea data. We show that this main finding is
robust to considering a number of model variations. While our main finding may seem as a
rather small effect, it will often be economically substantial. Furthermore, income inequality
adjustment becomes particularly relevant when income at the policy site is more unequally
distributed than at the study site. On average the reduction in transfer errors amounts
to more than 5 percentage points when income inequality at the study site is more than
20 percent lower than the level of inequality at the policy site. We perform a number of
108Country-specific income elasticities, aggregate statistics on transfer errors and transfer errors for all
country-to-country benefit transfers are available from the authors upon request.
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checks and show that our main result is robust to additionally considering other possible
transfer factors for differences in the price level or the mean level of the environmental
goods accross countries. Finally, we show that a naive a-theoretic transfer adjustment for
income inequality would increase benefit transfer errors. This emphasizes the importance of
employing the structural theory-driven factors that we draw on in our convergent validity
excercise.
Our findings are relevant in several respects: First, practitioners of benefit transfers
should consider employing transfer factors for differences in income inequality, in particular
when income is distributed more unequally at the policy site compared to the study site.
Our study has shown how this can be undertaken easily by drawing on simple, theory-driven
transfer factors. This would be, for example, particularly relevant for transferring values from
European countries to applications in the USA, where income is distributed considerably
more unequally. Moreover, inter-country differences in income inequality are considerable
for many pairs of European countries. Thus, studies assessing EU-wide benefits by scaling
up a small number of WTP-estimates from a subset of member states, should take into
account income inequality effects on value transfer. For instance, the benefit streams from
ecosystems services from all Natura 2000 sites have been estimated to be 314 billion Euros
per year using benefit transfer (ten Brink et al. 2011: 59-64, European Commission 2013). A
simple, conservative extension of this analysisadditionally applying benefit transfer factors
for income inequalitywould increase benefits by only 0.13 percent on average, which would
however translate into a sizable economic effect size of 446 million Euros per year.109 This
simple application highlights that although adjustments for income inequality may seem
of minor importance in percentage terms, they can imply substantial effects in absolute
economic terms.
Second, theory-driven transfer factors reveal that the frequent use of an income elastic-
ity of one in benefit transfers neglects income inequality, as the transfer factor for income
inequality becomes one for different income inequalities if and only if the income elasticity
109Our simple extended analysis follows the Natura 2000 steps, except that we additionally account for
income inequality assuming that the income elasticity of WTP of 0.38 is given by the mean estimate from
most comprehensive global meta-study on WTP for biodiversity conservation (Jacobsen and Hanley 2009).
Data on the income distribution of European countries was taken from the European Survey on Income
and Living Conditions provided by eurostat. The survey contains upper limits of percentiles for disposable
household income in 2011 per capita (equivalised). Dencentiles and 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th percentiles
were taken to construct national income distributions (taking the interval values as means of lower and upper
limits) and estimate mean income and relative income inequality. This approach yields only a conservative
estimate for the reduction in transfer errors from additional income inequality adjustment, as in Natura 2000
WTPs are transferred to the European average rather than on a country-by- country basis, where differences
in relative income inequality are much higher.
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of WTP is unity. Our analysis shows that this shortcut might perform well if income at the
policy site is distributed more equally and is relatively similar to the study site. However
this shortcut can result in serious transfer errors when income is distributed substantially
more unequally at the policy site. Thus, our study underscores once more the importance
of conducting theory-driven benefit transfer as proposed, among others, by Bateman et al.
(2011).
Thirdly, the collection of value estimates for different environmental goods in benefits
transfer databases is often hailed to be the holy grail of benefits transfer" (Pearce et al.
2006: 267). There are several attempts in this direction, such as the The Environmental
Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI 2017), a database including information on over 4, 000
international valuation studies, that is also mentioned in several guidelines on benefit transfer
(e.g. UBA 2012, Pearce et al. 2006). For instance, the UK sees a further increasing scope
of benefit transfer as value databases expand (HM Treasury 2011: 21) and actively supports
their development (Defra 2007). One of such future applications might be the use of benefit
transfer to inform government project appraisal by drawing on information gathered in
environmental impact assessments, e.g. for economic analysis in the context of the EU Water
Framework Directive (Droste and Meya 2016). The increasing availability of WTP-estimates
for different environmental goods should be accompanied by methodological developments
to increase the accuracy of benefit transfer (Pearce et al. 2006) that are sufficiently easy to
applyas the theory-driven benefit transfer factors tested in this studysuch as to be used
widely in practice.
Fourth and relatedly, there are several efforts underway to link ecosystem services to eco-
nomic activities in national accounts. Recently, the UN, EU, OECD, FAO and World Bank
(2014) proposed the system of environmental economic accounting - experimental ecosystem
accounting to facilitate further explorations on a country's ecosystem accounting. This is ac-
companied by a discussion of the conceptual foundations and appropriate valuation methods
to integrate ecosystem services in accounting standards (e.g. Droste and Bartkowski 2017,
Obst et al. 2016). One approach is to make changes in ecosystem services directly compa-
rable to market activities through monetary valuation. As primary valuations are usually
site-specific, this will regularly involve scaling-up estimates to the national level. The UN
et al. (2014: 127) thus call for efforts aimed at improving benefit transfer methods". Our
analysis suggests that this should include accounting for the effects of income inequality
when conducting benefit transfer.
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Finally, primary non-market valuation studies should report measures on income elas-
ticities and on income inequality to facilitate the application of more sophisticated and
accurate benefit transfers. Ideally, studies would always state standard deviations of respon-
dent's income besides relevant means, or even make the full income distribution available in
supplementary online material.
Overall, our findings add empirical evidence to the debate on the importance of economic
growth and changes in inequality for the valuation of non-marketed environmental goods.
They suggest that while accounting for differences in mean income is relatively more im-
portant, taking into account income inequality results in considerable improvements in the
performance of benefits transfers.
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6.8 Appendix
Table 6.3: Transfer errors |TE| (in percent) for unit transfer
from:
to:
DEN EST FIN GER LAT LIT POL RUS SWE
DEN 0 48.35 26.47 23.12 448.65 227.82 142.52 267.59 60.93
EST 32.59 0 50.44 17.01 269.83 120.97 63.47 147.78 73.67
FIN 36.00 101.76 0 67.45 646.19 345.84 229.83 399.94 46.87
GER 18.78 20.49 40.28 0 345.63 166.26 96.98 198.56 68.27
LAT 81.77 72.96 86.60 77.56 0 40.25 55.80 33.00 92.88
LIT 69.50 54.75 77.57 62.44 67.37 0 26.02 12.13 88.08
POL 58.77 38.83 69.68 49.23 126.23 35.17 0 51.57 83.89
RUS 72.80 59.64 80.00 66.51 49.26 10.82 34.03 0 89.37
SWE 155.98 279.75 88.22 215.16 1, 304.44 739.15 520.80 840.96 0
Table 6.4: ∆ |TE|TCV = |TE|TCV − |TE|unit (in percentage points)
from:
to:
DEN EST FIN GER LAT LIT POL RUS SWE
DEN 0 −3.21 0.31 −1.40 −9.43 −1.94 −4.94 −1.34 −0.26
EST −1.49 0 −0.88 −0.87 1.69 3.55 0.22 4.56 −0.76
FIN 0.58 −3.52 0 −1.19 −9.68 −0.75 −5.33 0.31 −0.59
GER −0.93 −1.26 −0.43 0 −2.63 1.46 −1.79 2.32 −0.58
LAT −0.32 0.12 −0.18 −0.13 0 −0.68 0.14 −0.92 −0.17
LIT −0.18 0.72 −0.04 0.20 −1.89 0 1.07 0.26 −0.15
POL −0.86 0.08 −0.50 −0.47 0.73 1.99 0 2.58 −0.44
RUS −0.10 0.73 0.01 0.26 −2.03 0.20 1.11 0 −0.11
SWE −1.70 −10.69 −2.05 −5.65 −33.31 −10.53 −16.68 −9.67 0
Table 6.5: ∆ |TE|Tµ = |TE|Tµ − |TE|unit (in percentage points)
from:
to:
DEN EST FIN GER LAT LIT POL RUS SWE
DEN 0 -25.24 0.94 -2.13 -161.45 -117.84 -42.33 -83.48 1.59
EST -13.82 0 -9.40 -15.28 -55.32 -50.42 -0.87 -17.01 -4.10
FIN 1.76 -32.16 0 -0.77 -212.77 -156.58 -54.05 -108.55 1.51
GER -1.43 -18.74 -0.28 0 -125.60 -92.71 -31.52 -63.74 0.76
LAT -7.60 -4.76 -5.35 -8.81 0 5.52 -7.50 -6.38 -2.56
LIT -17.12 -13.38 -12.14 -20.06 17.04 0 -21.36 23.17 -5.93
POL -8.72 -0.33 -5.94 -9.67 -32.81 -30.28 0 -9.65 -2.61
RUS -7.99 -2.98 -5.55 -9.09 -12.97 15.27 -4.49 0 -2.56
SWE 10.88 -51.21 5.50 7.72 -371.13 -278.81 -86.57 -182.78 0
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Table 6.6: ∆ |TE|TCV,µ = |TE|TCV,µ − |TE|unit (in percentage points)
from:
to:
DEN EST FIN GER LAT LIT POL RUS SWE
DEN 0 -27.90 1.25 -3.50 -168.10 -119.09 -46.40 -84.52 1.34
EST -15.62 0 -10.45 -16.32 -53.88 -47.68 -0.65 -12.77 -4.99
FIN 2.35 -35.12 0 -1.96 -219.69 -157.07 -58.51 -108.30 0.94
GER -2.38 -19.80 -0.71 0 -127.48 -91.76 -33.03 -61.92 0.19
LAT -8.05 -4.61 -5.59 -8.99 0 4.90 -7.33 -7.39 -2.79
LIT -17.40 -12.45 -12.20 -19.75 14.96 0 -19.98 23.49 -6.16
POL -9.76 -0.25 -6.54 -10.23 -32.18 -28.74 0 -7.23 -3.13
RUS -8.12 -2.19 -5.53 -8.76 -14.82 15.44 -3.31 0 -2.70
SWE 9.11 -60.46 3.39 1.93 -395.64 -285.84 -100.92 -190.57 0
Table 6.7: Transfer error changes for additional income inequality adjustment ∆ |TE|TCV,µ - ∆ |TE|Tµ (in
percentage points)
from:
to:
DEN EST FIN GER LAT LIT POL RUS SWE
DEN 0 -2.67 0.31 -1.37 -6.65 -1.25 -4.07 -1.04 -0.25
EST -1.80 0 -1.05 -1.04 1.44 2.74 0.22 4.25 -0.88
FIN 0.59 -2.96 0 -1.19 -6.92 -0.48 -4.46 0.24 -0.57
GER -0.95 -1.06 -0.43 0 -1.89 0.95 -1.51 1.83 -0.57
LAT -0.45 0.14 -0.25 -0.19 0 -0.62 0.17 -1.01 -0.24
LIT -0.28 0.93 -0.06 0.31 -2.09 0 1.38 0.31 -0.23
POL -1.04 0.08 -0.60 -0.56 0.63 1.54 0 2.42 -0.52
RUS -0.13 0.78 0.02 0.33 -1.85 0.17 1.18 0 -0.14
SWE -1.78 -9.25 -2.11 -5.79 -24.51 -7.03 -14.36 -7.79 0
Table 6.8: Transfer errors |TE| summary statistics (in percent)
|TE|unit |TE|TCV |TE|Tµ |TE|TCV,µ
mean 152.35 150.55 115.48 114.02
median 72.88 72.80 67.44 66.07
sd 215.57 211.27 152.70 149.43
Table 6.9: Transfer errors |TE| summary statistics (in percent) when also adjusting for differences in the level of
the environmental good, E˜c.
|TE|TE |TE|TE,CVY |TE|TE,µY |TE|TE,µY ,CVY
mean 149.48 147.70 113.05 111.60
median 71.86 71.82 67.21 66.04
sd 211.56 207.26 149.24 145.96
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7 How Empirical Uncertainties Influence the
Stability of Climate Coalitions
Abstract: International climate agreements are negotiated in the face of uncertainties con-
cerning the costs and benefits of abatement and in the presence of incentives for free-riding.
Numerical climate coalition models provide estimates of the challenges affecting cooperation,
but often resort to assuming certainty with respect to the values of model parameters. We
study the impact of uncertainty on the stability of coalitions in the Model of International
Climate Agreements (MICA) using the technique of Monte-Carlo analysis. We extend the
existing literature by (i) calibrating parametric uncertainty about damages and abatement
costs to estimates from meta-studies and by (ii) explicitly considering uncertainty in the
curvature of the damage function. We find that stability is more sensitive to uncertainty
in damages than in abatement costs, and most sensitive to uncertainty about the regional
distribution of damages. Our calculations suggest that heterogeneity can increase stability
of coalitions; however this depends on the availability of transfers.
Keywords: International environmental agreements - Climate coalition formation - Uncer-
tainty - Monte-Carlo analysis - Numerical modelling
Reference: Meya, J.N., Kornek, U., Lessmann, K. (2018). How empirical uncertainties in-
fluence the stability of climate coalitions. International Environmental Agreements: Politics,
Law and Economics, 18(2): 175198.
This is a pre-print of an article published in International Environmental Agreements: Pol-
itics, Law and Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-017-9378-5.
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7.1 Introduction
To address climate change, countries need to cooperate, as emission reductions represent a
global public good. Global climate governance relies on international environmental agree-
ments like the Kyoto Protocol to set up cooperation on climate change but participation and
ambition is impeded by incentives for free-riding (Barrett 2003). Theoretical and numerical
analysis have been applied to the design of agreements in order to overcome free-riding (e.g.
Barrett 2005; Dellink 2011). In these studies, the incentive to sign self-enforcing climate
agreements is calculated based on valuing abatement costs against avoided damages when a
country joins the agreement (Barrett 1994; Lessmann et al. 2015). However, abatement costs
and especially climate damages are subject to large uncertainties (e.g. Tavoni and Tol 2010;
Tol 2012) and conclusions are therefore limited. The present analysis studies the impact
of uncertainty on the stability of agreements in a numerical climate coalition model - the
Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA) - using the technique of Monte-Carlo
analysis.
Monte-Carlo analysis allows us to draw conclusions about the quantitative influence of
different uncertainties on the incentive to join an agreement. However, we abstract from
decision making under uncertainty, which is difficult to implement in numerical models.
While a recent academic debate has highlighted the importance of uncertainty for climate
change decision making (Weitzman 2009; Nordhaus 2012), there are only few studies that
look at the effect of uncertainty on the incentive to sign an agreement, and most of these are
theoretical analyses (Kolstad 2007; Kolstad and Ulph 2008, 2011; Na and Shin 1998). Due
to different assumptions about uncertainty, some studies find uncertainty to be conducive
to cooperation while others find that it has a negative impact. Finus and Pintassilgo (2013)
recently showed that the way in which uncertainty influences cooperation depends on the
availability of transfers in the climate agreement. Depending on the realization of random
variables uncertainty increases or decreases asymmetry in the distribution of damages across
countries; more asymmetry hinders coalition formation without transfers, but can foster it
with transfers as countries can be compensated (see also Weikard 2009).
A recent comparison among numerical models that seeks to extend these theoretical in-
sights by incorporating quantitative results finds that model assumptions on the distribution
of damages varies widely (Lessmann et al. 2015). However, representing such uncertainty
explicitly in numerical models is very challenging, and only a few applications go beyond
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simple sensitivity analysis. These studies have been mainly applied to the Stability of Coali-
tions (STACO) model using Monte-Carlo analysis (Dellink et al. 2013; Dellink 2011; Dellink
and Finus 2012; Dellink et al. 2008), with the exception of an application of stochastic pro-
gramming in the CWS model (Bréchet et al. 2012). Uncertainty analyses in STACO show
that the stability of coalitions is mainly determined by the distribution of damages rather
than by the distribution of abatement costs (Dellink et al. 2008; Dellink 2011). Olieman and
Hendrix (2006) introduce the concept of the stability likelihood of an international climate
agreement. Given a probability distribution of uncertain model parameters, the indicator
specifies the probability that a coalition (in which members have chosen to participate under
certainty) can be labeled as stable. This metric, therefore, is driven by and reflects the un-
certainty of model input, but decisions of players are taken under certainty for each possible
parameter value. Dellink and Finus (2012) apply the concept and confirm the results from
the theoretical literature, finding that heterogeneity across regions increases or decreases
coalition stability depending on whether or not transfers are available.
The present study extends previous ones in several ways in order to draw a more com-
prehensive picture of the effect of uncertainty on coalition stability. Firstly, we improve the
numerical representation by calibrating the uncertainty about abatement costs and climate
damages to evidence from meta-studies. A robust comparison of the magnitude of effects
is thereby made possible. Secondly, we consider uncertainty not only about the level of
damages but also regarding the curvature of the damages function, which reflects their sen-
sitivity to temperature increase. This allows us to assess the implications of uncertainty in
the curvature of the damage function, whose importance for coalition formation has recently
been highlighted (Barrett 2013). Additionally, we go beyond previous studies by incorporat-
ing the (arguably more realistic case of) concave utility functions, i.e. decreasing marginal
utility of consumption.
We use the numerical Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA) to study the
relative effect of different uncertain parameters on the stability of coalitions without and with
transfers. We limit our analysis to studying the incentive to stay in the coalition, without and
with transfers, as the incentive to remain a non-member to the coalition has been described
not to be the bottleneck of stability (Dellink 2011). Uncertainty in three key parameters
is specified and propagated through the model using Monte-Carlo analysis, similar to the
approach previously taken by Dellink et al. (2008). Our analysis therefore abstracts from
decision making under uncertainty but allows derivation of probabilities of different model
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outputs and comparison of the relative importance of the specified uncertainties. Specifically,
we consider (i) perfectly correlated global uncertainty vs. independent uncertainties across
regions; (ii) uncertainty in abatement costs vs. uncertainty in climate change damages; and
(iii) uncertainty about the curvature of climate change damages. This enables us to assign
stability likelihoods to specific climate coalitions and assess the extent to which transfers
among signatories may contribute to a stable agreement.
As our most important result, we find that the stability likelihood of coalitions is mainly
driven by uncertainty about damages through various determinants. Firstly, stability is
more affected by uncertainty about damages compared to uncertain abatement costs, and
mostly affected by uncertainty about the interregional distribution of damages. Secondly,
transfers become an important instrument when there is uncertainty about the distribution
of damages. Our scenarios show that stability is sensitive to uncertainty when no transfers
between regions are allowed but that the availability of transfers increases the robustness of
stability under uncertainty. Each realization of climate change damages produces distinct
winners and losers within the coalition. With transfers as an additional measure, worse-off
regions can be compensated to remain in the coalition by winners that experience larger
gains, i.e. adverse effects of the realizations of uncertainty are shared within coalitions.
Furthermore, while large coalitions with ambitious abatement targets are not stable under
certainty, we find that they have a positive probability to be stable under an uncertain
distribution of damages when transfers are available. Lastly, we present scenarios in which
uncertainty about the curvature of damages has a positive effect on stability. A higher
sensitivity of damages towards a temperature increase tends to increase stability. Steeper
damages resemble a critical threshold, which is known to improve the incentives to cooperate.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: The next section defines the con-
cepts of coalition stability employed in the analysis. Section 7.3 briefly describes the MICA
model of coalition formation and specifies the probability density functions for the uncertain
parameters. Section 7.4 presents the results of the Monte-Carlo analysis. Finally, Section 7.5
discusses and concludes.
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7.2 Formation of climate coalitions
7.2.1 Coalition stability
We follow the standard approach in the literature and describe climate coalition formation
as a cartel formation game (Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994). Consider
a set of N heterogeneous regions, for which the incentive to sign is modelled as a two-stage
game. At the first stage regions decide whether they want to become a signatory or remain
a singleton and at the second stage regions choose their emission abatements. The game
is solved by backward induction, assuming that signatories maximise their payoffs jointly
and non-signatories maximise their payoff individually, given the abatement decisions of the
coalition and all other non-signatories. Abatement decisions are taken simultaneously.
The stability and performance of coalitions then depend on a vector of model parameters
d ∈ Rˆl. To study uncertainty, this vector is replaced by a vector d that is stochastic in
one dimension and has the probability density function pdf(d). To describe the impact of
uncertainty on coalition formation, we apply the concept of stability likelihood developed
by Olieman and Hendrix (2006) and Dellink et al. (2008). The stability likelihood of a
coalition is the the probability that the coalition stability claim is correct (Olieman and
Hendrix 2006). Before applying the concept to our analysis, we need to introduce some more
terminology.
In MICA all decisions are taken under certainty. We hence draw a realization d of d as
a Monte-Carlo run to calculate the model output of MICA, yielding a distribution for each
stability and performance indicator. We analyse the formation of coalitions by applying the
concept of cartel stability introduced by d'Aspremont and Gabszewicz (1986) and applied
to international environmental agreements by Barrett (1994). Formally, a coalition is stable
if no member has an incentive to leave the coalition (internal stability) and no non-member
has an incentive to join (external stability). For our Monte-Carlo analysis, we only look at
internal stability, without and with transfers, in order to reduce the computational burden
and, more importantly, as the incentive to remain a non-member to the coalition has been
described not be the bottleneck of stability (Dellink 2011). We limit our analysis to studying
the incentive to stay in the coalition, without and with transfers.
The incentive to stay in a coalition S, a subset of all regions, for a signatory i ∈ S is
defined as the difference between the payoff pii upon joining to form S and the payoff from
free-riding by leaving S, for a given value of the parameter d:
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∆i(S, d) = pii(S, d)− pii(S \ {i}, d). (7.1)
A coalition S is called internally stable (IS) if for every signatory i ∈ S the coalition
payoff is higher than the free-rider payoff:
is(S, d) :=

1, forpii(S, d) ≥ pii(S \ {i})∀i ∈ S
0, else
. (7.2)
Furthermore, a coalition S is potential internally stable (PIS) if a transfer scheme τ exists
that guarantees every coalition member at least its free-rider payoff, i.e. compensation equal
to the value of benefits from leaving the coalition (Carraro et al. 2006). If consumption
rather than utility is transferable, as is the case in MICA (see below), the concept has to be
adapted (Kornek et al. 2014). Accordingly, a coalition in MICA is PIS if a transfer scheme
τ exists that redistributes consumption within the coalition, providing a payoff for every
signatory that is at least equal to its free-rider payoff at all times t ∈ [t0, tm] (Kornek et al.
2014):
pis(S, d) :=
1, if∃τ : pii(ci,t(S, d) + τi,t(S, d)) ≥ pii(S \ {i}, d)∀i ∈ S,
∑
i∈S τi,t(S, d) = 0∀t ∈ [t0, tm]
0, else.
(7.3)
Here ci,t is total consumption of each player and τi,t(S, d) is the transfer paid or received.
Finally, we can apply the concept of stability likelihood developed by Olieman and Hen-
drix (2006) and Dellink et al. (2008) to IS and PIS. The internal stability likelihood and the
potential internal stability likelihood of a coalition S are then defined as the means of IS and
PIS across the Monte-Carlo runs and can be interpreted as the probability that coalition S
is IS and PIS respectively for the assigned pdfs of the uncertain parameters (Olieman and
Hendrix 2006).
7.2.2 Coalition performance
Next, we are interested in the ability of a coalition to enhance global welfare and reduce
environmental damages. The performance of a coalition S is defined relative to the perfor-
mance of the non-cooperative outcome (all countries are singletons) and the fully cooperative
outcome (grand coalition) as a closing-the-gap index, originally developed by Eyckmans and
Finus (2006), and applied to study coalition performance under uncertainty by Dellink et
242
Empirical applications Uncertainty and Stability of Climate Coalitions
al. (2013) and Dellink and Finus (2012). In the grand coalition (GC) the climate change
externality is fully internalized and hence the outcome is most efficient, while in the case
of all singletons (AS) regions only internalize their own damages and the outcome is non-
cooperative.
Performance regarding global welfare WP is defined for a coalition S as:
WP (S, d) =
∑N
i=1 pii(S, d)−
∑N
i=1 pii(AS, d)∑N
i=1 pii(GC, d)−
∑N
i=1 pii(AS, d)
. (7.4)
Performance regarding environmental quality EP is defined as the ability to reduce global
temperature increase (∆T ) by 2195:
EP (S, d) =
∆T (S, d)−∆T (AS, d)
∆T (GC, d)−∆T (AS, d) . (7.5)
The effect of uncertainty on the level and uncertainty of WP and EP are estimated
using standard statistical measures on the sample of MC runs.
7.3 The numerical model and uncertainty distributions
This section first introduces the numerical coalition formation model MICA and describes
how the uncertain parameters enter the model (Section 7.3.1). Subsequently, probability
distribution functions for uncertain parameters are specified and the associated scenarios
are presented (Section 7.3.2).
7.3.1 Model of International Climate Agreements
We conduct our study in the Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA), developed
by Lessmann et al. (2009) and extended by Kornek et al. (2017). MICA is a numerically
calibrated model of coalition formation encompassing eleven heterogeneous world regions
(see Table 7.6) in the Appendix for a description of their makeup): Africa (AFR), China
(CHN), the European Union with 27 member states (EUR), India (IND), Japan (JPN), Latin
America (LAM), Arabic countries (MEA), other Asian countries (OAS), Russia (RUS), USA
(USA) and the rest of the world (ROW).110 These eleven world regions yield 2037 different
possible coalitions.
110For detailed definition of the regions in MICA and a full model description see Kornek et al. (2017).
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Table 7.1: Composition of the studied coalitions
Coalition Signatories
EJ EUR, JPN
ER EUR, ROW
EU EUR, USA
JR JPN, ROW
JU JPN, USA
RU ROW, USA
EJR EUR, JPN, ROW
EJU EUR, JPN, USA
ERU EUR, ROW, USA
JRU JPN, ROW, USA
OECD EUR, JPN, ROW, USA
Major Emitters AFR, CHN, EUR, IND, RUS, USA
GC AFR, CHN, EUR, IND, JPN, LAM,
MEA, OAS, RUS, USA, ROW
In our analysis we focus on twelve coalitions, which correspond to cooperation among
key players in the international climate negotiations (see Table 7.1).111 The OECD coalition
comprises four regions, which have been main actors in past climate negotiations and are
often held to be both the most responsible and capable. Our decision whether to consider a
particular aggregate world region as part of the coalition of OECD countries was based on
the relative influence of OECD member countries within this region as represented by their
GDP. We also consider all possible coalition structures (ten in total) in which two or three
of the OECD regions cooperate, in order to elucidate the effect of coalition size on internal
stability. Additionally, we study a scenario in which the most relevant current and future
emitters  China, India, Europe, USA as well as Africa and Russia  cooperate. Within
our model the countries of this coalition of `major emitters' are responsible for 67.59 % of
the global emissions in 2015 and for 62.15 % of predicted emissions in 2105 (in the absence
of a climate agreement). The large size of this coalition provides strong incentives for free-
riding. Finally, we also calculate the fully cooperative outcome of the grand coalition (GC),
where all regions cooperate in climate change mitigation, as a reference point for coalition
effectiveness.
MICA combines an integrated assessment model (IAM) with a coalition formation game.
Thereby MICA uses a Ramsey-type optimal growth model with a representative agent for
each region. The payoff pii of region i is regional welfare defined as the aggregation of
111The computational burden of Monte-Carlo analysis for coalition stability is substantial. Altogether, this
manuscript is based on four Monte-Carlo ensembles: for parameters in mitigation costs, marginal damages
(perfectly correlated and independent), and the slope of marginal damages. We execute the model 500 times
per parameter and for 21 coalition equilibria. Thus we arrive at a total of 4 ∗ 500 ∗ 21 = 42, 000 Monte-Carlo
runs and, at approximately 1 minute CPU time per shot, 42, 000 minutes or 700 hours, or about 30 days of
CPU time. To explore, for example, the stability of the grand coalition would add its ten subcoalitions to
the list, raising the computation time by 50 percent.
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(discounted) instantaneous utility of consumption of the representative agent of the region,
with utility rising in per capita consumption and marginal utility decreasing in per capita
consumption:
pii =
tm∑
t=t0
1
(1 + ρ)t−t0
pit log
(
ci,t
pi,t
)
, (7.6)
where cit is the consumption and pit is the population in region i at time t and ρ is the pure
rate of time preference. The time horizon t goes from t0 = 2005 to tm = 2195 in steps of ten
years.
Economic output can either be consumed or invested and is reduced by damages caused
by climate change and expenditures for abatement. To assess the stability and performance
of self-enforcing coalitions, two parts of the model are of particular importance: climate
damages and abatement costs.
For each region the damages Ωit of temperature increase is represented by
Ωit = θ1,i∆T
θ2
t , (7.7)
where ∆Tt is the temperature increase at time t compared to the pre-industrial level and
θ1,i and θ2 are parameters. This functional form and the quadratic exponent θ2 = 2 go
back to the RICE model112 of Nordhaus and Yang (1996). The coefficients of the damage
functions θ1,i are taken from Dellink et al. (2004) and were spatially rescaled to the eleven
world regions.
Abatement costs Λit are a function of the rate of emission control µit:
Λit = b1,it µit
b2,i . (7.8)
Again, the relationship employed originates from the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang
1996). The regional parameters of the abatement cost function b1,it and b2,i are calibrated
to the Regionalized Model of Investments and Development (Leimbach et al. 2010), a large-
scale, state-of-the-art IAM.113
In principle all model parameters are uncertain. But incorporating the full range of
uncertainty would place a tremendous computational burden on the Monte-Carlo analysis.
To focus on key variables, we restrict our analysis to uncertainty in the abatement cost
and damage function parameters b1,it, θ1,i and θ2. Abatement costs and climate damages
112Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy.
113For a description of the calibration procedure see Kornek et al. (2017).
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are identified as the determinants of coalition stability in the majority of the literature (for
a review see Finus 2008), and Dellink et al (2008) also limit their analysis to costs and
damages. In MICA, these three parameters selected for analysis are main determinants
of coalition formation: The balance between costs of abatement and benefits, in terms of
reduced damages, of internalizing emission externalities among members of the coalition
determines changes in consumption and hence welfare. These changes are, in turn, assumed
to determine decisions by members on whether or not to remain in the coalition.
7.3.2 Uncertainty distributions
We are interested in how uncertainty in the distribution of abatement costs shapes coalition
formation. To this end we incorporate independent uncertainties in the coefficient of the
abatement cost function b1,i, while the functional form is taken as certain (as in e.g. Dellink
et al. 2008; Nordhaus 2008).
To specify the probability distribution for the abatement cost coefficient b1,it, we make
the common assumption of a normal distribution (Dellink et al. 2008) but assign zero
probability to negative values, as negative abatement costs throughout the whole study
period 20052195 seem unrealistic.
As it is not evident ex ante which probability distribution is most suitable to describe
uncertainty in abatement costs over a long time horizon, assumption of a normal distribu-
tion appears to us to be the most conservative approach. We set parameter means equal
to the deterministic version of MICA, since values are calibrated to a multi-regional IAM
with technologically disaggregated abatement costs. It is assumed that the uncertainty is
identical across regions, represented by the same coefficient of variation. Furthermore, it
seems unrealistic that the uncertainty in the abatement costs for every time step is indepen-
dent from the abatement costs in the previous period. Thus, rather than drawing a b1,it for
each time step from probability density functions (pdf), we assume that there is uncertainty
about the path of abatement costs as a whole.
Level of abatement costs
We therefore introduce a random variable k ∼ N(1, 0.61). The variable has a multiplicative
effect on costs, hence we choose a unity mean, i.e. no effect on average. We choose a
standard deviation that reflects the variation reported in the meta-study by Tavoni and
Tol (2010) of the results from the EMF 22 International Scenarios (Clarke et al. 2009) as
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follows: In the model comparison ten IAMs were running scenarios with different emissions
stabilization targets for 2100, with and without the possibility of temporarily overshooting
these targets and delayed or full participation in an international climate agreement (Clarke
et al. 2009). We take the average coefficient of variation (CV) 0.24 of the global abatement
costs of the two scenarios from Tavoni and Tol (2010) most closely related to MICA.114
Based on this we calibrate the standard deviation of the global abatement costs, measured
as a fraction of output from 2005 to 2105 and discounted at a rate of 5%. Finally, the
corresponding distribution of k is calculated, yielding a standard deviation of 0.61686. In
each Monte-Carlo run we draw a realization of k independently for every region and calculate
the corresponding values of b1,it, so that regional heterogeneity varies between runs.
Level of damages
Damages caused by climate change are particularly uncertain regarding both their global
level and their regional distribution. Not only might climate change damages become more
or less severe in all regions, but also the regional distribution of damages might differ from
today's best guess estimates. As both uncertainties are likely to affect coalition formation
differently, we study uncertainty in global climate change damages and their regional distri-
bution separately.
To this end we simulate uncertainty in the level of damages in two ways. Firstly, we
model uncertainty in global damages as perfectly correlated uncertainty in the damage func-
tion coefficient θ1,i. Therefore, in each Monte-Carlo run a quantile is randomly drawn and
the corresponding values for θ1,i are taken from their regional distributions. This approach
leaves the heterogeneity of damages across regions unchanged. Secondly, we model uncer-
tainty in regional damages as independent uncertainty by drawing the values of the damage
function coefficient θ1,i independently from their regional distributions. Consequently, un-
certainty in regional damages changes the heterogeneity across regions. The two scenarios
are directly comparable, as regional distributions are calibrated to produce the same mean
global damages across Monte-Carlo runs.
We take the distribution of estimates from 14 major IAMs as reviewed by Tol (2012)
for a temperature increase of 2.5 °C as proxy for the probability of different climate change
damages. This implicitly assumes that each of the 14 estimates is certain. We then model
the damage coefficients θ1,i to be distributed according to a pdf that reproduces the mean
114These scenarios are 650 CO2e/ full participation/ no overshoot and 550 CO2e/ full participation/ over-
shoot with a CV of 0.27 and 0.21, respectively.
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Table 7.2: Distribution of θ1,i for uncertainty in global and regional damages
Region Uncertainty in global Uncertainty in regional
damages damages
Mean µ Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient
deviation σ of variation deviation σ of variation
ROW 0.00073 0.00072 0.97872 0.00177 2.41984
AFR 0.00111 0.00109 0.97872 0.00269 2.41984
LAM 0.00094 0.00092 0.97872 0.00229 2.41984
IND 0.00322 0.00315 0.97872 0.00779 2.41984
CHN 0.00266 0.00260 0.97872 0.00643 2.41984
MEA 0.00117 0.00114 0.97872 0.00283 2.41984
OAS 0.00118 0.00115 0.97872 0.00285 2.41984
JPN 0.00136 0.00133 0.97872 0.00329 2.41984
RUS 0.00228 0.00223 0.97872 0.00551 2.41984
USA 0.00088 0.00086 0.97872 0.00213 2.41984
EUR 0.00080 0.00079 0.97872 0.00194 2.41984
and standard deviation of the global damages from Tol (2012). The mean values for θ1,i
are taken from the deterministic version of MICA and are rescaled by a common factor
to meet the mean global damages for a temperature increase of 2.5 C° in Tol (2012). For
uncertainty in both global and regional damages, all regions are exposed to the same degree
of uncertainty, represented by a uniform coefficient of variation across regions. Again, the
standard deviations of θ1,i are calibrated to produce the standard deviation of global damage
estimates as reviewed in Tol (2012). This procedure gives higher standard deviations for
uncertainty in regional damages compared to uncertainty in global damages (see Table 7.2).
This is because regional uncertainties partly cancel each other out in the calculation of global
damages.
We employ different pdfs to model uncertainty in global and regional damages. The
choice was between normal or lognormal distributions, both of which have been applied
in previous studies of climate change damages (Tol 1995, Crost and Traeger 2011). For
uncertainty in global damages, we assume a normal distribution and assign zero probability
to negative damages, as it is very unlikely that a temperature increase of 2.5 degrees would be
beneficial across all eleven world regions. A similar approach was previously taken by Hwang
et al. (2013). By contrast, we assume a lognormal distribution for uncertainty in regional
damages. In principle, the idea of negative damage costs might seem less problematic when
modelling uncertainty in regional damages. However, negative coefficients in the damage
function would imply regional benefits from climate change even at very high temperatures.
Tol's (2014) survey of economic impacts of warming does not show a single study that
projects benefits for the range of warming in our scenarios, and we therefore find it prudent
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to preclude benefits in our study. Moreover, in this case, the assumption of a truncated
normal distribution would result in very distorted global damages, as a lot of probability
mass would be cut off due to the large standard deviationswhich are substantially larger
for regional uncertainty than for uncertainty in global damages. We therefore opt for a
lognormal distribution of the damage function coefficient θ1,i for uncertainty in regional
damages, as this allows us to reproduce the mean and standard deviation of the damages
reviewed by Tol (2012) exactly and satisfies our assumption of zero likelihood of negative
damages. This assumption follows earlier studies on coalition formation that also implicitly
assume zero likelihood of negative damages (Dellink et al. 2008). Both pdfs for uncertainty
in regional and global damages are in line with the result across IAMs that uncertainty about
damages is right-skewed (Tol 2012).
7.3.3 Curvature of the damage function
Lastly, we look at how uncertainty about the curvature of the damage function affects
coalition formation. This is particularly relevant, as this `damage function' is both subject
to large uncertainties (Weitzman 2012) and strongly influences model results (IPCC 2001),
in particular for large temperature increases (Weitzman 2010). Most commonly, regionally
disaggregated IAMs assume a polynomial of second degree (Bosetti et al. 2006; 2013; Bréchet
et al. 2011; 2012; Nordhaus 2010). However, the functional form is controversial. In
particular, Weitzman (2009) has highlighted the importance of low-probability high-impact
events, which might be underestimated by quadratic damage functions.
We therefore employ a lognormal distribution for the exponent of the damage function
θ2, as specified by Dietz (2013), based on the following assumptions: (1) zero warming
has zero economic cost, (2) the best guess is θ2 = 2 and (3) the 90th percentile is θ2 =
3. For computational reasons we truncate the lognormal distribution at θ2 = 4, in effect
incorporating the assumption that (4) values above 4 have a probability of zero.115 Note that
this procedure neglects recently highlighted issues for cost-benefit analyses associated with
`fat-tail' damage probability distributions (Weitzman 2007, 2009), as Weitzman's `Dismal
Theorem' only holds for unlimited parametric uncertainty (Nordhaus 2011).
While other similar studies incorporate uncertainty indirectly in models by increasing
global damages (Dellink et al. 2013), we take a different approach and isolate the effect of
the functional form from the level of global damages. Therefore, for every random draw of
115An exponent of 4 equals the 90% percentile of Nordhaus's (1994) subjective cumulative probability
function in the explorative stage of his sensitivity analysis.
249
Empirical applications Uncertainty and Stability of Climate Coalitions
Table 7.3: Overview on modelled uncertainties
Scenario Parameter Type of uncertainty pdf
abatement costs b1 independent normal (truncated)
global damages θ1 perfectly correlated normal (truncated)
regional damages θ1 independent lognormal
damage curvature θ2 perfectly correlated lognormal (truncated)
θ2 we recalibrate the best guess of θ1,i so that the global damages for a temperature increase
of 2.5 °C are equal to the mean of the damages reviewed by Tol (2012).
It is common practise in regionally disaggregated IAMs to assume a constant curvature
for the damage function across regions (e.g. Bosetti et al. 2013; Bréchet et al. 2011; Dellink
et al. 2013; Nordhaus 2010); correspondingly, we assume that there is common uncertainty
about θ2 to all regions. This is implemented by simply drawing a single θ2 in every Monte-
Carlo run for all regions, thereby, leaving the heterogeneity of regions unaffected.
7.4 Results
We studied the effect of the four specified uncertainties on coalition performance and stability
separately. To this end, we conducted numerical experiments for uncertainty in abatement
costs, global damages, regional damages and the curvature of the damage function (for an
overview see Table 7.3). For each scenario (and coalition) we ran the model 500 times. We
reserved one model run for the deterministic default parameter values, leaving four samples
each with 499 runs for the Monte-Carlo analysis.
Our choice of the number of Monte-Carlo runs was guided by the trade-off between
the computational costs of the model runs and the precision of the estimated mean and
variance of the Monte-Carlo ensemble (for the computational burden, see Footnote 111). For
precision, we need the number of Monte-Carlo runs to be large enough for robust estimates of
sample mean and sample variance. Higher moments are more demanding, so we consider the
standard error of the uniform minimum variance unbiased estimator for the sample standard
deviation. For large sample sizes n (here, more than 50 can be considered large), we have
σS
σ =
√
2(n− 1))−1. Applying this equation, for n = 500 the standard error of the estimated
standard deviation is just over 3 percent (compared to the estimated standard deviation).
For n = 100, the error is 7 percent, and doubling n (i.e. n = 1000) only reduces the error to
2.2 percent.
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In this section the results are reported successively for coalition performance (Section 7.4.1),
coalition stability without transfers (Section 7.4.2) and coalition stability with transfers (Sec-
tion 7.4.3). Histograms for all specified distributions can be found in the Appendix.
7.4.1 Coalition performance
In general, economic output, e.g. discounted consumption, the endogenous discount rate
and welfare, are little affected by the imposed uncertainties. For instance, global discounted
consumption in the cases where no regions or all regions cooperate shows very small coeffi-
cients of variation and the uncertainty for each region is negligible compared to interregional
differences.
This is in line with the findings of many IAMs that aggregated climate change damages
in monetary terms makes up only a small fraction of global economic output (Tol 2013).
The environmental variables temperature, cumulative emissions and carbon price are more
sensitive to the uncertainty in abatement and damages costs, as one would expect given the
more direct link to the uncertain variables.
The performance of all studied coalitions in both welfare and environmental respects
follow a similar pattern. In both cases, the major emitter coalition achieves around half
of the social optimum, due to its size, while all smaller coalitions achieve little. Generally,
performance tends to increase with the size of coalitions.
Figure 7.1 displays the performance of three selected coalitions to facilitate global wel-
fare and limit the temperature increase by 2195. The applied uncertainties do not lead
to substantially different mean values of the coalition performance indicators, which stay
relatively constant across all four scenarios. The induced uncertainty, as displayed by the
confidence intervals, is also low and shows only minor differences among the four modelled
uncertainties. The only exception is the uncertainty in regional damages which substantially
increases uncertainty about welfare.
7.4.2 Coalition stability without transfers
In this section we discuss the effect of uncertainty on coalition stability when no transfers are
available, as measured by internal stability likelihood (ISL) indicator. Figure 7.2 displays the
relative effect of the four simulated uncertainties on ISL. It shows that uncertainty affects
the internal stability of all coalitions except the major emitter coalition, but that differences
between scenarios are considerable. For the major emitter coalition incentives for free-riding
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Figure 7.1: Mean welfare performance (WP ) and environmental performance (EP ) and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals (whiskers) for uncertainty in abatement costs (b1), global damages (θ1-glo),
regional damages (θ1-reg) and curvature of the damage function (θ2). The figure shows results for the
coalitions Europe and USA (EU), OECD and `major emitters'. Black boxes indicate welfare
performance and environmental performance for the deterministic case.
are so high  due to its size  that we did not find a scenario for which internal stability
holds.
The relative effect of the uncertainties depends on the coalition. However, all the coali-
tions that are internally stable in the deterministic setting become unstable in many runs
in the scenario with uncertainty in the regional distribution of damages. Compared to the
binary result for stability in the deterministic setting, the internal stability likelihood reveals
much more mixed results. Coalitions that were internally stable in the deterministic setting
are less often internally stable in the scenario with uncertainty in the regional distribution of
damages; conversely, some coalitions that were not internally stable are sometimes internally
stable when uncertainty is concerned. In other words, parameter variation within the ranges
of uncertainty changes the incentive to participate from positive to negative and vice versa.
The only exception is the major emitter coalition, for which the incentives to free-ride are
so large that it is not affected by the imposed uncertainty at all.
It is particularly interesting to compare the effect of uncertainty in regional and global
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Figure 7.2: Internal stability likelihood and corresponding confidence intervals (whiskers) by coalitions for
uncertainty in abatement costs (b1), global damages (θ1-glo), regional damages (θ1-reg) and curvature
of the damage function (θ2). Black boxes indicate the internal stability likelihood for the
deterministic case.
damages, as only the former affects the heterogeneity of damages among signatories. For
all coalitions that were internally stable in the deterministic setting, the internal stability
likelihood is lower in the scenario with uncertainty in the regional distribution of damages,
compared with uncertainty in global damages. However, for coalitions that were not inter-
nally stable in the deterministic setting results are less clear cut: while the internal stability
likelihood of the OECD coalition is higher for uncertainty in regional damages than for un-
certainty in global damages, the reverse is true for the EJU coalition. Overall, this suggests
that without transfers the internal stability of coalitions is lost by changes in the hetero-
geneity of damages. When heterogeneity, i.e. the regional pattern of damages, changes,
the incentives of single regions frequently flip from positive to negative. Transfers could (at
least in part) even out these changes. But in their absence these changes affect the internal
stability of the coalition more frequently than in the scenario with uncertainty in global
damages.
Furthermore, it is instructive to compare the effects of uncertainties in abatement and
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Table 7.4: Summary statistics (mean [min; max]) for uncertain parameters in runs in which the OECD coalition
is internally stable relative to means across all Monte-Carlo runs.
`rest of the world' Japan USA European Union
b1 1.293 [0.307; 2.243] 1.092 [0.212; 2.206] 0.249 [0.005; 1.931] 0.821 [0.009; 1.966]
θ1-glo 0.013 [0.008; 0.022]
θ1-reg 1.013 [0.009; 11.74] 0.84 [0.062; 6.77] 0.296 [0.011; 1.324] 0.237 [0.003; 1.463]
θ2 1.868 [1.71; 2.081]
regional damages, as both scenarios lead to changes in heterogeneity among signatories. The
results of our numerical experiments suggest that uncertainty in damages matters more to
signatories than uncertainties in abatement costs, indicated by the more pronounced changes
in internal stability likelihood values compared to the deterministic setting. These results
reflect the greater degree of uncertainty associated with the estimation of damages compared
to abatement costs. Moreover, uncertainty about the curvature of the damages function, i.e.
the sensitivity of damages to the magnitude of temperature increase, affects internal stability
more than uncertainty about the level of global damages.
For insights into the underlying reasons for these observations, we investigate what drives
internal stability for the example of the OECD coalition, consisting of the European Union,
Japan, `rest of the world' and the USA. The conditions under which the OECD becomes
internally stable are elicited by comparing parameter values in runs that are internally stable
with their mean values across all Monte-Carlo runs (Table 7.4). This allows us to study
parameter values for which the OECD becomes internally stable. For mean parameter values
greater than one (smaller than one), uncertainty increases stability in cases where there is
an increase (decrease) in the respective parameter relative to the whole sample mean. For
instance for b1i a value larger than unity indicates that for region i the abatement costs
have to increase on average relative to whole sample mean in order for the OECD to become
internally stable.
Within the OECD coalition, the `rest of the world' region has a high abatement burden,
as a result of its relatively cheap mitigation options,116 which however mainly benefits the
other signatories (when no transfers are available). As the `rest of the world' suffers relatively
little from climate change, cooperation is unattractive for the region when the deterministic
case is considered. The simulated uncertainties display that in order to give the `rest of
the world' an incentive to remain in the OECD, its abatement burden needs to drop, while
116Abatement costs are measured by an abatement cost index, which is defined as the reciprocal of the
cumulative abatement over the 21st century by each region in the coalition of all regions compared to the
all singletons scenario. The rationale for this approach is that within the grand coalition abatement is done
where it is less costly and if marginal abatement costs are well-behaved, abatement costs are inversely related
to the abatement done in the grand coalition. This approach was developed by Lessmann et al. (2015).
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the European Union and especially the USA have to increase abatement efforts. This is
reflected in higher European Union and US abatement costs and lower `rest of the world'
abatement costs in the IS runs compared to the whole sample means. Or alternatively, the
relative economic impact of climate change to the `rest of the world' has to increase to give it
sufficiently high benefits from cooperation. Note that for the scenarios of uncertainty about
abatement costs b1 and especially for uncertainty about regional damages θ1-reg the OECD
can become stable for a wide range of parameter values of each signatory, suggesting that
stability is most affected by uncertainty about the distributional effects of climate coalitions,
especially relating to damages.
Comparison of the effects of uncertainty in global damages and uncertainty in the cur-
vature of the damage function reveals the importance of functional uncertainty for coalition
stability. Regarding the former, the OECD becomes only internally stable if there are hardly
any damages, which is the trivial case of no climate change externality. In contrast the like-
lihood that the OECD is internally stable increases with uncertainty in the curvature of the
damage function. Specifically, the OECD becomes internally stable when the sensitivity of
damages to the magnitude of temperature increase is high  more than 1.7 times the mean.
This suggests that cooperation is induced by common interest of avoiding a temperature
threshold above which severe damage will occur.
7.4.3 Coalition stability with transfers
To study how coalition stability is affected by uncertainty when transfers between signatories
are available, we now analyse the relative effect of different uncertainties on the potential
internal stability likelihood. Almost all studied coalitions are potentially internally stable
(PIS) in the deterministic setting (Figure 7.3), as the coalition payoff is high enough to
compensate signatories with a negative incentive. However, the large coalition of all major
emitters is not internally stable, even with transfers, as free-rider incentives are so high that
not all signatories can be kept within the coalition.
Transfers increase the stability of coalitions under uncertainty. When transfers are pos-
sible the internal stability of coalitions is less sensitive to the applied uncertainties compared
to a situation with no transfers, measured as the deviation from the deterministic case.
However, some coalitions, especially the coalition between the European Union and Japan
(EJ) and Japan and USA (JU), are unstable in the potential internal stability sense in many
runs. Remarkably, the major emitter coalition, the only coalition which is not potentially
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Figure 7.3: Potential internal stability likelihood and corresponding confidence intervals (whiskers) by coalitions
for uncertainty in abatement costs (b1), global damages (θ1-glo), regional damages (θ1-reg) and
curvature of the damage function (θ2). Black boxes indicate the potential internal stability likelihood
for the deterministic case.
internally stable in the deterministic case, has a considerable likelihood to be potentially
internally stable under uncertainty.
The differences between the internal stability likelihood (Figure 7.2) and potential in-
ternal stability likelihood (Figure 7.3) indicate that the effect of heterogeneity on stability
depends on the availability of transfers. In particular, the higher potential internal stability
likelihood of the major emitter coalition under uncertainty in the regional distribution of
damages is in line with the theoretical result that any coalition can become potentially inter-
nally stable if the heterogeneity between players is sufficiently high (Finus and Pintassilogo
2013; Weikard 2009). However, for coalitions that are already potentially internally stable in
the deterministic case the PIS likelihood indicator does not reveal the increasing incentives
that may result from uncertainty for signatories to stay in the coalition.
A different indicator is necessary to gain a better understanding of how uncertainty
influences the incentive to stay within a coalition when transfers are available but the value
of the PIS likelihood is already one. To this end, we studied the amount of consumption that
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each player can pass on while still having an incentive to stay inside the coalition, denoted
as the surplus (Carraro et al. (2006) introduce a similar concept for transferable utility
models).117 We find that the surplus, used as a continuous indicator of potential internal
stability, yields more detailed and more positive conclusions than the PIS likelihood about
the effect of uncertainty on the stability of (already stable) coalitions.
Figure 7.4 shows the change in the surplus under uncertainty relative to the absolute
estimate in the deterministic case (ratio). When negative, the surplus illustrates how far off
a coalition is from being potentially internally stable; when positive, the surplus is a measure
of the extent to which the coalition is generating a positive incentive for its members to
participate. For coalitions that are always potentially internally stable, a higher surplus
indicates that under uncertainty the regions within the coalition have a stronger incentive
to stay after redistribution, as the higher surplus is shared among the signatories.
The surpluses shown in Figure 7.4 indicate that even coalitions where the potential
internal stability under uncertainty drops below one have on average greater incentives to
stay in the coalition, compared to the deterministic case, since they can expect to gain
substantial benefits from cooperation. A remarkable exception is the coalition of major
emitters. The negative incentives for signatories to stay in this coalition, due to its size, are
reinforced under uncertainty in abatement costs, global damages and the shape of the damage
function. Only uncertainty about regional damages causes the incentive for signatories to
stay to increase. This finding is in line with the theoretical result that when transfers are
available any coalition can become stable if heterogeneity between signatory is sufficiently
high (Finus and Pintassilogo 2013; Weikard 2009).
117Kornek et al. (2014) define a measure for the surplus in the non-transferable utility framework and
develop an algorithm to compute it, which we describe here. For a coalition S consider the transfer scheme
τ that redistributes consumption so that the payoff of each signatory k is at least at its free-rider level. The
surplus can then be defined as the maximal consumption per coalition member every signatory j could lose,
still having a positive incentive to stay, discounted at rate rt over time t0 to tm:
lo(S, d) = max
τk,t,∆Ct
(
tn∑
t=t0
1
1 + rt
∆Ct(S, d)
)
(7.9)
subject to pik(cj(S, d) + τk,t(S, d)−∆Ct(S, d)) ≥ pik(S \ {j}, d),∀k ∈ S. (7.10)
The surplus aggregates the consumption streams of all members of the coalition that are available for
arbitrary redistribution when the coalition is internally stable after transfers. To gain an indicator of how
much additional transfers each member could receive, we divide the sum of consumption by the number
of members. If the surplus is positive, each member has an incentive to stay inside the coalition after
redistribution and the magnitude of the surplus indicates how strong the incentives to stay are. If the
surplus is negative, the coalition is not PIS and the negative magnitude of the surplus indicates how much
more consumption would be necessary inside the coalition in order for the incentive for members to stay to
become positive.
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Figure 7.4: Mean surplus relative to the absolute estimate in the deterministic case (ratio) and corresponding
confidence intervals (whiskers) for uncertainty in abatement costs (b1), global damages (θ1-glo),
regional damages (θ1-reg) and damage curvature (θ2).
A more detailed view of how the incentive to stay within a coalition with transfers
is affected by uncertainty can be gained by looking at the distribution of the surpluses
(Table 7.7 in the Appendix). The uncertainty in the surplus  measured by the standard
deviation  is in most cases highest for uncertainty in the regional distribution of damages.
For the majority of the studied coalitions the mean of the surplus is higher than the median
and hence the probability density of the surplus is right-skewed. The only exception is again
the major emitter coalition, which has a left-skewed distribution of the incentive to stay in
all uncertainty scenarios except in the case of uncertainty about regional damages.
Uncertainty in the regional distribution of damages produces the most skewed distribu-
tions of the incentive to stay within the coalitions, as the difference between the median and
the mean surplus is always highest in this scenario. Furthermore, for uncertainty in regional
damages the likelihood of having a strong incentive to stay goes up for all studied coalitions,
including even the major emitter coalition. Thus, when transfer schemes are available, un-
certainty about regional damages increases the internal stability of coalitions. However,
these observations have an explorative character due to the limited sample of coalitions in
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Table 7.5: Correlations between the heterogeneity in abatement costs (CVΛ) or damages (CVΩ) and coalition
stability without transfers (IS) and with transfers (surplus)
Coalition r(CVΛ, IS) r(CVΛ, surplus) r(CVΩ, IS) r(CVΩ, surplus)
EJ 0.689∗∗ −0.438∗∗ −0.063 0.332∗∗
ER − 0.557∗∗ −0.396∗∗ 0.183∗∗
EU − 0.562∗∗ −0.388∗∗ 0.254∗∗
JR − 0.037 −0.371∗∗ 0.192∗∗
JU 0.475∗∗ −0.456∗∗ 0.021 0.371∗∗
RU − 0.549∗∗ −0.369∗∗ 0.197∗∗
EJR 0.742∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.334∗∗ 0.216∗∗
EJU 0.339∗∗ −0.061 −0.051 0.248∗∗
ERU −0.320∗∗ 0.477∗∗ −0.368∗∗ 0.305∗∗
JRU 0.812∗∗ −0.133∗ −0.279∗∗ 0.212∗∗
OECD 0.091 −0.011 −0.178∗∗ 0.276∗∗
Major Emitters − 0.014 − 0.188∗∗
Correlation coefficients (Pearson's R) for n = 500; (*) (**) indicate significance at the p < 0.01
and p < 0.001 level, respectively; coalitions with missing values are either always or never
internally stable.
this study.
A principal result of the above analysis is that uncertainty in damage and abatement
costs mainly affects coalition stability through its effect on the heterogeneity of signatories
and that the direction of the effect depends on the availability of transfers. To test the
link between the heterogeneity of signatories and the stability of coalitions without and
with transfers we study correlations between the coalition stability and the distribution of
damages and abatement costs (Table 7.5), an approach employed by Eyckmans and Bréchet
(2012). For each coalition, heterogeneity is measured as the coefficient of variation (CV)
across all signatories in abatement, CVΛ, and damage cost, CVΩ, respectively. Table 7.5
compares the two measures of heterogeneity against internal stability of coalitions without
and with transfers, using `surplus' as a measure of stability when transfers are available for
the reasons explained above.
Regarding abatement costs, the relationship between heterogeneity and coalition stability
is not clear cut. By contrast, for damages we find that heterogeneity is negatively correlated
with coalition stability when countries have no possibility to transfer consumption. However,
the relationship is reversed when transfers schemes are available. In this case heterogeneity
in damages is always significantly positively correlated with the internal stability of coali-
tions. This means that when transfers are available, uncertainty in the regional distribution
of damages is likely to increase the stability of coalitions. Thus, our experiments add numer-
ical evidence to the analytical results regarding the relationship between heterogeneity and
stability of coalitions (Weikard 2009) and link these to the issue of uncertainty in coalition
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formation (Finus und Pintassilgo 2013).
7.5 Conclusion
We have studied how uncertainties about climate change damages and abatement costs
affect the stability of coalitions in a numerical model of coalition formation (MICA). While
we do not explicitly consider decision making under uncertainty, our numerical Monte-Carlo
analysis allowed us to quantify the probability that the claim that certain coalitions are
stable is correct. To this end, we have translated estimates of uncertainty about abatement
costs and climate change damages from empirical studies into four probability distributions
for parameters in our model, and propagated these distributions through the model using
Monte-Carlo analysis.
We found, firstly, that stability is very sensitive to uncertainty. As parameter variations
within the bounds of uncertainty frequently change the stability of coalitions, whether or not
a coalition is stable often appears to be a knife-edge case. Finding a specific coalition to be
stable (or not) should therefore not be mistaken for a prediction. This underlines the value
of more comprehensive indicators of the incentives to cooperate, such as stability likelihood,
which reveals the robustness of such incentives.
Second, uncertainty about damages matters more than uncertainty about abatement
costs. This is, of course, partly due to the larger empirical uncertainty in the case of damages,
and highlights once again the pressing need for more research on the economic impacts
of climate change. Furthermore, uncertainty in the regional distribution of damages has
a stronger impact on stability than uncertainty in global damages. This, too, highlights
the need for more accurate information on climate change impacts. The strong effect of
uncertainty about regional damages implies that heterogeneity in regional damages, i.e. how
the burden of climate change impacts is shared, matters more for cooperation than the
magnitude of the global burden. It is therefore important to understand impacts on the
regional level.
Third, we find evidence that heterogeneity increases coalition stability when transfers are
available and decreases coalition stability when they are not. This result has already been
demonstrated in the theoretical literature (Finus and Pintassilgo 2013; Weikard 2009); our
calculations suggest that it also applies to more complex models incorporating non-linear
relationships. As such, we view this as encouraging for climate change negotiations. While
real-world heterogeneity may initially present an obstacle to cooperation, as it inevitably
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creates losers (along with the winners), there is a rich set of transfer and compensation
schemes that can potentially turn heterogeneity from an obstacle into an opportunity, e.g.
by burden sharing schemes (Lessmann et al. 2015) or introducing trade in emission permits
(Jakob et al. 2014).
The analysis presented here shows that results regarding the stability of coalitions derived
from models of international climate cooperation should be interpreted with some caution.
Interestingly, for some coalitions, our analysis indicates that outcomes may be more pos-
itive than those suggested by deterministic analyses. Under uncertainty the likelihood of
important coalitions like the OECD being internally stable might increase, and even large
coalitions have a considerable chance to become internally stable when appropriate transfer
schemes are in place.
The methods employed in this study limit the generalizability of our results. Results are
derived from analysis of a small set of coalitions and should be tested in a wider sample of all
possible coalitions. We chose to focus on a limited set of coalitions to identify the major ef-
fects and to examine the underlying mechanics, and while we would not expect qualitatively
different results, an extension to a larger set of coalitions would strengthen our argument.
Finally, while uncertainty propagation by Monte-Carlo analysis allows us to study the effect
of real-world uncertainty on model results, uncertainty does not enter the strategic decision
making on whether or not to cooperate. This requires a modelling approach which incor-
porates decision making under uncertainty, e.g. stochastic programming. While our study
reveals which uncertainties drive the stability of coalitions, future research could explicitly
incorporate decision making under uncertainty in order to gain an in-depth understanding
of how uncertainty influences their formation.
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7.6 Appendix
Table 7.6: Makeup of regions studied in the Model of International Climate Agreements
Model region Countries
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa without South Africa
CHN China
EUR EU27 countries
IND India
JPN Japan
LAM All American countries but Canada and the US
MEA North Africa, Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf Countries,
Resource exporting countries of former Soviet Union (FSU), Pakistan
OAS South East Asia, both Koreas, Mongolia, Nepal, Afghanistan
ROW Non-EU27 European states without Russia, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and South Africa
RUS Russia
USA USA
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Figure 7.5: Histogram of the realization of the abatement cost factor k.
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Figure 7.6: Histogram of the realization of θ1 in case of uncertainty in global damages for EUR.
Figure 7.7: Histogram of the realization of θ1 in case of uncertainty in regional damages for EUR.
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Figure 7.8: Histogram of the realization of θ2.
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8 Ecosystem Services in Infrastructure
Planning
Abstract: We consider how ecosystem services can be incorporated into water infrastructure
planning by studying the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river channel in Germany.
We recalculate the project's benefit-cost ratio by integrating the monetary value of changes
in different ecosystem services, as follows: (1) the restoration costs of a mitigation measure
for a loss in fresh water supply for agricultural production in the estuary region, (2) the costs
of a loss in habitat services, transferring the willingness to pay from a contingent valuation
study to the area assessed in the environmental impact assessment, and (3) the benefits
of emissions savings induced by more efficient shipping, taking a marginal abatement cost
approach. We find that including monetary values for ecosystem service changes leads to
a substantial drop in the benefit-cost ratio. On this basis, we argue for a reform of the
standard cost-benefit analysis to facilitate more complete welfare assessments.
Keywords: ecosystem services; cost-benefit analysis; infrastructure planning; river deepen-
ing; Weser estuary
Reference: Droste, N., Meya, J.N. (2017). Ecosystem services in infrastructure planning
 a case study of the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river in Germany. Journal of
Environmental Planning and Management, 60(2), 231248.
This is the original manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of
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https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2016.1151405.
272
Empirical applications Ecosystem Services in Infrastructure Planning
8.1 Introduction
The effects of a region's infrastructure on the integrity of ecosystems, including both the
changes brought about by new infrastructure in the provision of ecosystem services118 and
their impacts on human well-being, have attracted much attention since the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
(TEEB 2010a) reports. Despite the growing literature on ecosystem services, however, hardly
any attempts have been made to account for monetary values of ecosystem service changes
in infrastructure legislation and planning.119
In European, international and national infrastructure planning, welfare assessments
such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are a common tool (EC 2008; Pearce, Atkinson, and
Mourato 2006; World Bank 2006). In order to fully assess the effects of infrastructure
projects on social welfare, all related costs and benefits should be integrated into a CBA
(Hanley and Barbier 2009), including monetary values of changes in ecosystem services (Russi
et al. 2013). In cases where the ecosystem services concerned are considered to be highly
valuable, neglecting them would lead to an inefficient allocation of public investment. In
the context of waterbody-related infrastructure planning, the European Water Framework
Directive (WFD), for example, sets standards for the quality of water bodies and mentions
economic analysis explicitly as a central decision support tool (cf. Meyerhoff and Dehnhardt
2007). However, the effects of waterway infrastructure projects on the waterbody quality
and the respective aquatic ecosystem services have rarely been assessed in monetary terms
(for CBA in the WFD context, see Hanley and Black 2006).
In this paper, we aim at assessing the importance of ecosystem service changes for CBA in
(water) infrastructure planning. To this end, we critically review the German infrastructure
legislation regarding the inclusion of ecosystem services and present a case study in which
ecosystem services are integrated into the CBA of deepening the Lower Weser river channel
in Germany.120 Thus, we ask: How does the cost-benefit ratio change for the projected
Lower Weser deepening when ecosystem service values are integrated?
118Ecosystem services are `the benefits that people obtain from ecosystems' (MEA 2005: preface) or, for a
more precise definition, `[f]inal ecosystem services are components of nature, directly enjoyed, consumed, or
used to yield human well-being' (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007, 619).
119For both the reasons and challenges of integrating ecosystem services into decision-making, see de Groot
et al. (2010).
120The Weser river in northwest Germany has been deepened several times (Franzius, Franzius, and Rudloff
2010; Wetzel 1988), leading to drastic alterations in the river flow regime (Schuchardt et al. 2007). The
deepening project currently being planned (WSV 2011) has been challenged by environmental NGOs and
farmers at the German Federal Administrative Court, where it was referred to the European Court of Justice
with regard to the `no deterioration' rule in the EU Water Framework Directive (Ekardt and Weyland 2014).
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We find it a particularly interesting case study for the following three reasons: (1) estu-
aries are well known as areas of high economic activity, as well as of significant ecosystem
service provision (Liekens, Broekx, and De Nocker 2013, 15); (2) the project is of consider-
able political relevance, as it was the principal case used to debate the WFD at the European
Court of Justice regarding when development goals such as infrastructure improvements are
allowed to overrule environmental standards such as the no-deterioration rule (Ekardt and
Weyland 2014); and (3) its benefit-cost ratio was assessed as being extremely high (PLANCO
2002).
The paper structure is as follows. In Section 8.2, we review the methodology and role of
CBA in the Federal Transportation Infrastructure Plan (BVWP). Turning to the case of the
Lower Weser deepening in Section 8.3, we provide exemplary monetary valuations of changes
in ecosystem services in order to compare the original CBA with an ecologically extended
one. In Section 8.4, we discuss the limitations and assumptions involved in our approach to
integrate ecosystem services into infrastructure planning. Finally, Section 8.5 concludes and
proposes unresolved questions for future research.
8.2 Critical review of the German federal infrastructure plan-
ning process
In this section, we review the methodology and decision-making process in German in-
frastructure planning, as laid down in the 2003 Federal Transportation Infrastructure Plan
(BVWP) (Section 8.2.1), the classification of maintenance costs (Section 8.2.2), and the
valuation of ecosystem services (Section 8.2.3).
8.2.1 Cost-benefit analysis in infrastructure planning processes
The aim of the BVWP is to channel public investments in a way that maximises social welfare
(BMVBW 2003b). It is generated by conducting an integrated assessment across different
transportation carriers. Based on scenario planning and traffic forecasts121 (ISL et al. 2000;
PLANCO 2005), it presents infrastructure investment plans for about 10 years ahead. The
Ministry of Transportation assesses the proposed infrastructure developments mainly accord-
ing to a monetary benefit-cost ratio. The overall ranking is furthermore subject to public
budget constraints and federal financial planning, and considers non-monetary criteria of
121Traffic forecasts and the implicitly assumed development of demand constitute a key source of uncertainty
(cf. Næss et al. 2012).
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spatial relevance and environmental risk (BMVBW 2003b; Meyerhoff and Petschow 1995;
Petry and Klauer 2005). Finally, a consultation process involving the relevant ministries,
transport associations and federal states is conducted before the BVWP is enacted by leg-
islative procedures (Petry and Klauer 2005). The assessment criteria and methodology for
ranking infrastructure projects bodies and mentions economic analysis explicitly as a central
decision support tool (cf. Meyerhoff and Dehnhardt 2007). However, the effects of water-
way infrastructure projects on the waterbody quality and the respective aquatic ecosystem
services have rarely been assessed in monetary terms (for CBA in the WFD context, see
Hanley and Black 2006).
Figure 8.1 displays a combination of partial assessments taken as a basis for assessing
the overall priority of projects (Petry and Klauer 2005). CBA plays a key role within this
decision-making process. The aim of the CBA is to assess economic welfare effects measured
in monetary terms; this makes it possible to compare the different consequences of a given
project with one another. The benefit-cost ratio defines whether or not a project falls into
the category of `priority needs', `further needs' or `no needs'. Furthermore, it is the only
criterion that will rule out those projects with a benefit-cost ratio of less than one (BMVBW
2003a). Projects which are very important in spatial terms may achieve a higher priority
ranking. A project that entails very high environmental risks (e.g. due to potential damage
in protected areas) will not be ranked lower or ruled out. Environmental risks need to be
assessed further in terms of the potential to avoid or at least mitigate them.
8.2.2 Classification of costs and benefits
The key variable in the infrastructure planning decision-making process is the benefit-cost
ratio. In order to assess the costs and benefits of a given infrastructure investment, a net
present value is calculated based on annual flows (BMVBW 2003b). The present value V of
a flow X is given by
V (X, t, p) =
T∑
t=0
(1 + p)−tXt. (8.1)
The annual flows are discounted at rate p, and t is the time period.122 The benefit-cost
122According to current legislation (BVWP 2003), costs and benefits are measured in present values with
a base year t0 = 2000 and prices of 1998. The discount rate is 3%. For waterway infrastructure investments
on river and canal beds, a use value of more than t = 100 years is assumed (BMVBW 2003b, 99). For the
Lower Weser deepening, the first year of operation is assumed to be 2015 (PLANCO2002). The formula is
simplified for constant flows (BVWP 2003).
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Ranking of projects according to Federal Transportation Infrastructure Plan 2003
cost-benefit analysis
environmental risk 
assessment
spatial relevance 
analysis
priority assessment
benefit-cost ratio > 1 benefit-cost ratio < 1
within budget until 2015 out of budget no need
assessment of environmental risks including a preliminary 
FFH compatibility assessment within a categorical matrix of 
degree of impacts and relevance of risk for different 
protection objectives (depending on scale, obligatory for 
waterways)
assessment of distributive and development goals and 
other spatial planning criteria 
 potential upgrading of projects due to high relevance
ranking according to benefit-cost ratio (and special needs)
priority need further need
potential changes in ranking due to considerations of 
overarching network concepts and different planning statusnetwork concepts
Figure 8.1: Schematic representation of the planning procedure within the 2003 Federal Transportation
Infrastructure Plan (adapted by the authors from Petry and Klauer 2005, 49).
ratio BCR is then calculated as the sum of present value benefits B of m categories divided
by the sum of present value costs C of n categories.
BCR =
∑M
m=0 V (Bm)∑N
n=0 V (Cn)
. (8.2)
This measurement is sensitive to the classification of cost and benefits. However, a de-
cision rule should be independent of whether or not costs are accounted for as negative
benefits (Pearce, Atkinson, and Mourato 2006). This is particularly important, since stan-
dard increased maintenance costs are accounted for in the BVWP as negative benefits. The
classification of maintenance costs (x) as benefits (B) instead of costs (C) biases the benefit-
cost ratio towards greater economic profitability because
B − x
C
>
B
C + x
(8.3)
for positive values of x. It never biases a profitable benefit-cost ratio below 1, but leads
to a biased ranking of infrastructure projects and, consequently, to an inefficient allocation
of public spending.
More specifically, the bias  measured as the fraction of the two cost-benefit ratios 
increases in the ratio of all other costs and benefits. Thus, the more beneficial a project is,
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the more its cost-benefit ratio is exaggerated. To see this point, let b = BC > 1 denote the
ratio of all other costs and benefits except maintenance costs (x) and let µ measure the bias.
Then, (8.3) is rewritten as:
bC − x
C
= µ
bC
C + x
. (8.4)
Rearranging for µ and differentiating with respect to b yields a positive first derivative:
∂µ
∂b
=
Cx+ x2
C2
> 0. (8.5)
This means, the bias from classifying maintenance cost as negative benefits (x) increases in
the ratio of all other benefits and costs (b) and the more beneficial the project, the greater
the bias.
8.2.3 Valuation of environmental impacts
In Germany, benefits are assessed according to nine different categories, including reduced
transport costs and regional benefits such as an increase in regional employment (BMVBW
2003b). The assessment also includes external effects such as accidents, noise or emissions.
Environmental benefits are assessed in terms of noise reduction and reduced airborne emis-
sions. Costs are included using a single factor representing investment costs.
The BVWP does not explicitly recognise any negative external effects of infrastruc-
ture planning on the environment, such as losses in ecosystem services (cf. Meyerhoff and
Petschow 1995; Meyerhoff and Dehnhardt 2007; Petry and Klauer 2005; Zabel 2011).123
However, German nature conservation law stipulates that the impacts of infrastructure
projects must be minimised and compensation provided for residual environmental impacts.
To some extent, therefore, changes in ecosystem services are implicitly included in a lump-
sum portion of the investment costs (Petry and Klauer 2005)  yet without being properly
assessed.124
To assess the ecosystem service-related welfare effects of infrastructure projects within a
CBA, it is necessary first to establish the monetary value of changes in ecosystem services.
This can be done using a range of methods (Russi et al. 2013; TEEB 2010a). Since many
123The currently developed BVWP 2015 does not differ in this respect and will not explicitly include
environmental costs (Intraplan, Planco, and TUBS 2015, Section 2.11).
124The initial CBA for the Weser deepening was conducted (PLANCO 2002), before the environmental
impact assessment (GfL, BioConsult, and KÜFOG 2006a) and the landscape conservation plan (GfL, Bio-
Consult, and KÜFOG 2006b) existed and is therefore inevitably inaccurate in estimating environmental
costs.
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ecosystem services are public in nature and are therefore not traded, no market price is
available. In such cases, the monetary value of changes in ecosystem service provision can
be estimated by either the willingness to accept or the willingness to pay,125 determined
by revealed or stated preference methods (e.g. Brouwer et al. 2009; Hanley and Barbier
2009; TEEB 2010b). Other options for assessing changes in ecosystem services in monetary
values include cost-based approaches such as avoided cost, replacement cost, mitigation or
restoration cost methods (Brouwer et al. 2009). However, cost-based measures are not
necessarily a good measure of welfare effects, since they give no indication whether there is
an actual demand for a specific service or whether preferences are met (cf. Bockstael et al.
2000). Thus, further information on preferences is needed.
8.3 Integrating ecosystem services into a cost-benefit analysis
of the projected deepening of the Lower Weser
In the following, we discuss the original CBA (PLANCO 2002)126 that enabled the deep-
ening of the Lower Weser to be included in the 2003 Federal Transportation Infrastructure
Plan (BVWP) as a high-priority project (Section 8.3.1). Furthermore, we monetise the pro-
jected changes in the ecosystem services concerned (Section 8.3.2) in order to re-estimate
the benefit-cost ratio for the deepening of the Lower Weser (Section 8.3.3) and report on a
sensitivity analysis for the resulting ecologically extended CBA (Section 8.3.4).
8.3.1 Original cost-benefit analysis
The first planning procedures for a further deepening of the Weser were initiated in the early
2000s. PLANCO was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Transportation to provide a
CBA for the river deepening project (PLANCO 2002).
According to PLANCO (2002), the deepening of the Weser river channel would deliver
the following benefits each year: improvements in the utilisation of shipping capacity would
yield an annual benefit of e1998 6.54 million127 because a deeper channel would allow ships
with a heavier cargo to enter the river, so that fewer ships would be required and hence
125The willingness to pay is the amount of money an individual is willing to pay to obtain a certain good
or service. Conversely, the willingness to accept is the amount of money an individual requires in order to
go without a certain good or service.
126There is an additional and partly revised CBA (PLANCO 2009). In comparison to the original CBA, it
is even less explicit in its assumptions and methodology, which makes it harder to reproduce.
127Monetary values are converted to e1998 throughout the text using the annual consumer price indices for
Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014).
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transport costs would be reduced. Time savings in terms of waiting times incurred by tidal
phases would deliver benefits because the tide-related time frame to access ports would be
extended for larger ships (e1998 0.05 million). The deepening of the channel would cause
increased maintenance costs due to a greater need for maintenance dredging; these costs
are accounted for as negative benefits (e1998 −1.99 million). Regional employment would
increase during the phase of deepening the Lower Weser (e1998 0.01 million). CO2 and NOx
emissions would be mitigated, as better used capacity would require fewer ships and therefore
less fuel per transported ton of cargo. This constitutes the largest annual benefit (e1998 8.64
million) of deepening the Lower Weser in the original CBA (PLANCO 2002). Finally, the
promotion of international trade would improve the international division of labour and is
therefore beneficial in terms of welfare (BMVBW 2003b). This is calculated as benefit of
10% of the savings in operational costs (e1998 0.66 million). The only costs considered are
investment costs, estimated at a total of e1998 15.34 million, with 57% accruing in the first
year and the remainder being equally distributed over the subsequent years of activity (2011-
2014) (PLANCO 2002). The planned deepening of the Weser was given `high priority' in
the BVWP 2003 because, based on these figures, it was estimated that the benefit-cost ratio
would be greater than 26 : 1 (PLANCO 2002, 2009).
8.3.2 Valuation of affected ecosystem services
Next, we monetise two main128 losses in ecosystem services and adjust the prices for a
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in order to illustrate the magnitude of the effects on
the environment caused by the Weser channel adjustment.
First, one major impact of the Weser deepening is an associated loss in provisioning
fresh water (Russi et al. 2013) for agricultural production in the region. Dredging results
in a stronger upstream intrusion of brackish waters into the estuary and increased salinity
(BAW 2004; Johnston 1981; Luo et al. 2007; National Research Council Marine Board
1985). This changes the fresh water supply in a region called Wesermarsch (IDN 2008). The
farmers in this region use the system of canals and ditches to water their cattle and land 
this is a provisioning ecosystem service that would be affected by the dredging of the Lower
128Very likely these are not the only effects. Potentially, the deepening would also have negative impacts
on cultural ecosystem services such as amenity and recreational services, e.g. for biking and hiking along
the Lower Weser, due to a more confined river (cf. Russi et al. 2013). Regulating services are also likely to
be affected negatively, given that dredging and the associated loss of habitats affect the nutrient retention
capacity of estuaries (cf. Dehnhardt 2002; Liekens, Broekx, and De Nocker 2013; Jacobs et al. 2013).
Including such potential ecosystem service losses in monetary terms would further lower the benefit-cost
ratio.
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Weser. The Generalplan Wesermarsch is a plan that has been produced to improve the
supply of fresh water in the Wesermarsch region by changing the ditch system to provide
less salty water for agricultural production. Administratively, it is a different project and the
relation between the two has been challenged in the political discourse. It has been argued
that the Wesermarsch planning is not intended to compensate for damage caused by the
planned Lower Weser deepening, but for damage done by a previous deepening of the river
(Niedersächsischer Landtag 2012). Assuming increasing marginal costs, the environmental
damage caused by a previous deepening of the channel would be a conservative estimate
of the environmental damage caused by the deepening currently being planned. Hence,
we assume that the costs of the plan can be used as a proxy for the restoration costs of
losses in provisioning fresh water ecosystem services for agricultural production.129 The two
federal states of Lower Saxony and Bremen budgeted e2011 50 million for the compensation
measure. A study commissioned to elaborate the plan estimated e2011 86.7 million as the
most cost-efficient measure (NLWKN 2011), whilst the ongoing political discourse has stated
that costs may increase up to e2011 120 million (Niedersächsischer Landtag 2012). We use
the e2011 86.7 million as a best guess estimate, the politically budgeted sum as a lower
bound and the maximum cost mentioned as an upper bound estimate to indicate the range
of uncertainty. We assume that the costs accrue constantly over the 14 years (NLWKN 2011)
of planning and implementation, which gives an average yearly flow of e1998 6.19 million
with an uncertainty range from 3.57 to 8.57 million.
Second, habitat and gene pool protection services are affected by the dredging activities
in the river bed. Such bio-physical data of the effects of the Weser deepening are reported
in the environmental impact assessment and in the planning documents concerning required
mitigation and compensation measures. The procedure is described briefly in the following
(cf. Rundcrantz and Skärbäck 2003 for more detail). First, there is an environmental
impact assessment (GfL, BioConsult, and KÜFOG 2006a) which, in the case of the Weser,
concludes that there would be an unavoidable `significantly negative' impact on different
ecosystems along the river and its tributaries. According to the German nature conservation
law, such unavoidable impacts must be mitigated or compensated for. In a second step,
the landscape conservation plan specifies the mitigation and compensation measures (GfL,
BioConsult, and KÜFOG 2006b). This plan finds a total of 109.8 ha subject to different
129As noted in Section 8.2.3, cost-based methods are not necessarily a good measure of welfare since
they do not contain information about individual and social preferences (and marginal WTP). In this case,
preferences are revealed in the political process entailing negotiations over an actual compensation measure
 the Generalplan Wesermarsch  which was not part of the initial planning.
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types of encroachments by dredging. It assesses the value or quality of the affected `subject of
protection' (Schutzgut, e.g. soil, waterbodies, climate, biotopes, landscape, flora, fauna and
humans) as well as the expected loss of value (Rundcrantz and Skärbäck 2003). Weighting
factors apply for different depths and durations of encroachment effects (Wende, Herberg,
and Herzberg 2005; GfL, BioConsult, and KÜFOG 2006b). By factoring in these weights, the
landscape conservation plan estimates compensation needs for permanent damage to 32.9 ha
(GfL, BioConsult, and KÜFOG 2006b). The overall area for planned compensation measures
to offset all the losses (including those that are not permanent) relating to the different
subjects of protection is 61.16 ha (GfL, BioConsult, and KÜFOG 2006b). To estimate
the change in habitat and gene pool protection services, we take the area of compensation
measures as a best guess estimate (61.16 ha), and use the area of compensation need for
permanent damages (32.9 ha) and actual encroachment (109.8 ha) as lower and upper bound
estimates.
The cost of the compensation measures are estimated at e1998 4 million (WSA Bremer-
haven, personal communication, 2014). From an ecological perspective, such compensation
measures do not necessarily offset all residual losses with regard to spatial and temporal eco-
logical equivalence (cf. Quétier and Lavorel 2011), especially for the biodiverse and unique
Weser estuary. In addition, from a welfare economics perspective, cost-based methods are
not always a good proxy for welfare effects, as cost-based proxies do not consider whether or
not the preferences of the population concerned have been met. To account for both areas
of uncertainty, welfare effects could alternatively be measured by the extent to which people
value these ecosystem services. Therefore, we estimate the value of the losses in habitat
services by applying a benefit transfer from a contingent valuation study of the willingness
to pay (WTP) of households in the nearby Elbe region. The study's value we transfer is the
Elbe, Weser and Rhine region inhabitants' WTP for the restoration of natural floodplains
by relocating dykes, extensifying agriculture and implementing species protection measures,
mainly the restoration of 15,000 ha of flood plains in the Elbe region to a near-natural state
(Meyerhoff 2002; Meyerhoff and Dehnhardt 2007).130 Here, we make the very conservative
assumption that WTP equals willingness to accept (cf. Horowitz and McConnell 2002).
Meyerhoff (2002) elicits under cautious assumptions (exclusion of protest votes, correction
of embedding effect and 2.5% reduced arithmetic mean) a yearly WTP of e2001 108 million,
130The fact that the participants in Meyerhoff's (2002) WTP study also included households from the
Weser region makes the transfer of their WTP to the area affected by a Weser deepening plausible: some of
the stakeholders are the same, and although the affected river is different, it is geographically close by (cf.
Brouwer 2000 for quality criteria of benefit transfers).
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which we scale down to the area affected and the number of households in the Lower Weser
region.131 This results in annual costs through the loss of habitat and species protection of
e1998 2.07 million with an uncertainty range from 1.11 to 3.71 million.
Third, the planned channel adjustment would allow larger ships to transport the same
amount of cargo and thereby use less fuel per transported ton of cargo. The savings in fuel
lead to emissions abatement. This constitutes a benefit through mitigation of airborne emis-
sions132 since damages are avoided (BMVBW 2003b). The BVWP method133 uses average
abatement cost with values that are high compared to recent estimates134 (Kuik, Brander,
and Tol 2009; Umweltbundesamt 2012a). Because marginal abatement costs increase over
time, using an average cost approach without great care overweighs current emissions and
tends to exaggerate the net present value of emission reductions due to discounting. There-
fore, we recalculate the benefits of emissions reductions based on the results of a recent
meta-study and use a marginal cost approach for greater accuracy. We follow the approach
of the German Federal Environmental Agency and assume that the national political miti-
gation target in the BVWP (BMVBW 2003b) is equivalent to limiting global warming to a
2 C° temperature rise (Umweltbundesamt 2012a; Wille, Preiss, and Friedrich 2012). How-
ever, with current international mitigation efforts corresponding to scenarios of 550-650 ppm
CO2eq by 2100 (Edenhofer et al. 2014), we assume a stabilisation around 500 ppm CO2eq,
which is still likely to keep the rise in global temperature below 2 C° (IPCC 2014). Esti-
mates of marginal abatement costs are available from Kuik, Brander, and Tol (2009), who
conducted a meta-study based on 62 estimates from 26 different models presented at the
Energy Modelling Forum (EMF) and the Innovative Modelling Comparison Project (IMCP)
in 2006. Accordingly, marginal abatement costs for stabilising the atmospheric concentration
of greenhouse gases at 500 ppm CO2eq are predicted as 66.00 e2005/tCO2eq for 2025 (with
36.50 and 119.40 being lower and upper bounds, respectively) and 133.90 e2005/tCO2eq for
131We scaled down the area from 15,000 ha of the Elbe floodplain as assessed in Meyerhoff (2002) to the
area affected by the Weser river dredging (32.9, 61.16 or 109.8 ha, respectively) and adjusted the WTP from
8.6 million households in the Elbe catchment area to 4.2 million households in the Weser catchment area.
132Lieken, Broekx, and De Nocker (2013) consider water quantity available for transportation as an ecosys-
tem service. Deepening the channel may thus yield benefits through an increased water flow that allows for
more efficient shipping.
133Emissions are valued with the average abatement cost to reach 80% emission reduction in 2050, approx-
imated as 205 and 365 e1998/t for CO2 and NOx emissions, respectively (BMVBW 2003b). These estimates
are based on studies by Jochem et al. (1997) and Masuhr et al. (1991).
134In fact, not only the price, but also the quantity of emissions savings, appears to be highly uncertain.
In the revised CBA from PLANCO (2009), the benefits from emissions reduction fall from the originally
reported e1998 175.25 million to just e1998 21.4 million.
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2050 (ranging from 79.40 to 226.00) (Kuik, personal communication, 2014).135 Marginal
abatement costs are highly convex in emissionscontrol rate (IPCC 2007; Kuik, Brander, and
Tol 2009) and are hence expected to rise over time. Assuming zero abatement costs in 1987
(the reference point in the BVWP 2003), we calibrate a second-degree polynomial to the
abatement costs mentioned in 1987, 2025 and 2050. This gives yearly benefits of abated
emissions of e1998 1.63 million in 2015 (with a range from 0.86 to 3.05 million) and e1998
14.58 million in 2115 (with a range from 9.48 to 22.09 million).
8.3.3 Ecologically extended cost-benefit analysis
Next, we adapt the original CBA conducted for the Lower Weser river channel by applying
our three main points of criticism: integrating ecosystem services, valuing carbon emissions
with marginal abatement costs based on recent studies and correcting the accounting bias.
We find a present value (sum of discounted annual flows with lower and upper uncertainty
bounds in parenthesis) of the loss of habitat and gene pool protection services of e1998 47.18
(ranging from 25.38 to 84.71) million and of the loss of provisioning ecosystem services of
e1998 44.90 (25.89 up to 62.15) million. Each of these figures is, on the lower bound, already
twice as high as the investment costs, highlighting the relative importance of environmental
costs compared to purely financial costs. Moreover, we recalculate emissions reductions
due to more efficient shipping using marginal abatement costs. Leaving the value for NOx
emissions untouched gives a present value of emissions reductions of e1998 97.69 (ranging
from 61.19 to 158.91) million, with the higher bound still being below the original figure.
This illustrates that, due to discounting and the long time horizon, it makes a substantial
difference whether average or marginal abatement costs are considered.
Recalculating the original CBA using these figures and classifying maintenance costs
as costs, the benefit-cost ratio drops from 26.12 to 1.71 (ranging from 1.05 to 2.99) (see
Table 8.1). Hence, the benefit-cost ratio appears to be very sensitive to our amendments
and this sensitivity appears to be relatively robust in relation to the uncertainties considered
in the ecosystem service valuation. Remarkably, the results of the ecologically extended CBA
hardly change when maintenance costs remain classified as negative benefits; this leads to
a benefit-cost ratio of 1.99 (ranging from 1.07 to 4.28 as lower and upper bounds). This
135Note that the marginal abatement cost strongly depends on the stringency of the long-term political
target (Edenhofer et al. 2014; Kuik, Brander, and Tol 2009) and results hence rest on the assumed stabil-
isation target with both nationally and globally less stringent climate goals resulting in substantially lower
abatement costs.
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mirrors the fact that, for given maintenance costs, the accounting bias decreases as the ratio
of all other costs and benefits approaches unity.
Table 8.1: Original and ecologically extended cost-benefit analysis, present values in million e1998.
Original CBAa Ecologically
extended CBA
Benefits
Benefits from improved shipping capacity utilisation 132.74 132.74
Benefit from time savings 1.04 1.04
Increased maintenance costs −40.44
Regional employment during investment phase 0.28 0.28
Benefits from abated CO2 and NOx emissions 175.25 97.69
[61.69; 158.91]
Benefits from advancing international trade 13.48 13.48
Sum of benefits 282.35 245.22
[208.73; 306.44]
Costs
Investment costs 10.81 10.81
Increased maintenance costs 40.44
Loss of habitat and gene pool protection service 47.18
[25.38; 84.71]
Loss of freshwater provisioning service 44.90
[25.89; 62.15]
Sum of costs 10.81 143.34
[102.53; 198.10]
Benefitcost ratio
With maintenance cost as negative benefits 26.12 1.99
[1.07; 4.28]
With maintenance cost as cost 6.38 1.71
[1.05; 2.99]
Lower and upper bounds are reported in square brackets.
aValues are reproduced by the authors based on annual figures from PLANCO (2002). There remains
a difference of less than 2% compared to the CBA by PLANCO.
8.3.4 Sensitivity analysis
Finally, we study the robustness of our results by means of a Monte-Carlo simulation. In
addition to the uncertainty ranges reported so far, this allows us to investigate the likelihood
of different benefit-cost ratios.
The value for the ecosystem service of habitat and gene pool protection seems particularly
uncertain, as a simple benefit transfer is required to estimate it. Therefore, we first conduct
a partial sensitivity analysis in which we specify probability distributions for the two main
sources of uncertainty: the area affected and the willingness to pay. We assume a normal
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distribution for both parameters, which we truncate at zero, as negative values seem very
unlikely. Mean values are set to equal our best guess estimates. For the uncertainty in the
area of ecosystem service loss, we assume a probability density function so that the upper
bound of the 95% confidence interval equals the overall area exposed to dredging activities
(our upper bound estimate). Furthermore, we calculate standard deviation in the WTP to be
equal to the coefficient of variation of 0.9 in the primary study (Meyerhoff 2002). Holding all
other parameters constant and conducting 10,000 Monte-Carlo runs produces a net present
value for the ecosystem service of habitat and gene pool protection with a mean (± standard
deviation) of 57.80 (± 43.31), which translates into a benefit-cost ratio for the ecologically
extended CBA of 1.71 (± 0.42). Thus, the estimated benefit-cost ratio appears to be rather
robust in relation to the relatively high uncertainty associated with this ecosystem service.
Next, we consider the joint effect of uncertainty in all cost and benefit positions. For the
annual loss in freshwater provisioning as an ecosystem service, we assume again a truncated
normal distribution, where we calibrate the standard deviation so that the lower bound of the
95% confidence interval reflects the minimum budgeted expenditure. Regarding uncertainty
in the abatement cost price, we assume a triangular distribution to account for right-skewed
nature, with mode, minimum and maximum being equal to the estimated best guess, lower
and upper bounds, respectively. For the remaining benefit and cost estimates from the
original study, we assume truncated normal distributions with means equal to the best guess
values in Table 8.1, and set the standard deviation ad hoc to 25% of the mean, as no further
information is reported.
The resulting right-skewed distribution of the benefit-cost ratio is displayed in Figure 8.2.
Under the assumed uncertainties, the benefit-cost ratio is distributed with a mean of 1.78
and a standard deviation of 0.58. Hence, the results of the ecologically extended CBA appear
to be robust to the specified uncertainties and we can be confident that even a few additions
to the official CBA lead to a substantial drop in the benefit-cost ratio of the projected river
deepening.
8.4 Discussion
The key finding of our analysis is that integrating the impacts of infrastructure projects
on ecosystem services in monetary terms into their CBA is likely to substantially alter the
results. In this section, we discuss key assumptions taken in our case study for the projected
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Figure 8.2: Results of the MonteCarlo simulation of ecologically extended CBA (N = 10, 000), with mean at
dashed line.
Lower Weser deepening, and several critical issues for a more general integration of ecosystem
services into CBAs in infrastructure planning procedures.
First, our method of monetising the changes in ecosystem services is based on proxies
which require certain assumptions. For example, in order to assess the loss of habitat and
gene pool protection, we assume that the habitat services of both floodplains and river
beds of these two Northern German rivers are sufficiently similar to safely transfer the
benefits. For the loss in freshwater ecosystems, we assume that the cost-based method used
is adequate to give an approximation of welfare changes. For climate regulation services, we
assume a certain development scenario. For the illustrative purposes of this study, such an
approximation seems appropriate. However, a more precise approach would be to value all
the different ecosystem services changes and welfare effects of a project such as the Weser
deepening separately and based on preferences. Such an approach to integrate ecosystem
services would depend on the availability not only of bio-physical data, which can be gathered
to some extent from an environmental impact assessment, but also on societal preferences,
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which are often not readily available.136
Second, the widely discussed limitations of CBA also apply to an ecologically extended
CBA (Hanley and Barbier 2009; Hansjürgens 2004; Pearce, Atkinson, and Mourato 2006;
Sen 2000). Distributive effects are not explicitly considered in the welfare analysis according
to the BVWP. In general, who benefits and who bears the costs are often not explicitly
stated, but could be (cf. Hanley and Black 2006). This applies especially when ecosystem
services are considered, as these are often public goods and are enjoyed by many. In a
further step, inequalities could be accounted for in CBA, for instance through distributive
weights (HM Treasury 2013). Case studies have also suggested that, in addition to economic
valuation, public participation schemes may improve planning processes for rivers (Newson
and Chalk 2007) and estuaries (Fidélis and Carvalho 2015). By integrating ecosystem service
values into CBA, these wider societal issues of justice and participation in planning are not
addressed. However, methods such as deliberative monetary valuations might be able to
increase participation, at least in the assesssment of values (cf. Spash 2007).
Third, within BVWP 2003, uncertainty is systematically considered neither in the CBA
nor in the environmental risk assessments (Petry and Klauer 2005). Long time horizons
inevitably entail uncertainty regarding the estimated cost and benefit streams. For instance,
marginal abatement costs depend on technical innovation as well as on national and global
stabilisation targets and mitigation pathways. Considering uncertainty ex ante requires the
specification of probability distributions (cf. Arrow and Lind 2014). Often, such probability
is not known for future events beyond an extrapolation of empirical patterns  for example,
the chances of cost overruns (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, and Buhl 2003). A pragmatic
approach to improve CBAs further by integrating uncertainty in the mild form of risk might
be to employ probability distributions based on expert interviews (cf. Petry and Klauer
2005), potentially with risk aversion factors gleaned from discursive processes, as has been
done in Switzerland (Umweltbundesamt 2012b).
8.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the integration of ecosystem services within a cost-benefits
analysis for infrastructure planning, using the example of a German infrastructure planning
136However, recent studies have gathered more information on the value of ecosystem services on the basis
of various water ecosystems (Russi et al. 2013), while Liekens, Broekx, and De Nocker (2013), in a regionally
more specific study, identified values for individual ecosystem services in estuaries around the North Sea
region.
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process, the projected Lower Weser deepening.
We find that the Federal Transportation Infrastructure Plan ranks projects based on
economic feasibility, which is measured by a benefit-cost ratio and is subject to public budget
constraints. Effects on ecosystem services are not considered in monetary terms, apart from
a lump-sum portion of the investment costs which are used for compensation measures. To
ignore ecosystems changes is to ignore the effects of ecosystem services on human well-being
(cf. MEA 2005); this effectively contradicts the goal of methods used to assess infrastructure
planning in terms of welfare effects. In addition, we find that a classification of costs as
negative benefits systematically biases the benefit-cost ratio towards greater profitability.
We reassessed the CBA of the Weser channel deepening and illustrated the relevance
of these shortcomings in the German infrastructure legislation. We have shown that by
integrating the values of two major ecosystem service changes, namely, the loss of `fresh
water supply for agricultural production' in the Wesermarsch region and the loss of `habi-
tat and gene pool protection services' in the bio-diverse river estuary, the benefit-cost ratio
drops substantially. We have thus provided case study evidence that ecosystem services are
highly significant and that integrating ecosystem services into the infrastructure planning
process can substantially alter its outcome. This demonstrates that if projects are ranked
mainly on the basis of monetary criteria, then ecosystem service changes should be included
in monetary terms in order to avoid an inefficient allocation of public spending  which
is generally relevant beyond the German context. For Germany in particular, our results
call for a substantial improvement in the methodology used to make infrastructure invest-
ment decisions, particularly with regard to the encountered accounting bias and to including
ecosystem services as standard.
Much of the bio-physical information required is already available in the mandatory
environmental impact assessments137 and, in the case of Germany, in the related landscape
conservation plan. In addition, the assumption that a loss in ecosystem services can be
completely substituted through compensation measures is not only a question of natural
science but also of human preferences for certain ecosystem services. Welfare-related changes
in ecosystem services can, in principle, be valued in monetary terms using existing tools
such as preference-based methods and, in some cases, cost-based methods (cf. Brouwer et
137See e.g. the EU directive on environmental impact assessment. Furthermore, there are attempts to
integrate ecosystem services into strategic environmental assessments (Honrado et al. 2013; Karjalainen et
al. 2013; Kumar, Esen, and Yashiro 2013; Partidario and Gomes 2013; Presnall, López-Hoffman, and Miller
2015) which might result in easier integration into CBAs.
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al. 2009). However, elaborating standardised methods for integrating ecosystem services
systematically into infrastructure planning processes remains a key task for future research.
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